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# THE LEFT UNRAVELED



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SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW LEFT  
CHALLENGE IN BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY

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## Abbreviations

AGM	Annual General Meeting
APO	Ausserparlamentarische Opposition (Extra-Parliamentary Opposition)
ASTMS	Association of Scientific, Technical, and Management Staff
AUEW	Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers
CAC	Conference Arrangements Committee
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CLP	Constituency Labour Party
CLPD	Campaign for Labour Party Democracy
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
DGB	Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Trade Union Federation)
EC	European Community
EETPU	Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications, and Plumbing Union
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
GMC	General Management Committee
GMWU	General Municipal Workers' Union
IGBE	Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau und Energie (Mineworkers' Union)
IGBSE	Industriegewerkschaft Bau, Steine, und Erden (Construction Workers' Union)
IGCPK	Industriegewerkschaft Chemie, Papier, und Keramik (Chemical Workers' Union)

IGDuP	Industriegewerkschaft Druck und Papier (Printers' Union)
IGM	Industriegewerkschaft Metall (Metal Workers' Union)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NEB	National Enterprise Board
NEC	National Executive Committee
NEDC	National Economic Development Council
NPD	Nationale Partei Deutschlands
NSCDG	North Southwark Community Development Group
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers
NUPE	National Union of Public Employees
PLP	Parliamentary Labour Party
SDA	Social Democratic Alliance
SDP	British Social Democratic Party
SDS	Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenverband (Socialist German Students Association)
SLD	Social Liberal Democrats
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (West German Social Democratic Party)
SSRC	Social Science Research Council
TGWU	Transport and General Workers' Union
TUC	Trade Union Congress
UCW	Union of Communication Workers

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## Preface and Acknowledgments

The art of politics resembles a tightrope act. Politicians must perform a balancing act between satisfying the organizational goals of their parties, which is usually to win elections, and the aims of groups and interests they claim to represent. This is a difficult act to perform! The difference between the tightrope artist and the politician is that the circus artist can count on the support of his troupe at each end of the rope. The politician, however, may find himself in the middle of the act, only to experience interference on each side of the wire. In order to satisfy the electorate, interest groups, and their organizations, politicians sometimes feel the need to use unethical methods of persuasion and survival.

Failures to perform the tightrope act are spectacular. Not only is the spectator impressed with the controlled fall of the performer, but also the attempts to get up as quickly as possible, take a bow to the sounds of fanfare blasts, pretend nothing has happened, and return to the lofty heights from whence he or she just came. Only very rarely does a politician bow out after a fall. Even if the politician threatens the media that “they will not have (so and so) to kick around anymore,” one cannot be sure that this declaration is in fact the end of a career.

As an adolescent, the hypocrisies of politicians angered me greatly. In graduate school, adolescent anger gave way to a certain kind of admiration for the difficult art of politics. Still committed to “truthful politics,” my interests in the West German Green Party and its tremendous difficulties in maintaining such a principle led me to investigate political organizations, in order to explain why politicians act the way they do.

Even my political idol, Willy Brandt, had been involved in the dirty factional wars in Berlin during the 1950s and at the national level when social democrats decimated the new left in the 1970s. This book, then, is about power in organizations and how institutional power is used by those who possess it for their own purposes.

My interest in studying the internal mechanisms of party politics was supplemented by a desire to examine whether the pessimistic predictions concerning the fate of West European social democracy were correct. The failures of socialism in Eastern Europe and the difficulties of social democrats in the West suggested to many that social democracy is at an end, both as a political philosophy and strategy. The political right, led by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, seemed to have carried the day! Although it soon became obvious to me that social democracy did not have all the answers, I still maintain that it has many of them. Social democracy as a political philosophy is still preferable to the social and economic irresponsibilities of neoconservatism.

This book is about two parties in crisis. They have lost voters; they have lost party activists and politicians to new challenging parties; and they have lost, at least temporarily, the confidence of the electorate. But the book opens and closes on an optimistic note for both the British Labour Party and the West German Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD). Surely they face difficult choices. Their intra-party politics may not be ethically sound and these parties have warts, no doubt. But they can and, with some effort, will recover from their losses. The book is written in the hope that it might contribute in a small way to that process of rebuilding.

I have to thank many people who helped me with this project. First, my Ph.D. committee at the University of California, San Diego, which supervised the thesis upon which this book is based. I could not have hoped for a more impressive group of academics and friends as advisers. Arend Lijphart gave me tremendous amounts of his valuable and scarce time. Peter Gourevitch gave me the most incisive comments and criticisms that a Ph.D. candidate can hope for. Gary Jacobson pushed me along the road to a completed thesis by grilling me on the significance and substance of my efforts ("Oh, yeah?" and "So what?"). Ellen Commisso, Peter Cowhey, Steve Erie, and Sam Kernell helped me sharpen my thoughts and ideas.

To go to graduate school in paradise is tough. One is constantly reminded of how beautiful the outside world really is and yet one is unable to participate in all it has to offer. Sitting in a library while others were out



there windsurfing was, for me, the worst punishment. Luckily I had friends. Chris Rocco, Suzanne Reading, David Wilsford (and his liquor cabinet), David Bartlett, Mike Coste, Hendrick Spruyt, Eduardo Silva, Henk Scribner, Khan Pham, Rene Nunez, and, last but by no means least, Carol Hager made life in graduate school a little less hellish. Carol helped me develop many of the ideas which are the basis for the argument presented here. Chris, as the extraordinary political theorist he is, made me think about the larger issues which are still woefully underdeveloped in this book. Eduardo proofread a number of chapters and actually agreed with some of the contents!

While emerging from graduate school with a half finished thesis I met members of the "German mafia." Andrei Markovits and Chris Allen especially took me under their wings and introduced me to others in the field as well as giving me advice and guidance. Herbert Kitschelt, Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, Gerard Braunthal, and eventually Wolfgang Merkel all contributed to the manuscript in one way or another. Gary Herzigel, Richard Locke, Victoria Hattam, David Cameron, and Kathy Thelen made me reflect more critically on some of my arguments at various conferences.

In West Germany and Britain, Ted Bowman, Peter Tatchell, George Nicholson, John O'Grady in Bermondsey, Sue Goss, Steven Bird at Walworth Road, Victor Schonfield, Vladimir and Vera Derer of the CLPD, Peter Munkelt and Karlheinz Schonauer in the SPD "Baracke," Robert Schumann at the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in Munich, August Haussleiter and Siegfried Helm of the Munich Greens, Günter Giersch, Manfred Jena of the Munich SPD, and Johano Strasser in Berlin, were fabulous in giving me interviews and much of the information contained in the following pages. My friends Chris Preston, Chris Rudd, and Martin Slater at Essex University helped me survive Thatcherite Britain. Doug Webber and Ingrid Siepmann not only put me up in Bonn, but provided many insights into the party they both love. To Doug a special thanks, not only for being such a wonderful archivist and political scientist, but for teaching me many things about my own country. Doug's struggle and success in an alien culture and language under difficult conditions inspire me.

I want to express my special thanks to the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) which was gracious enough to provide me with a doctoral research grant. Without this assistance in the academic year 1985–86, this project would not have been completed. At the risk of alienating U.S. citizens, I find it most disturbing that the SSRC apparently was (and

probably still is) the only U.S. grant-awarding body open to applications from noncitizen and nonresident graduate students. The cause of research is not being helped by the exclusion of foreigners from research funds.

After graduating from and teaching at San Diego, I moved to the mud and ice of Oberlin College, Ohio, where I wrote most of this book and experimented on a fabulous group of students. A very warm, special thanks to the students in the seminar on Political Economy and the Working Class. I was humbled by their enthusiasm, their knowledge, and abilities. They took apart my arguments and put them back together again. Thanks! Gloria Watkins, Mary Childress, Carol and Bob Tufts, Paul Dawson, Harlan Wilson, Carolyn Watkins, Anna, Cheryl, and Che provided for a wonderful "Oberlin experience." The most important thank you has to go to my friends Ben Schiff and June Goodwin. June took my thoughts on South Africa seriously. Ben not only read this manuscript a number of times but improved it considerably. The same goes for the anonymous reviewers and editors at Duke University Press to whom I owe a great debt.

I was sad to leave behind my friends at Oberlin, but overjoyed by the beauty and climate of my new academic home, the University of Miami. My colleagues have provided a pleasant atmosphere to work in. Irmgard Cruz, Esperanza Silvestre, and especially Barbara Parker did a marvelous job typing up the final manuscript. My most heartfelt thanks has to go to my best friend and wife, Ines, who suffered through the ups and downs of a junior academic in the job hunting and writing process. The book is dedicated to her and the love she has brought to my life.



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# 1 The Crisis of Social Democracy:

## Socioeconomic Change and Its Impact on Party Performance

By the end of the 1970s, most observers agreed that socialist and social democratic parties in Western Europe faced a crisis.<sup>1</sup> A multitude of problems added up to, at worst, organizational disintegration and a decline in their share of votes. At the very least, serious internal disputes erupted over policy and electoral strategy. Particularly social democrats in government faced hard times. The oil shock of 1973/74, economic stagnation, and inflation undermined their ability to extend social welfare programs and increase government spending. Instead, social democrats curtailed government expenditures, thereby breaking electoral promises to a variety of constituencies which had come to expect increased benefits. Even die-hard social democratic academics looked to the future with trepidation.<sup>2</sup>

A broad consensus among observers developed. Marxists, liberals, and conservatives agreed that social democracy was at an impasse.<sup>3</sup> All of these schools of thought concurred that social democracy had run up against fiscal limits. Marxists claimed that social democracy depended on the success of capitalism for its very survival. They suggested that capitalism no longer needed social democracy as it had done in the early postwar period to incorporate the working class.<sup>4</sup> Working-class organizations had been sufficiently weakened by unemployment and economic slowdown. In economic hard times the capitalists were striking back, reducing working-class benefits and ruining the “social democratic compromise” with capitalism. In contrast, conservatives and liberals argued that social democrats had promised increased government spending to too many social groups in order to build a winning electoral coalition. Paying off

various electoral constituencies had to end in financial disaster; increased social spending inevitably culminated in fiscal crisis and economic inefficiency; and stagnation and inflation were a direct result of excessive government spending. In this interpretation, social democracy was ruining capitalism.<sup>5</sup>

It should not come as a surprise that the lessons each group of analysts drew from social democracy's misfortunes diverged widely. Marxists complained about an alleged social democratic return to market-oriented strategies to solve economic stagnation. This was deplorable, suggested Christine Buci-Gluckman and Goran Therborn, since it meant that social democracy had abandoned all hope of a socialist transformation.<sup>6</sup> Conservatives and liberals did not find a return to free-market principles deplorable but charged that it had not happened quickly enough. If only social democrats had adopted free-market mechanisms earlier, the problems of the 1970s and 1980s could have been avoided.<sup>7</sup>

Other observers predicted the decline of social democracy as a result of industrial change, de-industrialization, and concomitant social change. Adam Przeworski and John Sprague argued that the decline of the traditional blue-collar work force due to de-industrialization made it increasingly difficult for working-class-based parties to obtain an electoral majority.<sup>8</sup> This decline places socialists in an electoral dilemma—the class is not large enough to provide an electoral majority by itself. To concentrate purely on mobilizing the class vote is therefore a fruitless strategy if socialists want to win elections. However, extending their electoral appeal to nonworking-class social groups leads to a decline in working-class support. A cross-class strategy involves an electoral trade-off most socialists find difficult to accept. It means significant working-class defections. The more a socialist party develops policies for nonworking-class voters, the less attractive it becomes to its original supporters. Electoral losses among its traditional base also make obtaining an electoral majority difficult. Przeworski and Sprague, therefore, suggested that electoral socialism may be at an end.<sup>9</sup>

A related argument focusing on the social and electoral bases of social democracy suggested that changing value systems have undermined the consensus on desirable policy ends. The work by Ronald Inglehart or Russell Dalton implied that materialist interests had dominated working-class-based parties.<sup>10</sup> Materialists worried about tangible goods such as increased wages and benefits. “Bread-and-butter” trade union interests are currently being challenged by “postmaterialists,” which are mostly

people from a nonworking-class background.<sup>11</sup> Many voters and party activists no longer care primarily about increasing benefits to the working class but worry about issues such as the environment, democratization, nuclear war, and racial or sexual equality. Such voters prefer democratization over huge bureaucracies. They want decentralization of political decisionmaking rather than a large welfare state. Paul Whiteley, in his study of the British Labour Party's membership and activist base, found that many of the party's activists were indeed of middle-class origins. Moreover, his findings suggested that nonmaterialist ideals motivated middle-class activists.<sup>12</sup> The conflicting priorities of these value systems are referred to as the clash between "old" and "new" politics.

All of these arguments illuminate problems faced by social democratic parties. The described processes adversely affected some of these parties. Yet, it proved premature to write off social democracy on the basis of these observations. In the 1980s a number of parties recovered from electoral losses and even increased their support. The Swedish social democrats made an impressive comeback in 1982. In France, Spain, and Greece the socialists have become the largest parties in their respective party systems. Newer studies of aggregate data on the performance of West European parties suggest that there is no electoral decline of social democracy.<sup>13</sup> Even in those cases experiencing marked decline, such as the British Labour Party and the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD), it is doubtful whether this erosion of support is irreversible. This study examines the two cases that have suffered from electoral and organizational erosion—an erosion that was a result of the emergence of new political parties. In both cases the electoral challenge from the new parties arose from intraparty struggles over policy in the established working-class-based parties.

The reasons for the electoral losses of Labour and SPD, this study suggests, are not solely due to factors beyond the party. Electoral and policy strategy influence how attractive a party is to the electorate.<sup>14</sup> Changes in the international economy, domestic economic adjustments, and social change as a result of de-industrialization are environmental factors which undoubtedly affect the performance of political parties. But parties are capable of adjusting to changes in the socioeconomic environment.<sup>15</sup> Policy and strategic adjustments are matters of intraparty decisionmaking. The electoral and organizational problems of the two examined cases were as much a result of internal strategic decisions as they were caused by external pressures. A serious shortcoming of the above predic-

tions about social democracy's demise is the focus on factors other than the parties themselves. Parties are viewed as completely dependent actors, when in fact they do have some choices about how to respond to social changes in the electorate, how to respond to economic difficulties, and how to react to new social demands. The crucial questions are: how well did the parties adjust? What were the conditions for successful adjustment? Under what conditions were attempts to adjust unsuccessful?

### The Electoral and Organizational Erosion of the British Labour Party and the West German Social Democrats

The two most important examples of social democratic decline at the end of the 1970s were the British Labour Party and the West German SPD. Labour, being in power from 1974 to 1979, encountered severe economic difficulties. A drawn-out debate over how the Labour government ought to respond to Britain's economic crisis deeply split the party. Especially after its devastating electoral defeat in 1979, Labour underwent a process of policy reversals, elite renewal, and organizational rules changes. Economic policy, continued membership in the European Community, nuclear disarmament, local housing policy, and rules governing relations between party activists and representatives were central to Labour's internal strife.

The outcome of this internal confrontation was a temporary victory for the leftist forces on questions of policy and organizational reform. As a result of the leftist victory, social democratic party leaders, activists, and members defected to form the British Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981.<sup>16</sup> The social democrats feared that they had irrevocably lost control over the party. The SDP took those policy positions which had been defeated in Labour, and the emergence of the SDP cost Labour a significant slice of its electorate. While Labour's share of the vote has steadily declined since 1951, its rate of losses to other parties has become spectacular only since 1979 (see table 1). In 1983 and 1987 the loss of votes to the Liberal/Social Democratic Alliance ensured that Labour experienced its worst electoral performances since 1918.<sup>17</sup>

The SPD's electoral and organizational erosion is somewhat less devastating than Labour's. As table 1 demonstrates, the SPD's share of the vote declined steadily since 1972. Claus Offe wrote the following about the SPD in 1981:



For years now . . . on all politically contentious issues (peace, building policies, environmental protection, nuclear energy, steel crisis, unemployment) there are social democrats on both sides of the frontlines, and in the long run not even the strongest organization can take this strain.<sup>18</sup>

Offe was correct. As a result of these internal struggles, the SPD also experienced electoral and organizational erosion. Much of its electoral decline since 1981 can be credited to the Green Party. The Greens, founded in 1981, captured many former or potential SPD voters, particularly due to the Greens taking a number of policy positions which had been defeated or simply ignored in the SPD's internal policy struggles.<sup>19</sup> The Greens advocated increasing environmental protection, reducing nuclear weapons on West German soil, phasing out nuclear power, and involving citizens in the policymaking process on issues such as street-planning, housing, and urban renewal. Moreover, many former SPD activists formed the nucleus of the Green Party. The Green Party offered them the opportunity to publicize their policy positions unencumbered by the opposition of leading SPD politicians and trade unionists.

The two cases provide evidence for a number of the arguments cited above explaining the demise of social democracy. Both Labour and SPD had difficulties convincing their respective constituencies that economic slowdown necessitated curtailing social expenditures. As the following chapters suggest, economic difficulties certainly affected their ability to hold together their electoral constituencies. Further, both parties sought to encompass two quite distinct groups: a mainly blue-collar union base mostly concerned with the extension of social services and a reform-minded, mainly white-collar and student cohort demanding social and political reform in the state bureaucracy, the universities, and the workplace. On some issues, such as industrial democracy, these groups may agree. On other issues, such as environmental protection, they share few common goals. Tensions between them finally boiled over into internal warfare after economic slowdown necessitated the abandoning of reform and social spending programs. Eventually these rifts split both parties. Splitting the SPD's and Labour's vote between the old and new parties is an important ingredient in the conservatives' electoral victories of 1983 and 1987 in both countries. However, the emergence of these new challenging parties was a result of developments in the established parties and not merely a reaction to economic crisis, social change, or de-industrialization.

Table 1: Electoral Performance of the Labour Party and the SPD since World War II (in percentages)

Electoral Results in West Germany and Britain (in percentages)						
Britain	1945	1950	1951	1955	1959	1964
Con.	39.8	43.5	48.0	49.7	49.4	43.4
Lab.	48.3	46.1	48.8	46.4	43.8	44.1
Lib. SDP (1983 & 1987)	9.1	9.1	2.5	2.7	5.9	11.2
West Germany	1947	1953	1957	1961	1965	1969
CDU/CSU	31.0	45.2	50.2	45.3	47.6	46.1
SPD	29.2	28.8	31.8	36.2	39.3	42.7
FDP	11.9	9.5	7.7	12.8	9.5	5.8
Greens	—	—	—	—	—	—

Source: Mark Kesselman and Joel Krieger, eds., *European Politics in Transition*, Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1987, pp. 94–95, 282.

Electoral Performance of the Labour Party and the SPD since World War II (in percentages)




Table 1: cont.

Electoral Results in West Germany and Britain (in percentages)						
1966	1970	1974	1974	1979	1983	1987
41.9	46.4	37.8	35.8	43.9	42.4	42.2
47.9	43.0	37.1	39.2	37.0	27.6	32.0
8.5	7.5	19.3	18.3	13.8	25.4 <sup>a</sup>	23.0 <sup>a</sup>
1972	1976	1980	1983	1987		
44.9	48.6	44.5	48.8	44.3		
45.8	42.6	42.9	38.2	37.0		
8.4	7.9	10.6	6.9	9.1		
—	—	—	5.6	8.3		

<sup>a</sup>Liberal/SPD coalition.

### The Research Question

In both the SPD and Labour cases, efforts to adjust to socioeconomic changes caused confrontations over policy and organizational power. These are two examples of a failure to adjust successfully, although the severity of the failure in terms of organizational and electoral erosion differs. The above arguments about economic slowdown, changing value systems, divergent interests, and social changes within the electorate, are all reasonable explanations for social democracy's problems. Yet they fail to explain an important divergence in the Labour and SPD cases: the defection of the left in the SPD case and the defection of the right in the Labour case.

Although both parties experienced a challenge to the dominant social democratic leadership group and its policy preferences, the outcomes of the struggle over policy and personnel appointments had very different results. In the Labour case, the hitherto dominant social democrats lost the struggle and defected from the party. In the SPD, the dominant social democrats remained in power. As a result, the SPD experienced a challenge from an activist movement ostensibly to its left. Labour, on the other hand, suffered from a challenge from a party of notable politicians to its right. The question this presents is: why did the left exit in the SPD's case and the right in the Labour case? Why was the dominant social democratic group able to hold onto power in one case and not the other?

To explain such a divergence—the emergence of radically different challenger parties which developed out of a protest against the policy direction of the established parties—an analysis of intraparty developments is necessary. None of the approaches treating political parties as black boxes can offer an adequate explanation for this divergence. The black box has to be opened, its inner mechanisms examined, to figure out why one group won and another defected from the organization. Further, only an examination of the internal process leading to erosion provides a solid foundation for any speculations about whether these two parties are capable of recovering their electoral losses.

### Intraparty Politics, Policy Coalitions, and Organizational Structure

In both parties trade union interests, traditional socialists, social democrats, and new leftists shaped the policy disputes of the 1970s. During the early postwar period, social democrats dominated policy. Labour and the SPD advocated the extension of the welfare state, better social policy, and increased worker benefits in return for the acceptance of the free-market economy and capitalist production.<sup>20</sup> The SPD's Godesberg Programm was the quintessential example of a social democratic policy strategy.<sup>21</sup> But the Labour Party also expressed its social democratic policy preferences consistently between 1947 and 1967.<sup>22</sup> The strategy was successful, particularly in the German case, attracting significant electoral support. By the mid-1960s social democracy was the undisputed ideology of both parties. It was supported by a majority of trade unionists and had replaced socialist theory and praxis.

In the late 1960s new left activists inside and outside of the parties challenged social democracy. The new left, in coalition with traditional socialists, attacked social democracy as an inadequate response to capitalism and demanded fundamental policy changes.<sup>23</sup> In both parties the new left sought democratization of the universities, the state, and the workplace; they demanded increased socialization of the means of production; they advocated an end to NATO and nuclear defense policies; and they also attempted to change intraparty organizational rules to increase party activists' control over the political careers and policy choices of local and national representatives.<sup>24</sup> The challenge extended to vigorous competition for offices in the party and representative positions.



The leftist challenge was defeated by the social democrats in the SPD, while in the Labour Party it was victorious. With the help of a large social democratic membership base, often organized by trade unionists, the social democratic party leaders were able to contain the new left in the local and regional party organizations. They divided and conquered their opponents. Some were integrated into leadership positions after having suitably modified their opinions, others were ignored, and a few recalcitrants expelled for their political opinions. Many activists found the party unresponsive to their demands and exited. In Labour the left dislodged social democrats, changing party policy and organizational rules. This succeeded because new leftists established a coalition with trade unionists and traditional socialists at the national policymaking level against the social democrats. The new left succeeded in splitting the usually dominant union-social democratic coalition. Trade union strategies proved decisive in both Labour and SPD's internal struggles. The unions and the new left came together in a temporary coalition to punish the social democrats in Labour for their inability to implement desired policy while in government. In the SPD the new left lacked enough union support to seriously challenge the dominant social democrats.

Why did the new left win in one case and lose in the other? The answer to this question lies in the process of coalition formation and the organizational power at the disposal of each group. Social democrats, trade unionists, traditional socialists, and new leftists had very different resources at their disposal. The institutional structure of each party provided each group of players with a set of opportunities and constraints, while their respective strategies in building coalitions with other policy groups were imposed on them by the institution. The SPD is a centralized party in which party leaders, in this case the social democrats, enjoy a number of powerful resources with which to discourage challengers, while the Labour Party does not afford its political representatives and leaders such powers.

The new left strategy in the Labour Party reflected the institutional distribution of power. However, the dominance of the union movement in the party's highest decisionmaking bodies is so overwhelming that the only path to victory for any group inside Labour is through building a majority coalition with trade unionists.<sup>25</sup> The new left concentrated on issues that would win union support in their challenge to the social democrats. They did not have to worry about taking over the entire local party structure as their counterparts in the SPD had to do. They found the

perfect issue on which to build a coalition with the majority of trade unions in the debate on the accountability of Labour's parliamentary representatives. Many unionists found it objectionable that a small group of M.P.s could defy Labour policies by simply ignoring them when in government.<sup>26</sup> The social democrats, who had traditionally enjoyed the support of the majority of unions, lost this support when they proved unable to implement promised pro-union policies. Once they lost union support, they lost control over party policy, appointments, and organizational reforms.

The SPD's new left also followed a strategy imposed by the institutional structure. In a hierarchical party where power is delegated from one party level to another, the new left attempted to take over the party from the local level upward.<sup>27</sup> To do so it had to mobilize supporters at the local level. The new left proved to be surprisingly good at mobilization, at least in the university cities where a ready pool of recruits was available. But the new left was not able to swamp the entire party from the local level upward. The social democratic leadership was able to counterattack, to stop their challengers and then, through a strategy of "divide and rule," able to maintain power. Countermobilization often depended on the support of union leaders and members who, in many cases, helped to outvote the new left.

Why did the unions in one case choose to support the new left and in the other rejected its policy aims? Why did union policy demands matter? The unions' strategy depended on the policy outcomes of the working-class-based parties' performance in government. In the Labour case, economic conditions were such that a pro-union policy stance was difficult to maintain. The Labour government and the unions found themselves at odds over the issues of incomes policy, high unemployment, and social welfare expenditures.<sup>28</sup> The organizational linkage between unions and party was such that the unions could use their intraparty power to remove opponents from party positions and fundamentally change policy. After Labour's electoral defeat in 1979, a majority of unions did just that by adopting policies and organizational reforms opposed by the traditional social democrats.

In the West German case, economic conditions did not seriously undermine the position of the work force or the unions. Although there were differences over policy, the Schmidt government did not leave office because of a wave of strikes against government policy as in Labour's case.<sup>29</sup> Further, the linkage between party and unions was very different from the

Labour case. The German unions did not have control over the highest policymaking arena in the SPD as the British unions have in Labour. Unions depended on the SPD for pro-union policy as much as their British counterparts. However, they did not have the possibility of directly interfering with SPD policymaking.<sup>30</sup> For union leaders it was a safer strategy to support party leaders against their internal opposition, especially when this opposition advocated a number of policies that the unions opposed. Different economic circumstances and a very different organizational linkage between party and unions explain the divergent outcomes in union strategies.

### Institutional Structures: Independent or Intervening Variable?

An obvious objection to the argument presented in the following pages is that economic conditions shape the strategies of the working-class-based parties and unions. The argument suggests that the British working-class movement faced a far more serious crisis than the West German and therefore reacted in a more radical manner. As economic conditions deteriorated, so did the tolerance of the affected working class for the social democratic compromise. West German unions would not react differently if they were faced with similar economic deterioration. They would also support a radical leftist movement if they faced austerity programs and industrial decline. They would also punish social democratic party leaders for not delivering pro-union policy. In such an interpretation, institutional factors play little more than an intervening role.<sup>31</sup>

Such a counterfactual argument is persuasive and difficult to refute. But, as the study shows, German unionists and party activists are far less likely to take decisive action against the SPD leadership because of institutional factors that limit their influence. First, union members, if they are also members of the SPD, are individual members and not representatives of their union as their British counterparts are. They respond to a different set of incentives than British trade union leaders who hope to shape party policy to foster their organization's interests. Second, West German unionists do not control SPD policymaking as British unionists do. Even if West German trade unionists wanted to control policymaking, they could only do so as part of a larger intraparty coalition. Third, union leaders and activists are skeptical of coalitions with the "greenish" elements of the

new left. No matter how badly the economy does, trade unionists are more likely to support the social democrats than a coalition of environmental and other social protest groups. Finally, as a result of the organizational distance between SPD and the unions, union leaders are more likely to rely on the strength of their organization, vis-à-vis capital, to achieve their goals than to use their power of persuasion in the SPD. In economic crisis, West German unions are more likely to distance themselves from the SPD, unlike their British counterparts who attempt to control policy.<sup>32</sup>

The theoretical statement the following study makes is that institutional structures shape the rationalities of actors inside a political party in a profound way. The goal of the research is not to conflate the experiences of two rather different parties, but to show how institutional structures shape political outcomes by setting limits and creating opportunities for the participants of the intraparty competition over positions and policy. Institutional structures favor some intraparty groups over others. The intraparty players are very much aware of these factors and their decisions are to a large extent shaped by their perception of how institutional rules and structures help or hinder them in their pursuit of policy and organizational power.

The argument that institutional structures matter echoes the claims made by Jon Elster, Peter Gourevitch, and Peter Hall.<sup>33</sup> These authors have all suggested that personal rationality is bounded by institutional frameworks. It is curious how easily the rational choice school of thought, which derives much of its inspiration from incentive and organizational theory, has ignored or forgotten this central theme in organization theory. Elster argues that rational choices ought to be analyzed in the context of structural limits and opportunities.<sup>34</sup> I hope to follow this advice. This study shows how party politicians, trade unionists, and party activists defined their respective sets of goals and how they devised strategies—given the opportunities and limits set by the organization—to achieve their aims.

### Theoretical Propositions and the Structure of the Argument

Three crucial intraparty differences between the Labour and SPD cases help to explain why in the SPD the social democrats won the intraparty struggle over policy, organizational power, party rules, and appointments,



and why they lost in the Labour Party. This divergence in outcomes can be explained by the different relationship between party and unions in the two cases; the means of leadership control over party factions; and the bases of membership activism and recruitment. These three factors translate into theoretical propositions. First, political parties are complex organizations in which the distribution of organizational power and the interaction between a variety of groups, factions, or ideological tendencies determine electoral and policy strategy. Second, electoral performance and the outcomes of government policy shape the formation of coalitions between policy groups. Third, the bases of membership enrollment and activism matter in the policymaking and coalition building process. The following chapters are organized around these propositions.

The organizational structure of political parties plays an important role in shaping the outcome of intraparty conflict. Chapter two provides the reader with a brief analysis of the literature on party and electoral behavior. The chapter develops some of the theories mentioned in this introduction and shows how both the structuralist and choice approaches to the study of voting and political parties have systematically ignored the important aspect of intraparty decisionmaking. Chapter three discusses the current academic debate on intraparty politics. It suggests that the accepted dichotomy of leaders and activists is inadequate for a detailed study of intraparty politics.<sup>35</sup> The chapter then develops a method for studying group interaction and the distribution of power through organizational structure. Chapter four focuses on how policy is made, and who controls policy and personnel appointments. It discusses the mechanics of policymaking and candidate selection procedures, and it illustrates just how radically different the distribution of power is when we compare SPD and Labour. The thesis developed is that institutional structures define the power of one set of actors—party leaders, activists, or members of interest groups—over another set.

Chapter five describes the policy choices of both parties during the 1970s and 1980s while in and out of government. It is designed to provide the reader with some basic information about the issues dividing policy groups. The chapter investigates the gap between policy promises and actual government performance, particularly in the Labour case. It focuses on how the political leadership responded to domestic and international pressures (external variables) and how these responses translated into intraparty confrontations. A dramatic policy and elite renewal process took place in the Labour Party after 1979. Less dramatic policy and

elite adjustments took place in the SPD following the 1983 and 1987 election losses. Both parties undertook a renewal of their policy positions and leadership groups in order to adjust to a changing electorate and social base once out of government.

Chapter six analyzes the formation of intraparty coalitions on these policy disputes. It investigates the motives guiding the unions', activists', and politicians' strategies, and explains how the various policy decisions discussed in chapter five actually came about. What factors shaped the new left intraparty strategies in their attempt to take over party policymaking? Why do the unions in the British case adopt a far more critical view of social democratic policies than their West German counterparts? What consequences does this have for the parties? How does it affect the policy groups within the party? This chapter also discusses current attempts to reestablish compromises between the winners and losers of the intraparty struggles of the 1970s in order to recapture Green or SDP voters. It is the chapter in which the puzzle—why the left defected in one case but not the other—is analyzed and solved.

The thesis developed in chapters two, three, and four is extended in chapter six: actors adjust their policy aims and strategies to suit the institutional structure of the party. Their aims are shaped by their analysis of how they can achieve their goals. For instance, the new left in Britain adopted policy proposals with an eye toward building a majority coalition with the trade unions.<sup>36</sup> The British new left voiced demands very similar to those of the more radical trade unions (often relying on traditional socialist themes) to attract their support on organizational rules changes and personnel appointment decisions. In contrast, the West German new left needed to mobilize enough activists to take over a majority of the SPD's local organizations in order to take over the next higher organizational level. Their policy choices aimed at mobilizing local activists around localist issues, particularly the citizen initiative movement.<sup>37</sup>

Chapter seven analyzes the conflicts between new left activists, social democratic party leaders, and their supporters, and trade unionists of two local parties to determine the impact of organizational structures on policy debates and elaborate on the causes of coalition formation. The local case studies are included to furnish empirical evidence for some of the broader generalizations made in the theoretical parts of this study. The local cases provide insights into how parties recruit new members, why members (particularly the new left activists) join, and what the internal decisionmaking process looks like. The basis of membership recruitment

and reasons for activism are crucial in understanding the responsiveness of parties to new demands and challenges. The important questions are: Who are the activists? What do they want? How do they act? How do policy groups interact with one another? What are the reasons for building coalitions and how are these negotiated? Why do they survive or collapse? How do the established local elites maintain their power? Under what circumstances do they lose it?

The fact that the SPD is a large membership party and that Labour is not, is a significant factor in the explanation of divergent intraparty dynamics. At the local level, small numbers of activists can take over a constituency Labour party since there are so few activists in the party. Such a takeover is a much more difficult undertaking, requiring much larger recruitment drives in the SPD. The SPD is a thriving membership party. Further, the tactics of both challengers and defenders of the status quo are noteworthy since they address the issue of intraparty "democracy."<sup>38</sup> What passed for "democratic practice" in both parties can only be described as manipulation of activist numbers, organizational rules, and procedures in order to take over or maintain power. Indeed, the very definition of what is "democratic" becomes part of the struggle.<sup>39</sup> Each group defines democratic interaction with its own set of interests in mind. Chapter seven examines the "blood and guts" of intraparty politics and is, therefore, arguably the most political chapter in the book.

The concluding chapter reevaluates the theoretical findings of the national and local studies in terms of building a theory of party organization and explaining the electoral and organizational problems of Labour and the SPD. The chapter then addresses questions of democratic theory raised in particular by the practices of local activists and political entrepreneurs bent on prolonging their careers. Further, the chapter raises the question of choice and structure. To what extent do parties have choices in adapting to socioeconomic change? To what extent are they confined in their choices by structural factors, either in the organization itself or in the wider setting of the international economy and domestic society? The question of choice versus structure is at the heart of this analysis. Finally, the chapter concludes with a few thoughts and speculations about the future of British and West German social democracy.

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## 2 Theories of Electoral and Party Behavior

Two schools of thought predominate the study of electoral and party behavior. The first school focuses on structural factors such as socioeconomic variables and social bases. Political parties represent social interests and a particular class, religious, or ethnic base. Changes in the economy or society affect party performance. The second school emphasizes the role of electoral and strategic choices open to political parties and the voters. Each vote is a rationally calculated choice, while party strategies are calculated risks in order to attract voters. Each approach makes a set of assumptions and predictions about voter and party behavior. While structuralists view parties as essentially dependent upon their electoral bases, choice theorists tend to argue that parties make choices which determine their electoral fortunes. Further, structuralists hold that voters cast their ballot on the basis of identification and social position rather than as a rationally calculated choice between policy packages.

Both structural and choice approaches develop explanations for the predicaments of the SPD and Labour. Both venture predictions as to the future of social democracy. Structuralists suggest that social democracy's problems are grounded in unfavorable socioeconomic shifts. De-industrialization, a decline of the working class, and increasing intraclass divisions all point to continued electoral decline for working-class-based parties. Choice theorists, on the other hand, portray social democracy's problems in less apocalyptic terms. They suggest that parties can develop policies to attract a new electoral majority, and that current social democratic problems are based on wrong political choices. However, electoral



fortunes are reversible with the right policy offering. The following paragraphs examine the explanations offered by various authors within these two broad schools of thought for social democratic electoral decline and their suggested solutions to electoral losses.

### The Structural Approach

David Butler and Donald Stokes' seminal study of the British electorate influenced much of the elections studies literature during the 1970s.<sup>1</sup> The authors suggested that voters use a kind of shorthand to make voting decisions, and that they identify with a political party representative of their supposed class interests. The concept of party identification went hand-in-hand, at least in Britain, with the concept of class-based voting. A voter, through a number of influences such as parents and the social environment, develops emotional ties to a party and habitually identifies with it. Voters then depend on the party leadership to provide them with evaluations of policy and judgment of the consequences of these policies. Voters' attitudes, therefore, are significantly shaped by the party. However, environmental factors also strongly influence the individual. Environmental changes, for instance in social position, may cause a change in voter allegiance.<sup>2</sup>

The party identification model of voting suggests that the root cause of electoral decline for working-class-based parties is class de-alignment. Class de-alignment is a process linked directly to changes in the socioeconomic structure. In the 1940s working-class-based parties had solid support in the manual working class. Blue-collar workers, particularly those in trade unions, developed an identification with Labour and the SPD, which still persists among the core blue-collar workforce. As long as working-class ghettos existed, party identification with Labour or the SPD remained consistently high. However, changes in the class structure have not only led to a numerical decline of blue-collar workers, but many manual workers are upwardly mobile and tend to develop new political views as their social environment changes. As social inequality lessens and social mobility increases the emotive attachment to working-class-based parties decreases.<sup>3</sup>

The problem of a shrinking blue-collar base for socialist parties is of course not new. Party strategists, including Eduard Bernstein, have suspected that the traditional working class would not become an electoral

majority.<sup>4</sup> Party strategy, if predicated to winning electoral majorities, would have to appeal to groups outside of the working class. Adam Przeworski and John Sprague suggest that what is new since the 1970s is that the shrinkage of the traditional base has reached such proportions that minimal appeals to nonworking-class groups no longer suffice to attract an electoral majority.<sup>5</sup> A dilemma has become obvious: either working-class-based parties retrench themselves in their traditional social base, which means no electoral majorities, or they extend themselves into other social groups at the expense of traditional policy goals and their former base. Either way, electoral majorities are going to be difficult to obtain.<sup>6</sup>

Another very sophisticated argument emphasizing the importance of socio-structural change is presented by Patrick Dunleavy and Christopher Husbands.<sup>7</sup> These two authors develop what they term a radical model of voting behavior. They suggest that the party identification model underestimates the importance of social changes within the class. Party identification analysts and authors such as Przeworski and Sprague argue that the traditional working class is shrinking. Dunleavy and Husbands disagree. They suggest that the working class is becoming more heterogeneous in its composition.<sup>8</sup> They maintain that sectoral location determines the vote. Voters are influenced by the media, the political parties, their work environment, the unions, and their consumption patterns. These influences shape voter perception of their interests. Interest has become defined not by an overall class position but by the social location of the voter.<sup>9</sup>

According to Dunleavy and Husbands, class de-alignment is caused by increasingly stark divisions within the working class between public and private sector workers, as well as between workers in noncompetitive, declining, and competitive, prosperous industries.<sup>10</sup> Public sector workers have an interest in expanding social services through higher taxation; workers in private, competitive industries have an interest in reducing taxation and view public service employees as low productivity workers with whom they share few interests. Further, consumption patterns by which the authors mean housing, education, car ownership, and health care, influence voting choices.<sup>11</sup> On these issues voters do consider their respective sets of interests carefully before casting their vote. Public sector workers may, for instance, prefer the extension of mass transport while private workers in competitive industries may favor individual car ownership and the extension of the freeway system.<sup>12</sup> Further, workers in

Table 2: Labour Party Share of the Vote within Classes, 1964–87  
(in percentages)

	Salariat	Routine Nonmanual	Self- Employed	Technicians	Manual
1964	20	31	13	45	70
1966	25	42	19	61	73
1970	29	42	19	58	60
Feb. 1974	23	35	18	39	59
Oct. 1974	24	37	13	46	63
1979	22	36	13	44	55
1983	14	25	12	26	49
1987	15	27	13	26	51

NB: 1987 are estimated.

Source: *Labour and Britain in the 1990s*, London: Labour Party Press, 1988, p. 6.

prosperous industries may support the selling of council homes and the privatization of state-run industries because they can afford to buy their own homes and invest in shares.<sup>13</sup> Since the Conservative Party offers a more attractive policy on housing and transport to the prosperous sections of the working class, it is not surprising that such workers support Thatcher's popular capitalism.

Empirical evidence appears to exist in abundance to back up both the class shrinkage and the class splintering arguments. It is widely known that both SPD and Labour enjoy far greater support from the blue-collar working class than they do from white-collar workers.<sup>14</sup> The more a worker's job is in jeopardy, the more likely that worker is to vote SPD or Labour.<sup>15</sup> Equally, the higher paid a worker, the more competitive the industry, the more likely that worker is to support either the Liberal or Conservative parties.<sup>16</sup> Table 2 illustrates the decline Labour has suffered in all social groups since 1964. Labour's major electoral losses are in the manual working class and the routine nonmanual groups in the South of England.<sup>17</sup> Dunleavy and Husbands suggest that the reason for this situation lies with the perception among the Southern workers that public sector employees and workers in declining industries are low productivity workers. The Southern English working-class voters do not view their fellow workers as an object of solidarity but as a cohort likely to impose greater tax burdens through high wages' demands and subsidies.

Table 3: SPD Share of the Vote within Classes, 1961–87 (in percentages)

	Workers		Civil Servants and Employees		Self- Employed
	Unskilled	Skilled	Up to Midlevel	Leading	
1961	56		30		14
1965	54		34		18
1969	58		46		17
1972	66		50		23
	Workers		Civil Service and Salaried Employees (based on salary & responsibility)		Self- Employed
	Unskilled	Skilled	Up to Midlevel	Leading	
1976	62	49	44	28	32
1980	55	57	42	37	28
1983	50	52	34	24	26
1987	55	52	33	28	13

Sources: For 1961–72, Franz U. Pappi, "Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur in der BRD," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 14, 1973. For 1976–87, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, "Die Konsolidierung der Wende," *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 18, no. 2, June 1987.

In Germany, SPD losses have also been concentrated in the upper-income groups it used to attract. Manual workers, trade union members in declining industries, and lower-income public employees tend to support the party in greater numbers than any other social group (see table 3). This social group has shrunk from 30 percent in 1976 to 25 percent in 1987.<sup>18</sup> There is then some support for the class shrinkage thesis. However, some interesting discrepancies appear when analysts investigated workers working with new technologies and those working with traditional technologies. Contrary to expectation, workers with new technologies tended to support the SPD in greater numbers than those in traditional sectors.<sup>19</sup> The SPD has a solid base of support among technically highly skilled workers as well as those in low skill positions. Such data suggests that upward social mobility does not provide a good explanation for a decline in the working-class vote. The SPD's problem appears to be one of keeping divergent constituencies together.

The most important losses for the SPD come in its student and white-collar sectors. Almost all of the SPD's electoral decline in 1983 and 1987



Table 4: SPD and Green Party Shares of the Vote in Major Cities  
(in percentages)

	SPD Share of Vote		Difference	Green Party Share of Vote
	1972	1987		1987
Munich	47.9	30.9	-17.0	13.4
Frankfurt	47.0	33.7	-13.3	13.3
Hamburg	54.5	41.2	-13.3	11.0
Stuttgart	44.7	31.8	-12.9	12.7
Bremen	58.1	46.5	-11.6	14.5
Cologne	52.9	43.0	- 9.9	11.2
Hannover	53.2	43.4	- 9.8	10.6
Essen	58.9	52.0	- 6.9	7.4
Dortmund	61.9	55.2	- 6.7	8.0
Duisburg	64.0	59.4	- 4.6	6.5
Federal Republic	45.8	37.0	- 8.8	8.3

Source: U. Feist and H. Krieger, "Alte und Neue Scheidelinien des politischen Verhaltens," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 21, March 1987, p. 35.

can be linked to the emergence of the Green Party. The Greens have taken a substantial chunk of voters from the SPD in the cities, particularly in university towns (see table 4). The Green Party attracts a very distinctive social group: highly educated, young (twenty-five to forty years old) voters with postmaterial values.<sup>20</sup> The Greens tend to be strong in student towns, but also among young, upwardly mobile professionals, educators, and civil servants. They represent a constituency which used to support the SPD until 1980.

In Britain, industrial decline, economic adjustments, and the social shifts these changes cause seem to explain shifting voting patterns. In West Germany, analysts have speculated on the emergence of a new social division between material and postmaterial interests to explain the shifts in electoral patterns.<sup>21</sup> The supporters of the Green Party have often been described as postmaterialists who no longer share the preoccupation with the economic issues of the traditional working class, such as betterment of wages and benefits. They worry about environmental issues, civil rights, and international relations.

Table 5: Party Identification of Life-Style Groups

	CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	Greens	No Id.
<i>Traditional Groups:</i>					
The elevated Conservative	46	15	1	1	37
The "open-minded, adjustable" average citizen	35	25	1	1	38
The conventional, duty-bound employee	22	38	3	1	35
The integrated, elderly person	45	21	—	—	35
The isolated, elderly person	41	25	1	—	33
<i>Between Traditional and Progressive Groups:</i>					
The unobtrusive, passive employee	23	24	2	1	50
<i>Development-oriented Groups:</i>					
The postmaterialist, left- alternative, younger person	1	6	—	39	54
The left-liberal, integrated postmaterialist	6	31	3	11	49
The career-minded younger person	17	22	2	1	58

Source: Peter Gluchowski, "Lebenstile und Wandel der Wählerschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, March 21, 1987, p. 29.

The focus on political values in West Germany has led influential analysts to rethink social categories. An interesting contribution to election studies is a typology developed by Peter Gluchowski (see table 5), which divides society into nine distinct value groups.<sup>22</sup> Each group exhibits a distinctive pattern of electoral allegiance. The SPD has since adopted this typology in a number of studies it commissioned to examine its electoral opportunities and problems.<sup>23</sup>

Gluchowski's empirical findings reveal a clear dilemma for the SPD. It has significant electoral support in the traditional working sector, amongst older people, and the "normalbürger" (the average citizen) category. On the other hand it has support in the upper-income, left-liberal, and progressive social groups. In other words, its electoral support runs across social cleavages and value orientations. It faces a much more homogeneous Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and a Green Party with

a deep social base among well-defined groups.<sup>24</sup> The party has widespread support but is not well anchored in any social group except the traditional working class. Gluchowski concludes that it will be very difficult for the party to reconcile these very different value orientations.<sup>25</sup>

Structuralists make a number of assumptions about the behavior of political parties: they tend to see parties as dependent upon the fortunes of their social base; parties represent social interest groups; and electoral support varies with changes in the size of the social base. Whether one agrees with the class shrinkage argument of Przeworski and Sprague or the class splintering argument of Dunleavy and Husbands or Gluchowski, social democrats face an uphill struggle in both scenarios. If parties are no more than merely representatives of social interests which are more difficult to reconcile than ever before, then indeed these parties face hard times. It is this aspect of the structural approach that theorists who believe in rational choice disagree with most fundamentally. Choice theorists argue that structuralists make untenable assumptions about both parties and voters.

### The Choice Approach

Choice theorists argue that the behavior of both parties and voters is explicable through the use of rational choice assumptions.<sup>26</sup> Voters do not vote according to patterns of party identification but because they believe that a party will benefit them or alternatively impose costs on them. Similarly, parties attempt to maximize votes to win elections and make rational calculations to achieve this goal.<sup>27</sup> In other words, it is possible for both parties and voters to make mistakes. They may elect a party which imposes unexpected costs, or parties may adopt strategies that do not attract voters.

Voters have preferences and parties can do little about these preferences.<sup>28</sup> Voters compare and choose between parties according to their preferences. In direct contrast to structuralists, choice theorists argue that social change has not occasioned class de-alignments. In fact, there is no such thing as a class de-alignment but only partisan de-alignments. Ivor Crewe put it this way: "Glacially slow changes in the British social structure have undoubtedly taken place. . . . But in all of these cases, shifts in party support have been small, often quite temporary, and always local-

ized; no shift in the social structure has produced an enduring, nationwide realignment of party support since 1945.”<sup>29</sup> What has occurred is that voters have changed their minds over time on a variety of issues, and leftist parties have had problems identifying these shifts in popular opinion.

If voter preferences are difficult for parties to affect, then the parties have to adjust their preferences to those of the voters. Choice theorists suggest that the Labour Party adopted policies which, over time, lost their appeal among the electorate.<sup>30</sup> On issues such as nationalization, foreign policy, trade union power, poverty, and the welfare state, Labour’s positions lost popular support.<sup>31</sup> Equally, the SPD suffered from a similar phenomenon according to the findings presented by Gerard Braunthal.<sup>32</sup> Both parties promised policies which the electoral majority did not find attractive.

Choice theorists have developed two influential models of party behavior. The Downsian model assumes that party leaders control their organization and their policies. Party leaders, if strategically wise, are able to devise policies in such a way that it will attract more voters than competing parties.<sup>33</sup> Such parties are quite responsive to shifts in individual voter preferences. The second model, in contrast, assumes that party activists dominate policy.<sup>34</sup> Unlike the Downsian model, this model suggests that parties tend to be relatively unresponsive to voter preferences because party activists are assumed to be more radical than the average voter. With such parties it is likely that extremist positions predominate in the party and that, as a consequence, new parties, closer to mainstream voter preferences, emerge as the SDP in Britain.

The inability to present attractive policy to the electorate explains the electoral erosion of both Labour and SPD according to choice theorists. Neither party has been able to present policy packages to deal with new concerns of the voters. They both insisted on established policies at a time when new issues emerged, when the electorate was getting more and better political information. Crewe suggests that Labour adopted policies quite out of touch with the aspirations of the mainstream white-collar voter.<sup>35</sup> The electoral gains of the Liberal and Social Democratic Alliance in the 1983 and 1987 elections among the Southern white-collar working class seem to support this analysis. In the West German case, the SPD was unable to satisfy the political demands of the environmental, peace, feminist, and civil rights movements’ supporters who then founded, voted, and supported the Green Party.



### Limitations of the Structural and Choice Approaches

Both approaches provide powerful arguments and a wealth of empirical data to support their validity. But each approach falls somewhat short of explaining the Labour and SPD comparison. They fall short for theoretical and conceptual reasons as well as empirical ones.

Jon Elster argues that social science, particularly rational choice theorizing, needs to take into consideration a number of factors other than merely the goals of the individual but also the beliefs that the individual might have about his or her opportunities.<sup>36</sup> Structures do not determine action, but they may significantly shape the process by which action is taken, and they make certain outcomes more or less likely. Of course, a player may be mistaken about open options and may choose a course which was not really feasible and, therefore, the result may be disastrous. Nevertheless, it is still up to the player to make a choice. These choices are not necessarily rational. After all, Mancur Olson has shown that it is not rational to vote.<sup>37</sup> Dunleavy and Husbands are correct when they suggest that people vote in response to their environment, their social location, and work situation.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, choice theorists are wrong when they assume that an unlimited number of choices are open and feasible. In a political party not all choices are open since party leaders or party activists are constrained by a number of exogenous and endogenous variables in designing electoral strategy.

While the structural analysts provide very strong reasons for the demise of social democratic and socialist parties, they cannot explain quite as well why certain social democratic parties such as the ones in Sweden, Spain, Greece, France, and Norway have done quite well electorally.<sup>39</sup> Did they do so well for exogenous reasons such as a divided opposition or favorable economic circumstances or a history of social democratic hegemony?<sup>40</sup> Or are endogenous reasons such as an attractive policy package or charismatic party leaders the reason for their success?<sup>41</sup> In each case there are numerous explanations why social democracy has excelled. The important point is that socioeconomic, structural changes have taken place in all parts of Western Europe and do not represent a coherent, comparative reason for the success or failure of social democratic parties across cases.

The debate amongst electoral studies specialists about which variables

are important and which ones are not rages on without significant signs of abatement. Are candidates and issues important? Do structural shifts explain voting and party behavior? It would appear to the uninitiated that only one fact is quite certain: there is a great deal more volatility today among the voters in British and West German elections than twenty years ago.<sup>42</sup> Voters tend to split tickets, they will swing from party to party, and they are less inclined to vote today than twenty years ago. Until there is good evidence to reject the importance of short-term issues on electoral behavior, choice theorists have an important point. But choices are not made in isolation. The arguments pertaining to structural limitations placed upon social democratic parties by the shrinkage of the blue-collar sector and the splintering up of working-class interests are powerful and very much in evidence in the two following case studies.

The major problem for choice theorists is how to explain the failure of political parties to find attractive policies. As Alessandro Pizzorno has pointed out, Downs's model of party behavior is completely inadequate.<sup>43</sup> Party leaders do not control their organizations; but neither do the party activists. Parties cannot adopt a new set of popular policies merely because they happen to be "in." Internally there may be much opposition to a popular policy, and parties do not merely follow public opinion. Przeworski and Sprague rightly point out that parties also shape public opinion, they actively get to define options.<sup>44</sup> Dunleavy and Husbands argue that parties actively shape the electorate's view of legitimacy and feasibility.<sup>45</sup> Thatcher's housing policies are a splendid example of this ability to create and shape expectations. Choices are not made by any one group but arise as the result of interaction between various groups and players within the organization. Perhaps the most important objection to the application of "rational choice" assumptions to organizations is that organizations are not individuals; they contain many individuals with divergent sets of interests, and, therefore, a number of "rationalities" interact within an organization.

The inadequacy of choice theorists' models of party competition is most obviously revealed by a German-British comparison. Downs's model may explain the West German situation where the parties concentrate on the "political middle" and therefore experience losses at both the left and right fringes. However, how does the model explain the British case where the parties move to the extremes? Downsian theorists then use "activist power" to explain why moderate leaders lost to the activists, who imposed radical policies on their parties. These authors suggest that the political

middle was therefore exposed to a SDP/Liberal Alliance challenge.<sup>46</sup> Each approach, however, fails to explain one of the cases. The following chapters will attempt to develop a more accurate model of party behavior.

The above discussion has concentrated on establishing the differences between two distinct modes of analysis. There are plenty of analysts, however, who have attempted to combine elements of structural analysis with choice theory. Gosta Esping-Andersen's work on Scandinavian social democracy furnishes such an example.<sup>47</sup> The author recognizes the structural problem facing social democracy in having to appeal to a number of quite distinct social groups. He suggests that a coalition between white-collar and blue-collar workers is the only viable option open for social democrats if they desire to win election.<sup>48</sup> However, the interests of these two groups are at odds over a number of issues, as Dunleavy and Husbands suggest. Esping-Andersen argues that only a rejection of the old social democratic policies of wage egalitarianism, extended welfare state policies, and supporting declining industries to maintain employment will enable the building of such a coalition.<sup>49</sup> Social democrats need to diversify their policy offerings to attract white-collar workers with creative investment strategies, educational policy, and "economic democracy" in terms of giving employees the opportunity to invest in their companies. Only such creative, progressive policies will enable social democrats to win elections.

Esping-Andersen may well be correct in his analysis but he, like the choice theorists with whom he shares the assumption that the right kind of policies will win elections, underestimates the opposition that such a new policy course might engender within the social democratic party. The following study focuses on the limitations of institutional structures on policy groups within a political party. The study investigates the struggles which took place inside both Labour and the SPD over precisely these issues: which policies will attract electoral support? Which social group ought the party placate or target as potential electorate? Which policies help to win elections? How can the party hold together divergent social interest groups and ought it try to do so?

## Conclusion

Each approach has a set of strengths and weaknesses. Structuralists convincingly argue that social democracy faces a less homogeneous electorate

today than it did twenty-five years ago. Its traditional blue-collar, working-class base has shrunk, while the industrial adjustment process of the 1970s and 1980s has caused severe rifts among both blue- and white-collar workers in productive and competitive industries versus those in the public sector and declining industries. The shortcoming in this analysis is the insistence that social democratic parties face inexorable decline as a result of these unfavorable shifts.

Choice theorists rightly point out that parties can develop electoral and policy strategies which enable them to build electoral majorities. They develop some interesting hypotheses about which types of policy might actually bring new voters to these parties. While choice theorists correctly view parties as capable of adjusting to new circumstances, they underestimated the difficulties such adjustments present in terms of intraparty struggles over a new political course. Choice theorists ignore the fact that political parties are made up of various policy groups and individuals who compete with one another over policy and power in the organization. They forget that parties are political battlegrounds and underestimate the opposition to "vote maximizing" strategies. In order to gain a fuller understanding of the adjustment process, and electoral and policy strategies we need to open up the black box to find out how parties function. The next chapter suggests some ways of doing just that.



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### 3 The Study of Intraparty Politics

There are few studies of intraparty politics. This is surprising because the early studies of political parties concentrated on institutional structures and internal power struggles. The classic works on political parties by Max Weber, Robert Michels, Mosei Ostrogorski, and later Robert McKenzie and Maurice Duverger treated parties primarily as organizations.<sup>1</sup> But since these studies appeared, little innovation has occurred to sharpen theory and analysis. Reasons for this neglect are varied, but two factors appear decisive. First, the study of internal politics is extremely difficult to conceptualize and suffers from a lack of useful, agreed upon principles, or theoretical starting points. Second, the question of intraparty politics has been dominated by a normative preoccupation: the relationship between democratic systems of government and political parties which may not be “democratically” organized. The first reason has discouraged researchers; the second has sidetracked research.

Most studies of intraparty politics examine party factionalism.<sup>2</sup> They share few common theoretical assumptions and do not build a body of knowledge. Research concentrates either on extremely detailed one-case studies of intraparty factionalism or broad-ranging comparisons between numerous cases which end up suggesting that there are few common denominators.<sup>3</sup> Each case appears idiosyncratic. Ralph Zariski, after twenty years of studying party factionalism, noted in exasperation that he was not certain that these studies produced any worthwhile, generalizable result.<sup>4</sup> Klaus von Beyme shared Zariski’s pessimism about the field of inquiry. He first asked whether social science needed a general theory of



political parties or a conceptualization of intraparty politics. He then firmly rejected these notions, stating that parties are too diverse a phenomenon to study as a single entity.<sup>5</sup>

The other formidable obstacle to a systematic study of parties has been the preoccupation with the question whether political organizations and democracy are compatible. Michels's study of the SPD set the tone for this debate.<sup>6</sup> He provided a negative answer, arguing that parties do not act democratically internally, therefore they cannot be expected to be catalysts of democratic reform or part of a democratic system. Much effort has since gone into showing that undemocratic organizations can be part of a larger democratic system. McKenzie argued that political democracy depends on leaders in parties being able to impose their wishes on the organization in order to give the electorate clear choices.<sup>7</sup> But the preoccupation with this question has sidetracked some authors. McKenzie, for instance, imposed his ideas of democratic interaction on his analysis of the policymaking process in Labour. The wish to show that "oligarchic domination" is good for democracy led to a serious misperception of the distribution of power in the political organization. McKenzie argued that Labour leaders controlled the party, when in fact all he could show was that a successful coalition between unions and social democrats existed.<sup>8</sup>

The question whether a party reaches its decisions democratically is, of course, by no means uninteresting or unimportant. However, what precisely intraparty democracy is supposed to be or whether it is desirable was a question on which authors could not agree. McKenzie, Duverger, and others wanted to show that democracy could exist even if parties were oligarchic organizations. They maintained that representative democracy depended on leadership control over party activists since parties had to provide voters with clear choices on policy and personality.<sup>9</sup> Parties were there for systemic reasons and not for party activists to get their way. Others wanted to show that parties were merely another means of disenfranchisement because they afforded politicians the opportunity to manipulate opinions and limit political choices. In other words, liberal bourgeois or representative democracy was not real democracy.<sup>10</sup> Michels would only accept "direct democracy" as true democracy. Duverger or McKenzie viewed "representative democracy" as the only viable form of democracy in modern society. Normative views of what a party ought to look like shaped the research into intraparty decisionmaking.

It is a truism that there are many types of parties, party systems, and external and internal factors which quite possibly make every party

unique in some way. Yet, it would be an unacceptable argument for social scientists if one claimed that because every individual is different from another, their study was impossible or not worthwhile. The same goes for parties—they are a distinct phenomenon and therefore comparable. Moreover, political parties are the vehicles by which most representatives obtain access to policymaking institutions. They are not merely important as an institution that may or may not be democratically organized, but they are as important in the policymaking process as interest groups or so-called “corporatist systems.” In most Western democracies they are at the center of political decisionmaking. Therefore, they ought to be at the center of political study and not some appendage. What goes on inside a party when it decides upon which policy proposals to adopt and which ones to ignore is a crucial political issue. A model of political parties, how they are embedded in their environment and how they respond to environmental changes is therefore an important contribution to the literature on political organization. The following model draws upon a number of approaches ranging from organizational theories to theories of power and incorporates aspects of the rational choice literature.

### A Model for the Study of Intraparty Politics

What then are the components of a model of the political party which can be applied to a range of cases? Angelo Panebianco and Alessandro Pizzorno respectively have provided useful starting points.<sup>11</sup> Political parties in Western democracies are voluntary organizations that seek to attract members and voters. Parties consist of individuals with a range of personal goals and these individuals represent various social bases. As such, all parties face collective action problems. Pizzorno suggested that parties consist of three levels: the social base, activists, and political entrepreneurs.<sup>12</sup> At each level a different form of rationality determines voting for, joining, or acting within the party. Parties provide individual benefits to political entrepreneurs (a career), but they also have to supply common goods (policies and ideologies) to activists and, of course, to the voters or members of the social bases whose interests the party hopes to represent. Finally, to attract political entrepreneurs, activists, and voters, parties offer a range of positive incentives.

All parties exhibit organizational structures (i.e., an internal distribution of power) to ensure internal cohesion.<sup>13</sup> To organize the membership

and its activities and to make decisions on policy, electoral strategy, and who may or may not be a member, parties—like all other organizations—establish a set of rules and structures. The distribution of power is not coincidental—it reflects relationships between groups within the party. The institutional form adopted at the foundation determines for a long period of time afterward what the relationships between groups and individuals look like. The intentions of the founders will “leave an indelible mark on the life of an organization” long after these decisions are made.<sup>14</sup> These incentives for action and structures to distribute power in the organization form the basis for a model of the political party.

### Incentives and the Questions of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty

Political parties in Western democracies are voluntary organizations in competitive electoral systems. They depend on the provision of incentives to attract voters, members, activists, and political entrepreneurs. They promise to provide policies for the benefit of their electorates. Parties are often the only means by which individuals committed to a policy or ideological orientation can hope to fulfill their wish to see the policy or their “Weltanschauung” enacted.<sup>15</sup> Parties provide opportunities for those wishing to make a career from political engagement. They provide an environment in which people can feel at home politically; where they share common political allegiances. Parties provide career-oriented, policy-oriented, and solidaristic incentives for individuals to join the organization. Political entrepreneurs, activists, and members join parties to satisfy certain wants. These wants may be at odds with one another and the circumstance provides a basis for struggle between individuals and groups over which goal ought to have priority.<sup>16</sup>

A widespread and often repeated assumption about party leaders and activists is that leaders seek electoral majorities and activists seek certain policies. This assumption, while quite plausible, leads to a second and rather dubious proposition. Party activists are often characterized as more radical than party leaders. Leaders are portrayed as understanding the importance of coalition-building and compromise; party activists want certain policies and will not compromise them.<sup>17</sup> While this proposition may hold true in some cases, I would suggest that the activists’ insistence on policy is not more radical, but is the outcome of a response to different

sets of incentives for leaders and activists. As the study shows, there are party leaders who insist in a very radical manner on their policy preferences. Radicalism conveys a notion of ideological commitment rather than pragmatism. But it may well be that Helmut Schmidt was, in all senses of the word, a “radical” believer in his policies, which made compromise in the SPD very difficult.

Political parties depend on entrepreneurs, activists, and dues-paying but inactive members for certain tasks. Parties depend on the members for much of their income; they frequently depend on their activist base for electioneering; and they depend on the political entrepreneur to build confidence in the organization with interest groups or voters to support the party. In other words, very different relationships of mutual dependence exist between each type of actor and the organization. Some parties possess coercive powers (negative incentives) over potential members. Martin Shefter rightly points to “patronage-based parties” as one instance where otherwise voluntary organizations possess a means of enticing people to join without them having alternatives if they wish to obtain, for instance, employment in the civil service of a city or country.<sup>18</sup> However, most Western parties do not or are not supposed to possess such negative incentives to encourage or coerce joiners. Parties have to find noncoercive means and positive incentives to attract each type of actor.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, each type of actor has an interest in shaping the organization’s aims in such a way as to reflect his or her view of the primary goals the party ought to stand for.

Once members have joined the organization they face a set of continuing questions: does the party represent my interests and political desires, either ideologically or in terms of policy? Does it provide for my social needs? Does the party deserve my loyalty? If the party does not meet the wishes of individual members, the question for the member then becomes: should I stay in the party or leave? Albert Hirschman’s formulation of the options facing members of organizations is highly relevant in this context.<sup>20</sup> The average voter may make voting decisions on the basis of the question, “what have you done for me lately?”<sup>21</sup> For the policy activist and the political entrepreneur the question is more one of, “is the organization responsive to me and if not, what can I do about it?”

In providing career opportunities, policies, and solidarity, political parties experience organizational dilemmas.<sup>22</sup> Which of the organizational aims is to prevail? The member may look to the party for leisure services or some form of assistance; the policy activist looks to the party for the



implementation of policy; and the political entrepreneur regards the party as a means to a political career or even government power. What if, for instance, the goals of the career-oriented, political entrepreneur clash with the policy demands of a determined group within the party? What if a proposed policy is extremely unpopular with the electorate? Which group wins the struggle—the policy activist or the political entrepreneur? The distribution of power within the organization becomes a key factor in determining the priorities and which type of actor predominates.

A further complication arises from the observation that intraparty struggles do not just pit policy activists against political entrepreneurs—one insisting on policy, the other on electoral victory—but that clashes often involve two or more groups, including political entrepreneurs and policy activists.<sup>23</sup> Parties contain groups with a variety of policy preferences. Divisions in the party are not merely horizontal ones, but vertical ones combining political entrepreneurs with policy activists and groups of members throughout the organization. Both Labour and SPD encompass social democrats, traditional socialists, and new leftists, as well as a trade union constituency which at times has no distinct policy position but will act as a separate policy group when it comes to questions pertaining to the unions. Each broad group consists of policy activists and political entrepreneurs with a supporting social base. These groups are at odds over policy. Again, the outcome of these clashes raises the question of who wins and why that group wins. Are the winners constantly winning and, if so, why? If the losers constantly lose, why do they stay in the organization? If there are compromises on policies or personalities, how are these reached and enforced?

Each group calculates what the possible costs and benefits are of exhibiting loyalty, voicing opposition, or threatening to exit if the desired policy option or appointment is not made. What advantages or disadvantages are involved in remaining loyal to the party? Under which circumstances is it beneficial to adopt any of the strategic options? When is the threat to exit effective? Hirschman suggested that exit is a viable option only if there is an organization to exit to.<sup>24</sup>

In terms of strategic options, each type of actor has a set of alternatives. For instance, the political entrepreneur can hope to build a solid base of support among the activists. Alternatively, the entrepreneur might build solid support among the social base and the electorate to use electoral popularity as a means of coercing internal opponents into compromising with his or her policy decision or electoral strategy. The more successful



the entrepreneur is at mobilizing support, presumably the more potent the individual's ability to threaten the party with a withdrawal of loyalty or even exit if his or her demands are not met. Similarly, policy activists may build support for their position by exhibiting internal strength through mobilizing the policy's supporters or by marshaling external support, for instance, through demonstrations.

Policy activists can impose high costs on the party in electoral terms if they openly contradict the stated goals of the party. Similarly, politicians and representatives are in a position, especially when they are in government, where they can override the stated policy goals of significant activist groups. Government power provides representatives with a certain degree of immunity from pressure emanating from their party. Once out of government, however, representatives are far more susceptible to intra-party pressures since the strictures of having to rule, the necessity of negotiating compromises with coalition partners, and the protection afforded them by political office have dissipated. The distribution of intra-party power between policy activists, political representatives, and interest group representatives then becomes a crucial issue in explaining why one set of actors wins and another loses.

### Organizational Power and Michels's Iron Law of Oligarchy

It is quite possibly Michels's fault that parties take a back seat in political analysis. Michels's argument concerning the distribution of power within political parties has remained virtually unchallenged as one of the most powerful theses in sociology.<sup>25</sup> The "iron law of oligarchy" has persuaded many analysts that they know what needs to be known about the decision-making process within a party. According to Michels and many analysts after him, leaders make party policy. The greater the bureaucratic apparatus a party develops, the more party leaders control policy.<sup>26</sup> They manipulate organizations to their own ends, and they make sure that parties are electioneering devices through which the maintenance of the political system is guaranteed. Party policy is not a result of struggle between a variety of groups, but imposed on the party by its leaders in pursuit of their own sets of interests. Even Michels's critics admit that Michels's theory has a great deal of descriptive merit since most parties develop leadership oligarchies which predominate policymaking. Some of the

most thoughtful political thinkers have assumed that parties are black boxes in which leaders make all the important decisions.

Michels argued that political parties consist of leaders and masses.<sup>27</sup> Leaders over time become oligarchs who dominate the organization for their own ends rather than the collective good. Michels developed a double-tiered concept of oligarchy—a weak and a strong version.<sup>28</sup> Michels's weak form of oligarchy suggests that leaders enjoy the advantages of being active and informed. They hold the advantages small groups have over larger groups so impressively described by Mancur Olson.<sup>29</sup> This version of oligarchy is persuasive. It approximates the theory of "transaction costs" which claims that not all political actors desire to take the time and effort to find out about all issues and therefore allow for specialization. Leaders can lay claim to information, a commodity they possess and exploit for their own purposes.

Michels's strong version of oligarchy is the one in need of serious qualification. This version suggests that the oligarchy is a conspiratorial group. They do not hesitate to sell out the membership's interests if these do not coincide with the interests of the oligarchy. Herbert Kitschelt referred to this as Michels's theory of "elite control."<sup>30</sup> The oligarchy is able to do so because the masses are apathetic, they like to be led. The masses abrogate responsibility easily, according to Michels, because they are not psychologically equipped to handle responsibility and lack the organizational means to insist upon their interest, even if they do have the intellectual qualities.<sup>31</sup> Both the weak and strong versions of oligarchy mean that leaders prevail in intraparty conflicts. If they are challenged severely—an unlikely occurrence—they can always resort to incorporating some of the leading lights of the opposition by giving minor policy and career concessions.<sup>32</sup> This is usually sufficient to quell internal upheaval.

Michels's argument must be reevaluated on at least two points. First, the strong version of the theory of oligarchy is empirically incorrect. Second, parties are not made up of leaders and masses but a variety of groups which are vertically organized. There are no reliable studies which actually show a perfectly united leadership group which aims to control its mass base—even in Michels's studies of the SPD it becomes apparent that the leadership group is disunited.<sup>33</sup> Political parties contain policy groups with a social base, a party membership base, party activists, and some form of representation among the politicians at the local, regional, or national level.

Michels explained oligarchic domination in terms of the psychological nature of the leaders and masses; the advantages of bureaucracy and intellect. To him, organizational structure made no difference since any bureaucracy develops oligarchic domination.<sup>34</sup> It was Duverger who pointed out that parliamentary leaders need not always dominate their organizations.<sup>35</sup> Duverger did not disagree with Michels on the issue of oligarchy. He merely suggested that parties consist of parliamentarians and political leaders in the organization, of members and militant activists, and of voters. All of these groups had some form of influence in the organization. Duverger qualified his critique of Michels by stating that in bourgeois and socialist parties, party leaders usually have the upper hand in policy and electoral strategy decisions.<sup>36</sup> However, Duverger suggested that Michels's approach ignored the importance of the distribution of power in an organization and the diversity of players.

Duverger pointed to a serious problem in Michels's theory. Organizational distribution of power is a crucial variable that an elitist model of political parties ignores. Without reference to internal power distribution it is impossible to adequately explain why the oligarchy of social democratic leaders in the Labour Party did not benefit from the "iron law of oligarchy" and defeat their opponents, but were themselves defeated by policy activists. The institutional structure of the Labour Party is such that social democratic party leaders could act like a Michelsian oligarchy as long as they enjoyed trade union support. Once they lost union support, they lost power. Equally, the position of the SPD social democratic party leaders of the 1970s is now being eroded. In order to prevent further electoral and organizational erosion, the traditional social democratic group had to provide policy concessions and personnel appointments to their challengers. The case of the Labour Party in the last twenty years suggests that the iron law is incorrect. The SPD case suggests that the iron law must be amended even in the case of the party from which it was derived. The SPD institutional structure approximates a Michelsian oligarchic party more closely than Labour. Party leaders do enjoy powers to manipulate challengers. Nevertheless, they must adjust to the demands of their social base in order to stay electorally competitive and that can only be done by giving concessions to intraparty challengers.

Charles Sabel's analysis of the internal politics of trade unions suggested a reversal of Michels's position.<sup>37</sup> The question should not be whether oligarchs can misuse the organization to obtain their selfish interests, but in how far leaders can maintain their position without ceding power to the

subordinates. He suggested that this ability is not constant, but variable. The more the leaders are successful in one respect—that is to isolate themselves from their base—the more they run the risk of losing rank-and-file support. As soon as they lose support they have to rediscover ways of attracting new recruits, often involving a loss of power to their subordinates. Fights break out over how to remain competitive as an organization.<sup>38</sup> The leaders' ability to control their troops varies with a number of factors. The influence of activists increases when the party is out of government; the institutional structure may provide activists numerous avenues of exerting pressure on the representatives; and, further, party leaders are not a united group but split by ideological and strategic preferences. Both Duverger and Sabel's work lead to the conclusion that Michels's notions of organizational control must be fundamentally amended. Amendment has to come in the form of a careful analysis of intraorganizational distributions of power between party leaders, representatives, activists, and members.

### Definition of Power

A discussion of a distribution of power necessitates a definition of terms. Steven Lukes and John Gaventa provide helpful suggestions for such a definition.<sup>39</sup> Power manifests itself in terms of what Steven Lukes defined as the three faces of power. The first face of power is observable persuasion in which "A is able to make B do what B would not otherwise do." This dimension of power applied to voluntary organizations involves primarily the control over political resources such as votes, jobs, and influence.<sup>40</sup> This first dimension is the most visible because it can be measured in terms of concrete institutional or other capabilities, enabling one actor to persuade or coerce another. It can be observed by the reactions of the players involved. If, for instance, an intraparty group changes or modifies its policy position and then obtains coveted positions in the organization, we can assert that a bargain has been struck between the subordinate and the dominant group.

The second face is the ability by one actor to structure the political game in such a way that it becomes impossible for the opponent to gain access to the game. Authors such as Lewis Minkin, in his analysis of policymaking in the Labour Party, have referred to this aspect of power as "agenda-setting."<sup>41</sup> Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz define the second aspect of



power thus: "A set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures ('rules of the game') that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others. Those who benefit are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests."<sup>42</sup>

Bachrach, Baratz, and Gaventa point out that the main manifestation of this second face of power is the imposition of "nondecisions."<sup>43</sup> The dominant group has been able to so effectively manipulate the rules of the game that their opponents do not get to voice their position. Again, we need to apply this concept to voluntary organizations in which coercion is subtle rather than overt. Nevertheless, as Michels and numerous others remind us, bureaucracy, organizational rules, and decisionmaking structures are all a manifestation of power one group might exercise over another. For instance, if a particular intraparty policy group is consistently kept away from the policymaking institutions of the organization (by having its resolutions ignored, by not having representatives elected to the convention, or by not even having their proposals put on the discussion agenda), then we can safely assume that the group is not in favor with the dominant group.

The third face of power is the most difficult to define. This face involves the actual structuring by the dominant group of how the opposition views its own interests, its strategies, and possibilities. Gaventa points out that such a phenomenon is observable but often only dimly understood by the participant. He cites the example of many slaves who identified with their masters and regarded themselves as worthless, rather than objecting to the situation they were placed in.<sup>44</sup>

The first and second faces of power apply most obviously to the study of policymaking and political parties. The control over policy, agenda-setting, careers, patronage, and negative and positive incentives to entice cooperation from opponents are relatively easily studied. Although political parties depend primarily on positive incentives to entice actors to join, once these individuals have joined they find themselves in an organization in which both positive and negative incentives operate to enforce organizational cohesion. Organizational rules and structures define who controls the policy agenda and actual policy, who can make appointments thereby controlling careers, and who controls access to the party in terms of membership applications. The case studies in chapters five through seven illuminate all three faces of power. Organizational structures do not just shape power relations (the first and second face) but directly influence



the perception of interests of each intraparty group (the third face). The following chapter describes the distribution of power in the SPD and the Labour Party to show how institutional factors define the relations between one set of actors and another.

### Endogenous and Exogenous Variables

The theoretical apparatus of the study builds upon three major propositions. First, parties are complex organizations with an internal distribution of power which shapes the relations between policy groups, political entrepreneurs, and the party's social base. Each party consists of a dominant coalition of policy groups and political entrepreneurs who determine electoral strategy and party policy.<sup>45</sup> Second, internal dominant coalitions are shaped by the electoral performance of the party and the outcomes of policy in its effects on the party's social base. Especially if the party is in government in hard economic times, it faces the possibility of alienating voters and jeopardizing the composition of the dominant internal coalition. Third, the bases of membership recruitment and motivations for joining the party play an important role in shaping the process of coalition formation and policymaking. If a dominant coalition has neglected its base of support in the rank and file it faces a more difficult task if the local parties are overrun by opponents. Mobilization of grass roots support is an essential ingredient in maintaining organizational power.

Political parties face a set of external obstacles and internal choices. They respond to an electoral market, economic circumstances, and social conditions which circumscribe their electoral strategies and policy choices. Further, since parties consist of numerous individuals with different sets of goals which are heavily influenced by exogenous variables (social base, interest group membership, and ideology), they are battlegrounds for clashing sets of rationalities imported by these intraparty players. The institutional structure of the party shapes the way in which these intraparty players translate their goals into practical policy.

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
## 4 Institutional Structures and the Distribution of Organizational Power: Principle and Practice in SPD and Labour

The preceding chapter outlined a definition of power; the following paragraphs analyze the way in which the institutional structures of the Labour Party and the SPD distribute power within the organization. Party statutes define relationships between the various bodies in the party. Frequently the party statutes reflect principles rather than actual practice. The chapter focuses on the methods by which policy decisions are supposed to be made according to the principles set out in party statutes and the reality of the policymaking process. The chapter analyzes agenda setting, policymaking, candidate selection procedures, relations between representatives and party activists, and the relations between the local and national party.

The institutional distribution of power in Labour and the SPD differs greatly. The SPD consists of a number of organizational levels in which power is supposed to be delegated from the local to the national policymaking and administrative level. The national policymaking bodies, the Party Convention, the Executive Committee, and the Presidium consist of delegates from the lower organizational levels. The principle in decisionmaking practices is that decisions are transmitted from the bottom to the top of the organization. The practice is that most decisions, particularly on policy, are made by the top levels, which consist of national representatives and other professional politicians (see figure 1).

The Labour Party consists of local, constituency parties and a national policy and administrative level. Decisionmaking power in principle resides in the party's Annual Conference and the National Executive Committee (NEC). But the practice differs: decisions are made by either the

Figure 1: The Organizational Structure of the SPD




Source: Gerard Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983, p. 18.

Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) when Labour is in government and/or the trade unions. Both Annual Conference and NEC are greatly influenced by decisions made in the trade union movement and not in the party. From a purely organizational point of view, the SPD is a very centralized, hierarchical party since policy decisions are taken at the top of the organization. Labour is comparatively decentralized since it affords decision-making power to an organization outside of the party which is very decentralized in itself (see figure 2).

The dynamics of policymaking, agenda setting, and candidate selection procedures for representative and intraparty positions again differ greatly in the two parties. The following paragraphs describe these procedures and the relations between the local and national party to illustrate the vastly different internal conditions under which the two parties formulate their policy and electoral strategies. The relations between politicians, policy activists, and interests groups, especially the unions, are the focus of attention.

Figure 2: The Organizational Structure of the Labour Party



Source: Lewis Minkin, *The Labour Party Annual Conference*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980, p. 10.

In the Labour Party, trade unions play an important role in financing party candidates, in making appointments to internal and representative positions, and in local and national policymaking. The unions are an integral part of the Labour Party. The West German unions are, by law, party neutral. As organizations they are not supposed to be involved in internal party politics. The SPD does not affiliate with organizations in the way that Labour does. In the SPD only individual members of the party have voting rights, yet many trade unionists are members of the SPD. To win intraparty struggles over policy, individual party members have to be mobilized for or against a policy. This divergence in relations between party and unions, the bases of membership recruitment, and centralization of decisionmaking are crucial in understanding the very different patterns of coalition building in the two parties.

#### Institutional Structures of the SPD and Labour

##### *Policymaking in SPD and Labour*

According to the party statutes, Labour policy is decided in the Annual Conference and the NEC. The SPD has three policymaking arenas: the Party Convention (Parteitag), the Presidium, and the Executive Committee (Parteivorstand).

The Labour Party's Annual Conference approximates a stockholding company in which trade unions affiliated to the Trade Union Congress (TUC) hold "stock" in terms of votes. The basis of Labour's policymaking process is its unique concept of direct and indirect membership.<sup>1</sup> Labour has direct members who join the party at the ward level. These members are represented in the Annual Conference by their delegates from the Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs). The indirect members are all members of the unions affiliated to the party. These members are represented by their delegations from the trade unions.

Each trade union affiliates all or a portion of its membership to the party.<sup>2</sup> The number of affiliated members determines the financial contribution to Labour. The number of votes each trade union delegation at the Annual Conference controls is dependent upon how many of its members the union has affiliated. For instance, the National Union of Public Em-



ployees (NUPE) has affiliated some 400,000 members to the party and therefore holds some 400,000 votes at the Annual Conference.<sup>3</sup> In other words, the size of the financial contribution to Labour and the size of the union determine the union's influence in the party. The ratio of votes between the so-called "union bloc vote" and those of the direct members in the CLPs is around one to ten. The trade unions hold some 90 percent of the Annual Conference's votes, the rest being split up between the CLPs and a number of much smaller socialist societies who also hold some votes.<sup>4</sup>

The NEC, the administrative body of the party while conference is not in session, consists of four "sections" or divisions. There is a trade union delegation of twelve members; Annual Conference elects five women; the CLPs elect seven representatives; and the socialist and cooperative societies elect one member. The leader of the party, the deputy, the treasurer, and a representative from the Young Socialists are also part of the NEC. Again, the unions control a majority of appointments as they directly elect seventeen of the twenty-nine NEC members.

The most obvious conclusion from the above distribution of power is that in order to pass any policy, it needs the support of a number of large trade union bloc votes.<sup>5</sup> As discussed below, during the 1950s three large unions held so many votes at the Annual Conference that they decided what Labour Party policy looked like if they voted in unison, which they usually did. Since then the consensus on policy among the unions has dissipated. However, a coalition of a few large unions can override the wishes of any group of parliamentary leaders, CLP activists, or opposing trade unionists. To make policy, a dominant coalition must include a majority of the trade union bloc votes.

Policymaking in the Labour Party becomes even more complicated when Labour is in power. When in office, policymaking power shifted to the PLP and, within the PLP, to the prime minister and the cabinet.<sup>6</sup> After 1976 the PLP began to implement policies which did not conform to Annual Conference policy decisions (to which the PLP is technically bound and supposedly committed).<sup>7</sup> Since neither the unions nor party activists had direct control over the PLP, both groups sought ways of establishing greater institutional control of the PLP to ensure compliance with party policy while Labour was in power.

The SPD's convention consists of delegates from the twenty-two party districts, which themselves consist of delegations from the 250 subdistricts and over 10,000 county and local chapters.<sup>8</sup> The SPD's convention is

made up of 400 delegates and meets every two years, unless a special policy conference is called. Each delegate has an equal vote, and policy decisions are taken by a simple majority vote. There are no special representatives from working groups, trade unions, or interest groups with voting privileges.

Whoever wants to shape SPD party policy has to have significant control of the party's districts and subdistricts in order to influence the selection of delegates to the convention.<sup>9</sup> The 400 delegates are not rank-and-file activists but either party representatives in the Bundestag, the state parliaments, or party functionaries. They are certainly the elite of the party.<sup>10</sup> The convention also votes for the members of the Executive Committee which is entrusted with administering the party while convention is not in session. The Executive Committee consists of thirty-six members, and again, most members are also members of the Bundestag.

The convention's policymaking activities are, in reality, rather limited. Convention sets policy guidelines and is a forum for debate.<sup>11</sup> The members of the Executive Committee and the party Presidium make policy. The Presidium, hardly mentioned in the party statutes, is elected by the Executive Committee and is made up of twelve members. It is the inner sanctum of the party, and Presidium members are government ministers.<sup>12</sup> The chancellor or chancellor candidate, if the SPD is in opposition, and his closest associates make up the Presidium. In other words, the ideological complexion of these two institutions is crucial in determining party policy. It matters greatly who sits in the Presidium and on the Executive Committee and what their preferences are on policy and electoral strategy.

### *Agenda Setting*

In the Labour Party the agenda for the Annual Conference is set by the Conference Arrangements Committee (CAC). The trade unions control appointments to the CAC since the five members of the CAC are elected by the Annual Conference.<sup>13</sup> As with other Annual Conference elections, the largest unions dominate the selection process in favor of their preferred candidates, and thus the members of the CAC are usually union functionaries. The CAC decides which resolutions—put forward by the CLPs and individual trade unions—are to be discussed at the conference and in what order. The CAC has the responsibility of ordering hundreds of pro-

posed resolutions and amendments to party policy. It composes these resolutions into motions to be voted upon. This process gives the CAC the opportunity to weed out proposals the majority of unions disapprove of or to put them into a resolution which will fail. For instance, on one memorable occasion, Minkin reports, the CAC made sure of the defeat of a proposal by placing it on the same motion as a resolution to nationalize the Milky Way.<sup>14</sup>

The Resolution Commission (Antragskommission) of the SPD is elected by the Executive Committee.<sup>15</sup> Whoever the majority of party executive members are, they also control the selection of commission members. The commission has a great deal of leeway in deciding which proposals are to be discussed and which are to be dismissed or ignored. There is some discretion about dismissing policy proposals from the minority wing.<sup>16</sup> During the 1970s when the new left was clearly a minority in the Executive Committee, the commission nevertheless tabled numerous leftist policy proposals which were in some cases accepted by the convention. As in the Labour Party, the partisan nature of the commission does not mean that minority positions are systematically excluded from the agenda. However, minority proposals are tabled only at the tolerance of the dominant group—not as a matter of power, but as a sign of magnanimity.

### *Candidate Selection Procedures*

The procedures for selecting candidates for local council or parliamentary elections differ considerably when comparing Labour and the SPD. Labour's selection process is initiated by the NEC, the local executive committee, the ward committees, the affiliated trade unions, and the socialist societies, all of whom have the right to put forward candidates. The candidates are interviewed by the CLP executive committee. A shortlist of candidates is drawn up.<sup>17</sup>

The local executive committee has discretion over the shortlisting of suitable candidates. Support from executive committee members is essential if a member wants to become the nominee.<sup>18</sup> Candidates sponsored by trade unions have some advantages since the unions support their candidacy financially.<sup>19</sup>

The shortlisted candidates are interviewed and give a speech to the General Management Committee (GMC) of the CLP. The GMC votes until one candidate has a clear majority.<sup>20</sup> The NEC must then endorse the

candidate and is able to refuse the candidate if he or she has not been selected properly or if the candidate does not conform to party principles. Under certain circumstances the NEC may appoint a candidate, but this procedure is hardly used, in order to avoid, as McKenzie notes, a high-handed image.<sup>21</sup>

Prior to the introduction of mandatory reselection rules in 1979, once a candidate had been elected to Parliament, it was almost impossible to remove that person from his or her position if the CLP wanted to appoint another candidate.<sup>22</sup> The CLP had almost no control or influence over the actions of their M.P.<sup>23</sup> The rules changes of 1979 fundamentally altered the relations between representatives and the local party. M.P.s have to be reselected before every general election and their policy record is scrutinized by the CLP prior to reselection.<sup>24</sup>

Selection processes in the SPD differ fundamentally from the Labour case. West German electoral law provides voters with two votes: one for a direct candidate, another for the party of their choice. Individual voting districts elect a direct representative. The seats in the Bundestag and the state assemblies (Landtage) are divided into direct and proportionally distributed seats. Every party receiving more than 5 percent of the vote gains seats according to their percentage of electoral support. The first vote goes to a direct candidate; the second to the party—the second vote determines how many seats the party is to obtain proportionally.

The selection of direct parliamentary candidates varies at different levels of government. Bundestag members are selected by a constituency assembly (Wahlkreiskonferenz) where delegates from the local and county federations meet. Local chapters may propose a candidate who prepares a speech and is interviewed by the delegates. The assembly votes until one candidate has a clear majority. Landtag candidates are elected by county federations. For the proportional seats, parties draw up a list of candidates. The candidates on the top of the list have the best chance of becoming representatives.<sup>25</sup> In an area where a party is electorally weak, it is crucial where a candidate finds himself or herself on the list because in these regions the party obtains few direct seats but some proportional seats. Being on the top of the party lists guarantees a seat in the parliament.

In the 1950s and 1960s the regional and national party leadership used to draw up the candidate list without consulting the local parties.<sup>26</sup> The list of nominees was drawn up by the districts and voted upon in a secret



ballot by the delegates in a state conference. In the 1970s the selection and placement on the party lists became an important issue in the struggle between policy groups. During the period of intensive struggle between these groups, many minority candidates found themselves at the bottom of the list and unable to become serious contenders for parliamentary seats.<sup>27</sup> New left candidates often found themselves at the bottom of the party list and protested this obvious form of discrimination. Since then a kind of proportionalism has been adopted. Some districts and state parties attempt to place representatives of a variety of policy groups in promising positions on the party list.

### *Relations between Representative and Party Activists*

The struggle between policy groups was not confined to policy only. It involved the appointment to party offices and the rules governing the relations between local party organizations and their representatives. Without control over party offices and representative positions, it is impossible for a group of policy supporters to actually implement desired policies. Moreover, to ensure that representatives enact policy, some form of control over representatives by the policy activists is essential.

New left activists in both parties demanded the introduction of party rules which would oblige the representative on the local council and in the state (the West German case only) and national parliaments to enact party policy.<sup>28</sup> In the West German case, the new left demanded the introduction of the so-called "imperative mandate." The concept implies that representatives must enact party decisions because they are bound by them and merely represent the wishes of party membership. The demand for an imperative mandate was a short-lived issue. Party leaders such as Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt insisted that the imperative mandate was not only unconstitutional but also impractical.<sup>29</sup> The West German constitution guarantees representatives the freedom to make policy decisions based on criteria other than purely the party's expressed will. Second, and more importantly, the SPD never enjoyed a parliamentary majority, therefore necessitating coalitions with other parties. In order to form a coalition, some compromises or concessions to the coalition partner are necessary. An imperative mandate would eliminate any possibility for coalition compromises.



In the Labour Party the debate on party rules governing the relationship between representatives and activists was a central issue in the struggle between new leftists and social democrats. Once a parliamentary candidate had been elected to Parliament, there were virtually no mechanisms by which the CLP could recall the M.P. Unlike all other social democratic and socialist parties in Western Europe, which require at least some form of reselection process, Labour did not have any recall options. If the parliamentary seat was safe, no matter what changes took place within the CLP, the M.P. was safe as well. This situation became problematic in the late 1960s when local activists and their M.P.s in a number of urban constituencies found themselves at odds over policy.<sup>30</sup>

Local activists demanded changes in the reselection process. It was this issue which spawned the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) which became the central focus of the struggle for the new left. The CLPD demanded the introduction of mandatory reselection.<sup>31</sup> Parliamentary candidates would have to face a reselection process in their parties before every general election. The social democrats feared that since they did not have a large membership or activist support base in the CLPs, the reselection process would mean that radical left wingers, who controlled many CLPs, would select radical candidates instead of moderate social democrats. The left argued that the representative had an obligation to be at least somewhat informed about his or her activist base's political opinion and should represent at least some of their views in Parliament or in the local councils.<sup>32</sup>

While the SPD rejected the imperative mandate outright, the Labour Party did adopt mandatory reselection in 1979. M.P.s are now treated just as if they were parliamentary candidates and face their local executive committees and GMCs which decide whether to put up the standing M.P. or some other candidate. Very few M.P.s have actually been rejected by their local party.

### *Relations between the Local and National Party and Disciplinary Action*

New members join both Labour and SPD at the local level. They usually have to fill out an application form which is processed by the local secretary and a committee of party workers, who then sign up the prospective member. In principle, everyone has the right to join the party

upon application. It is usually up to the individual local party to recruit more members. It is common for local parties to sponsor events at which they will then disseminate material about the party and attempt to recruit more dues-paying members. The Labour Party's direct membership is very low in comparison to other socialist or social democratic parties in Western Europe. The party probably only has some 250,000 direct members.<sup>33</sup> The SPD, in contrast, is a very active membership party with more than 900,000 members.<sup>34</sup> Local recruitment drives can, however, take on a quite partisan bias as discussed in chapter seven.

Every party has a set of rules governing the rights and obligations of their members. The highest authority for disciplinary action in the Labour Party is the Organization Committee of the NEC. This subcommittee decides upon whether a particular member or group of members has done harm to the organization and what punishment this individual or group should incur. If the committee finds the case too politically sensitive, as in the case of the Trotskyist newspaper editorial board of the *Militant* in 1983, the Annual Conference may be asked to vote on the case.<sup>35</sup> Disciplinary action may take the form of expulsion, removal from office without expulsion, or censure. The local GMC also has the right to expel members, but this decision is subject to an appeal to the regional office or the NEC. There have been relatively few local expulsions as a result of Labour's membership crisis. Most disciplinary action until the 1980s involved leftist groups. Only after 1981 have some rightist groups, such as the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA), been expelled.<sup>36</sup> However, disciplinary action at the national level against the local members is rare for two reasons. First, national leaders try to avoid confrontations that may prove that the national level has few powers over the local parties; and second, Labour has few activists. Disciplinary action that may lead to defections of the few available activists is unpopular with party leaders.

In the SPD disciplinary action can be taken by the subdistrict, the district, and the convention. Each organizational level elects an arbitration commission. These commissions have the right to expel or otherwise punish members by barring them from candidacy to office or removing them from a position. Studies of such procedures show that these commissions were an integral part of factional struggle in the 1970s and used very frequently to punish and expel Marxists from the SPD.<sup>37</sup> The expulsion threat was used frequently while there was no significant political party to the left of the SPD. The incidence of expulsion as a strategy to get rid of

“unwanted or unruly elements” has been sharply reduced with the emergence of the Green Party.<sup>38</sup>

## Conclusion

In the Labour Party, policy is made by the dominant coalition of trade unions at the Annual Conference and in the PLP in times when Labour is in government. Policy in the SPD is dominated by the Presidium and the Executive Committee. In the SPD, therefore, policy tends to be made by a relatively small group of professional politicians, whereas in the Labour Party policy depends very much on the policy desires of the union movement. The political agenda of Labour is again determined by the dominant group of unions, whereas in the SPD it is the dominant group of political entrepreneurs in the district organizations who get to determine the composition of the party's convention and the issues to be discussed.

The SPD's multi-tiered organization enhances the ability of party leaders to block the challenges of opposed policy groups. In any dispute with such groups, party leaders can draw on their control over the arbitration commission and career opportunities in the districts and in the parliaments to entice cooperation from or punish opponents. To win policy concessions or favorable personnel decisions, significant backing from the dominant group of party leaders is required. In order to shape policymaking, a broad majority of party members has to be mobilized to take over successive levels of the organization. To take over the SPD, a grass roots movement has to capture the institution from the local to the subregional and regional levels upward. This is a very difficult undertaking in an active membership party. Michels's oligarchy thesis applies well in a party with such an organizational structure.

In the Labour Party power relations are quite different. Political leaders depend on the support of a majority of trade union votes for their organizational power. While in government, party leaders have independence from the party and unions, but once in opposition, the PLP and the political elites need to accommodate themselves with a majority of unions in order to stave off grass roots, activist inspired challenges. The relative independence of political representatives from the local parties helped the political elites greatly in their efforts to stay in power and shape policy. This institutional safeguard was challenged by the activists and abolished in 1979 to 1981. McKenzie noted that as long as party leaders pleased the

union movement, they could behave like a Michelsian oligarchy, vis-à-vis their rank and file.<sup>39</sup> The trade unions control who gets which position, which policy proposals are adopted, and which ones are rejected. Once social democratic party leaders lost union support, however, they could no longer maintain power in the organization.

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## 5 Electoral Strategy and Policy Choice

The chapter examines the SPD's and Labour's attempts to either regain or maintain electoral competitiveness. Both parties adopted "social democracy" after World War II to attract a wider electorate. By the mid-1960s social democrats had triumphed, dominating both organizations and their policy choices. Initially both parties enjoyed electoral success and government power. Consequently, social democracy as an electoral strategy appeared to have paid off. But, once their economies slowed down, social democrats found themselves in an unenviable position. Economic problems forced both governments to impose unpopular policies on their core constituencies. These policies exacerbated divisions within the electoral and organizational bases of both parties. The gap between electoral promise and political performance intensified intraparty conflicts over policy, personalities, and positions. After electoral defeat, both parties entered a phase of policy and elite renewal in order to reverse their electoral losses. The following pages describe the policy choices and electoral strategies of the period 1950 to 1988.

### Definitions of Social Democracy: A Transformative Strategy or a Stage of Capitalism?

Almost all parties of the political left agonized over questions of ideology and political strategy. Should working-class-based parties participate in elections and parliamentary politics? What should a socialist society, the



final goal of working-class-based parties, look like? These fundamental questions split the working-class movement from its beginnings. Debates over the definition of social democracy, democratic socialism, socialism, or communism have engendered heated disagreements and, in most West European cases, bitter rifts between socialist, Communist, and social democratic parties. This is not the place to recapitulate these debates and their outcomes. Suffice to say that in the 1950s, social democracy became the guiding set of principles for both Labour and SPD. Since social democracy played such a pivotal role in the political development of these two parties since World War II, it is important to establish what is meant by the term.

Adam Przeworski succinctly summarized the choices facing working-class-based movements.<sup>1</sup> They had to decide among several options: whether to pursue socialism through or in confrontation with capitalism; whether to rely solely upon the working class as an agent of transformation or whether to recruit allies in other social groups; and, finally, whether to seek to improve capitalism or concentrate exclusively on a revolutionary transformation.<sup>2</sup> Social democrats as opposed to socialists, according to Przeworski, seek transformation through cooperation with capitalism (they do not threaten private property or capitalism); by establishing alliances with other social groups (they appeal to nonworking-class social groups); and through gradual improvement (they advocate parliamentary reform of the existing social, political, and economic system). Socialists normally reject these cooperative strategies and if they adopt them they are forced to abandon any hope for a socialist transformation.

Przeworski suggests that once socialist party leaders decided to seek socialism through elections, coalition building, and parliamentary action, they were forced to adopt economic improvements as their primary policy goal.<sup>3</sup> Only electoral promises of economic betterment capture voters, especially from nonworking-class groups. Socialists had to build electoral, and soon, government coalitions. They found that transformative policy goals such as nationalization and the expropriation of capital were not policies bourgeois parties would accept. Consequently, socialists became social democrats—they abandoned rapid transformation for the promise of a gradual evolution toward socialism in order to achieve electoral majorities and governing coalitions.<sup>4</sup>

Social democracy proved effective in two important ways: it provided a political strategy conducive to union support and it proved to be highly practical for policymaking. The preoccupation with economic improve-

ments for the working class reflected trade union demands for better working conditions, wages, and benefits. Carl Schorske demonstrates how the German unions managed to isolate the radicals (who rejected the materialist strategy) in the SPD in 1905 in an important power struggle over the issues of whether the SPD should support the mass strike.<sup>5</sup> The unions opposed the strike because it jeopardized not only their strike funds but also improvements they had gained at the factory level. Similarly, the Labour Party did not espouse radical socialist policies because the British union movement which founded, organized, and financed the party did not support socialist policies except for a long-term commitment to a socialist state.<sup>6</sup> Socialism may have had a long-term appeal, but in the short term, economic improvements mobilized supporters in greater quantity than long-term, uncertain promises of socialist utopia.

Social democracy also provided a practical set of policies. Redistributive social and economic policies improved the economic circumstances of the working class significantly. John Maynard Keynes provided the theoretical justifications for interventionist policies to which socialists and social democrats were driven by electoral necessity. Keynes showed that the market could be manipulated by the state without the confiscation of capital and private property.<sup>7</sup> Przeworski's key point then is that social democracy is a deradicalizing ideology because it stresses economic growth, which makes it dependent upon a well-functioning capitalist system. Socialists cannot have economic growth and revolution at the same time. Przeworski formulated the dilemma in the following way by quoting Léon Blum and Salvador Allende: "What is not possible is thus the programme articulated by Allende when he said that 'the political model toward socialism that my government is applying requires that the socio-economic revolution take place simultaneously with an uninterrupted economic expansion.' What is not possible is the realization of Blum's belief 'that a better distribution . . . would revive production at the same time that it would satisfy justice.'"<sup>8</sup>

The major distinction between socialism and social democracy is that the latter accepts capitalism as a desirable economic system, aims to gradually improve the economic position of workers by providing welfare policies (health, education, social security, old-age pensions, unemployment benefits), and by doing so alleviating the inequalities and unevenness of unbridled capitalism. As Mark Kesselman suggests, the academic debate turns on the issue whether social democracy still quali-

fies as a transformative strategy.<sup>9</sup> Leo Panitch suggests that social democracy is a stage of capitalism. It encourages corporatist institutions and thereby it encourages control over the worker by the state, the unions, and capital.<sup>10</sup> Claus Offe and Helmut Wieselthaler argue that social democracy's emphasis on elections leads to a deradicalization of the work force because elections emphasize individual rather than class action.<sup>11</sup> All of these authors agree with Przeworski that social democracy cannot be a transformative strategy. Some of these authors suggest that socialism is a worthwhile political aim and that social democracy hinders the coming of socialism.

Other authors disagree. Socialism may have been a desirable political aim in the early twentieth century, but conditions have changed. Social democrats have changed their minds about what is "a political good" for the working class and for the rest of society. Sven Steinmo notes that it is "more than a little silly" to judge the achievements of social democracy in the light of a late nineteenth-century model of social change.<sup>12</sup> Steinmo suggests, rightly I believe, that social democracy has brought many positive changes to the working populations of Sweden and other countries in which social democrats were able to shape the political agenda. Steinmo agrees with Esping-Andersen that social democracy can and in fact does produce social transformation.<sup>13</sup> These authors suggest that social democratic reform is cumulative, in direct contrast to Przeworski, who argues that social democratic reforms are not transformative and easily reversible.

Social democracy aims to attract workers and other social groups to a political strategy of economic growth while at the same time regulating the adverse features of a market economy through state sponsored welfare programs. Of course, there are Christian democratic political thinkers who suggest a similar strategy. Bismarck, after all, introduced the welfare state to Germany and it was the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) that established the foundations of the West German welfare state. Social democrats maintain that they differ from such conservative thinkers in terms of the extent to which the welfare state is used as an active instrument of wealth redistribution, its extensiveness of services provided, and its actual impact on reducing class divisions in education, health, and opportunity. State power is translated into the creation and maintenance of policies and bureaucracies which do transform the life chances of a vast proportion of citizens.

## Social Democracy's Triumph in Labour and the SPD

Social democracy became the political creed of both SPD and Labour after 1950. Social democrats dominated the NEC and PLP in Labour; and the Presidium, the Executive Committee, the parliamentary party, and the Party Convention in the SPD. The SPD conversion to social democracy became explicit with the 1959 Godesberg Programm. The program advocated an economic policy of "competition as far as possible—planning as much as necessary."<sup>14</sup> The party abandoned commitments to state planning, nationalization, investment steering, or worker control. Market mechanisms replaced state intervention. The party adopted the principles of the social market economy established by the CDU/Christian Social Union (CSU) government. Further, the party accepted integration into the West via the European Community (EC) and, more importantly, into the NATO defense alliance. The SPD, in a major reversal of its former policies, accepted the division of Germany and its defense commitments to NATO.<sup>15</sup>

Otto Kirchheimer described the SPD's Godesberg Programm as an attempt to minimize policy differences with the CDU/CSU in order to gain electoral competitiveness.<sup>16</sup> Whether or not he was correct in his assessment of SPD motives, it is certain that the Godesberg Programm was intended to reverse the electoral stagnation of the party since 1949. Karl Flechtheim suggested that SPD leaders and activists panicked after the electoral defeat of 1957.<sup>17</sup> It appeared as if the party would never be able to become a governing party at the federal level. The party had to break out of its blue-collar base, particularly at a time when automation and new forms of energy production were about to revolutionize the workplace and reduce the proportion of blue-collar workers.<sup>18</sup> The SPD, according to its leading politicians and strategists, had to find a new electoral and policy direction to appeal to a broader coalition of social groups in order to help shape the coming "second industrial revolution."

The notion of "class conflict" disappeared from the party's vocabulary. Humanist and Christian ethics replaced Marxist analysis. The change in ideology had been preceded by a thorough elite renewal process. Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner, Fritz Erler, and Karl Schiller represented the new social democratic political elite.<sup>19</sup> They were supported by the vast majority of Bundestag representatives and party functionaries. The convention adopted the Godesberg Programm by a 324 to 16 margin.<sup>20</sup> In the following years a number of Marxist critics of the new program were expelled from the SPD for not supporting the party's new political line.<sup>21</sup>



Social democracy's victory in the Labour Party is not as clearly demonstrable as in the SPD since the party did not adopt a "Godesberg-like" policy program. In principle, the party has always been committed to a long-term socialist transformation as Clause 4 of the party's constitution states.<sup>22</sup> Yet, in practical policy terms, the party abandoned any socialist pretensions while in government between 1945 and 1951.<sup>23</sup> In 1945 Labour promised to bring about manpower planning, nationalization, and socialization. While nationalizations did occur (which were not reversed until the Conservatives under Thatcher came to power in 1979), Labour failed to introduce worker management in the nationalized industries. Public enterprises were run like any other firm except that its unprofitable sections were subsidized by the state. Labour did not expropriate capital or private property; nor did Labour introduce collectivization or a council system. Labour adhered to a parliamentary reform strategy in terms of creating the National Health Service, educational reform to provide public schooling, and various welfare policies for returning veterans, the unemployed, and the elderly. None of these reforms were reversed by the Conservatives when they returned to power in 1951. During its long term in opposition from 1951 to 1964, the social democratic wing of the party with the help of a majority faction within the trade union movement solidified its control over Labour's organization and policies. The party manifestos of 1955 and 1964 contained no mention of further extensions of public ownership (except for the water industry) or the introduction of worker self-management.<sup>24</sup> Labour adopted the corporatist National Economic Development Council (NEDC) as a means of bringing unions, capital, and the state to the bargaining table to settle industrial conflict. As in the SPD case, Labour's policies differed minimally from those of the Conservative Party. Both social democrats and conservatives shared a commitment to market principles coupled with a welfare state. Where they differed was in the extent to which the state ought to be used to bring about greater social and economic equality.<sup>25</sup>

Labour's leadership manifested the triumph of social democracy. In 1955 Hugh Gaitskell, a most prominent social democrat (or "revisionist" as they are referred to in the Labour Party), was elected party leader. James Callaghan, Roy Jenkins, Anthony Crossland, Peter Jay, and George Brown held influential posts in the shadow cabinet and were to become ministers in the next Labour government.<sup>26</sup> The election of Harold Wilson as party leader in 1963 was not a signal that social democrats had lost control over the party to the left wing from where Wilson came. Rather,



trade union leaders made it absolutely clear that they supported Wilson not because of his political affiliation, but because they thought he would make a better party leader and campaigner than his opponent Brown.<sup>27</sup> Wilson's charisma got him the job, not his politics. The majority of his union allies expected Wilson to implement a set of social democratic policies. Labour insisted, as did the SPD, that a second industrial revolution was imminent and that the future of British industry hinged upon how it modernized and used the new production technologies. Labour staked its hopes on what Wilson referred to as "the white heat of technology."<sup>28</sup> Technological adaptation was to bring competitiveness back to British industry, and with it renewed economic growth and prosperity to fund increased welfare expenditures.

#### Promises and Performance: Social Democrats in Government

In 1964 the Labour Party won the elections and replaced the Conservatives in power. In 1966 the SPD entered a governing coalition with the conservative parties. The SPD had to wait another three years until it became the senior partner in a coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) to turn social democratic promises into political reality. Once in government, the high hopes for a rapid implementation of social democratic reforms to bring about a more efficient capitalism were dashed by the onset of economic problems. In the British case, the economic crisis set in during 1966, only to be exacerbated by the oil embargo of 1973–74. West Germany recovered quickly from the economic slowdown of 1966, but the tremendous growth rates of the 1950s and early 1960s could not be replicated in the 1970s, particularly after the oil crisis. The electoral promises of reforms, a fairer socioeconomic system, and increased participation in the workplace and the universities were either abandoned or watered down and delayed. Instead, both Labour and SPD found themselves in a situation where they were more concerned with managing the economic problems of their respective economies rather than reforming them as promised.<sup>29</sup>

Managing rather than reforming, cutting rather than extending welfare benefits, alienated significant interest and social groups within and outside of the two parties. Trade unions found themselves captive to "their" government, their membership subject to losses of economic benefits; and stu-

dent protest groups and white-collar workers found their demands for workplace and university reforms abandoned or neglected. These circumstances heightened conflicts between social democrats and their opponents. But, while in government, social democratic party leaders and their supporters in representative or party offices were relatively secure from oppositional pressures. SPD social democrats isolated their socialist and new left opponents; Labour Party leaders simply ignored their critics. The following sections examine the performance of the two parties in government.

### SPD Performance in Government: 1966–82

The SPD's term in government can be divided into three distinctive periods characterized by quite different personalities and policy objectives. From 1966 to 1969 the SPD formed part of the so-called "Grand Coalition" with the CDU/CSU. These three years were dominated by two policy concerns. First, the Grand Coalition introduced the Emergency Laws as a constitutional amendment. Second, the Grand Coalition was formed to consider, develop, and pass an economic policy package to stimulate the economy.

Willy Brandt became chancellor in 1969 and inaugurated the second period of SPD rule. Brandt entered government in a coalition with the FDP led by Walter Scheel with two major policy promises. The first was to relax and normalize, as far as possible, relations with East Germany and the Soviet bloc. The second promise concerned a range of social, educational, and workplace related reform policies. The so-called "reform package" and Brandt's "Ostpolitik" became central issues at the 1972 elections in which the SPD scored its most impressive electoral victory to date. However, only two years after this event, Brandt resigned.

Helmut Schmidt's reign as the SPD's chancellor from 1974 to 1982 marks the third period of SPD rule. Schmidt continued the coalition with the FDP now led by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who took over the foreign ministry and has not relinquished this position since then. Schmidt's years as chancellor are often quite aptly described as the "economic crisis management" years. Many of the reform policies initiated under Brandt were scaled back (worker codetermination, educational reform, economic planning, investment steering) or simply abandoned. The SPD-led government relied on good economic performance and maintaining law and order for their electoral appeal. However, over time, the Schmidt group

alienated various intraparty groups over its defense policy (the NATO double track decision) and its neglect of environmental issues. The SPD lost these voters first to the new social movements and then to the Green Party.

### *1966–69: The Grand Coalition*

Two developments led to the Grand Coalition. For the first time since 1949, West Germany experienced economic slowdown in 1965. Second, the constitution did not contain a section on emergency legislation and the CDU/CSU government wanted to introduce measures to regulate a state of emergency. Both measures required, according to the CDU/CSU leadership, a broad consensus. They brought the SPD into the government to give both measures broad parliamentary and, therefore, public legitimacy.<sup>30</sup>

Leading politicians from all political parties expressed fears about the impact that slower growth might have on the electorate. Some suggested that democracy in West Germany was only guaranteed by economic success, but not by an emotional attachment to the democratic process and was, therefore, inherently unstable. Many politicians feared that economic slowdown would lead to a reemergence of extremist groups of both the left and right. The desire to write emergency legislation was partially caused by the specter of extremism.<sup>31</sup> Ironically, the Grand Coalition did bring about the rise of both an extremist nationalist party (the Nationale Partei Deutschland—NPD) and a leftist student protest movement (the Ausserparlamentarische Opposition—APO). Both NPD and APO protested against the absence of an opposition to the Grand Coalition.<sup>32</sup> They suggested that it was quite unsettling that politicians as diverse as the social democrat Brandt and the arch-conservative Franz Josef Strauss should peacefully coalesce in a cabinet led by a former National Socialist—Kurt Georg Kiesinger.

Despite the fact that the Grand Coalition was opposed by a growing student protest movement and the bulk of trade unions, the episode turned out to be of great advantage to the SPD. Once the Emergency Laws were adopted, the issue faded very quickly from the public debate. Moreover, the coalition government produced an economic policy which was credited with bringing about a miraculous economic recovery by the end of 1966. The SPD had the foresight to insist upon having their economic expert, Karl Schiller, as minister for economics. Schiller, who later left the SPD to join the CDU, was credited with bringing about renewed economic

growth.<sup>33</sup> He represented not only a moderate SPD policy strategy and loyalty to the capitalist system, but also suggested to the electorate that the SPD was capable of running as complex an economy as that of West Germany. Detractors had argued that a party out of government for over thirty years was incapable of governing. The Grand Coalition proved otherwise. The party was rewarded with a marked improvement in the elections of 1969. With a 42.7 percent share of the vote the party was only some 3 percent short of the CDU/CSU and able to form a coalition government with the FDP. Electorally, the adoption of the Godesberg Programm and success in government from 1966 to 1969 made the SPD a competitive party. It had increased its share of the vote from 31.8 percent in 1957 to 39.2 percent in 1965. Now the party could form a government as senior partner in a coalition.

#### *1969–74: The Brandt Foreign and Domestic Policy Reforms*

The next five years of government under Chancellor Willy Brandt divide into a period (1969–72) where foreign policy, or Ostpolitik, dominated the agenda, and then a second period (1972–74) where domestic reforms were on top of the SPD-led government's list of priorities. The SPD's attempt to normalize relations with East Germany and a variety of East European nations including the Soviet Union overshadowed all other issues in the Bundestag.<sup>34</sup> Domestically, the issue of détente proved explosive. The CDU/CSU opposition argued that Brandt pursued an unconstitutional policy because any recognition of East German sovereignty was a violation of West Germany's Basic Law. The CDU eventually took the SPD-led government to the Constitutional Court where it lost its case.<sup>35</sup> Despite this outcome, Ostpolitik was a highly controversial policy even within the SPD, and when the time came to vote on a treaty with East Germany in the Bundestag, it appeared that Brandt did not have the necessary votes for his policy. However, the CDU/CSU failed in its attempt to topple Brandt with a constructive vote of no confidence. Nevertheless, Brandt no longer enjoyed a clear majority in the Bundestag and elections became necessary both to provide a government and to function as a kind of referendum on Ostpolitik.<sup>36</sup>

The 1972 elections produced an unexpectedly large victory for the SPD. The party gained 45.8 percent of the second vote and surpassed the CDU/CSU as the largest party. This proved that the SPD had succeeded in



attracting a wide variety of voters. A factor which produced unpredictability in these elections was that eighteen-year-olds were for the first time allowed to vote and the SPD was able to attract a disproportionately large share of first time voters. The reform promises Brandt and other SPD leaders made during the election campaign attracted not only the first time voters, but a sizable student constituency. Brandt not only promised more attention to environmental issues (at that stage a fairly minor issue) but he promised an ambitious attempt to democratize society. As he put it, the SPD ought to risk "more democracy" by which he meant participation in the workplace (*Mitbestimmung*) and in the universities.<sup>37</sup>

The electoral platform also attracted both blue- and white-collar workers in record numbers since the party could offer successful economic management as a proven track record. The years from 1969 to 1972 had been marked by increasing industrial conflict, but also by relatively high growth rates and high wage settlements for most unions.<sup>38</sup> The SPD promised the extension of welfare provisions—a more progressive tax system; higher old age pensions; flexible retirement age; and a variety of improvements in social security benefits. Finally, the SPD launched its campaign for codetermination as urged by the trade unions. The unions, both blue- and white-collar, supported codetermination proposals.

By the early summer of 1974 Willy Brandt had been replaced by Helmut Schmidt as chancellor. Ostensibly the reason for Brandt's resignation was the discovery of an East German spy in the chancellory.<sup>39</sup> However, Brandt resigned for other reasons as well. He could claim that the coalition had done what it set out to do in foreign policy. Treaties with Poland, East Germany, and the Soviet Union had been signed and ratified. Travel to and from East Germany became somewhat easier for Germans on both sides of the divide. However, domestically few of the promises of 1972 had been fulfilled. Brandt ran into a series of obstacles. First, he had to deal with a coalition partner that was not prepared to accept any reform that would bring about "qualitative social structural changes compatible with the aims of democratic socialism."<sup>40</sup> The FDP did not support the democratization plans of the SPD left or any serious attempt to "eradicate privilege on all fronts."<sup>41</sup> Second, Brandt was limited by a series of intra-party confrontations over the reform package discussed in the following chapter. Finally, the ability to reform was curtailed by the oil crisis of 1973–74. Managing the crisis rather than bringing reforms now became the most important task for the coalition.



*1974–82: The Schmidt Years and Modell Deutschland*

By all accounts, the Schmidt/Genscher coalition succeeded in weathering the economic crisis of the 1970s admirably well. While most West European countries experienced prolonged economic slowdown, West Germany emerged from the oil shock in remarkably good condition. There is, of course, a debate as to whether the reasons for West Germany's economic success lie in government policy or in the unique position of many of its more competitive industrial sectors.<sup>42</sup> The slogan "Modell Deutschland" intimated that West Germany was indeed to be emulated. There is little doubt that Schmidt won the 1976 and 1980 elections because of the extraordinary economic performance of West Germany's manufacturing base.

The Schmidt/Genscher government collapsed in 1982 over economic policy. The second oil crisis of 1981 forced the government into a round of austerity programs. The SPD was reluctant to impose even greater cut-backs in social welfare programs as had already been imposed up to that point, while the FDP insisted upon further reducing expenditure. The FDP defected from the coalition and forced Schmidt into opposition through a constructive vote of no confidence. But the SPD's period in government ended because their coalition partner defected.<sup>43</sup> However, in electoral terms the party did not lose its FDP-leaning voters, only those on its left wing. In 1980 the Green Party had already formed but had not become a serious electoral threat. In 1983, however, the party broke through the 5 percent barrier and won entry into the Bundestag.

The emergence of the "new social movements," which represent the base for the Green Party, explains the electoral demise of the SPD. Each of the new social movements emerged as a result of SPD policy. The environmental groups organized against the nuclear power policy of the national and state governments. The environmental movement also campaigned against union-supported building projects. The feminist movements campaigned against the failure of the Schmidt government to bring about policies to end discrimination against women at work, in the family, and before the courts. The peace movement protested the Schmidt-inspired NATO "double track" decisions which brought about the modernization of NATO's nuclear armaments, particularly on West German soil. The SPD had initially backed Schmidt's proposals to President Carter to match the Soviet buildup of medium range missiles.<sup>44</sup>

Many of the activists in the new social movements and the Green Party

were former SPD voters and activists. They left the SPD disillusioned with the failure of the party to live up to the expectations it had awakened with its reform strategy of 1972. Reforms had been promised in many areas. A reform of the universities had been promised to reduce student numbers, increase the number of universities, and to create a more democratic interaction between students, assistants, and professors. This reform eventually did become a reality but it did not create the avenues of democratic participation that the student protest movement had demanded. Further, codetermination was to be introduced in the workplace.<sup>45</sup> The final codetermination law of 1976 looked very different from the initial drafts of the early 1970s. Only firms with more than 2,500 employees were affected and the management side was given an extra vote on the powerful supervisory board. The FDP insisted upon this caveat to full codetermination. The final bill did not significantly shift power in the firm away from the employer to the employees.<sup>46</sup>

Jürgen Hoffmann notes that the promised reforms of 1972 were either abandoned or turned into the opposite of what the reform movements had initially called for.<sup>47</sup> Hoffmann suggests that more planning was replaced by more market; and more democracy was replaced by less participation. Schmidt's ascent to the chancellorship brought the end of the reform strategy and increased tensions with the political left, both in the SPD and outside of it.<sup>48</sup> The struggles over the "radical's decree" and the "Berufsverbot," which barred former members of the Communist Party from becoming state employees since they, by definition, did not support the West German Basic Law, is an obvious example of the bitter rift between the Schmidt group and the political left.<sup>49</sup> Those sections of the electorate and the SPD's political activists who had voted or joined the party in order to bring about more democracy as Brandt had promised were sorely disappointed by the Schmidt government.

By the end of 1981 Helmut Schmidt had seriously alienated two important constituencies. On the one hand, many of the reform supporters of the 1972 era voted for the Green Party. The Greens also represented those constituencies most affected by the austerity program, which imposed cutbacks on nonunionized groups such as welfare recipients, the handicapped, some of the unemployed, and certain groups among the elderly.<sup>50</sup> On the other hand, the unions most affected by government cutbacks (particularly those in the public services) opposed SPD policies through demonstrations and, occasionally, strikes. The unions broke rank with the government over wage policy and used their considerable economic

power to bargain directly with the employers, from whom they hoped to get a more positive response than from the government.<sup>51</sup> However, while the unions opposed the Schmidt government because of its austerity program, they did not support the emerging Green movement, which they regarded as a threat to economic growth. Union leaders viewed the Greens as more of a threat to prosperity than the limited austerity measures of the SPD in response to the temporary economic setback of 1981–82.

#### Labour's Performance in Government: 1964–70 and 1974–79

Labour's control of government was interrupted for four years by the Conservatives in 1970 to 1974. Labour's performance divides into four distinct periods. Harold Wilson came to power with the promise of rejuvenating the British economy by encouraging new technologies and keeping the pound strong. By 1966 these policies were abandoned in favor of inflation fighting measures which necessarily meant wage reductions for trade union members. Having lost the 1970 elections, Labour regrouped and developed a new strategy. The party's Annual Conference adopted very radical, socialist policies between 1970 and 1973. But union leaders recognized that Labour might not be able to implement these policies and that the party's leadership opposed most of the policies in any case. A compromise was worked out. The so-called "Social Contract" was to provide the unions with a number of desired policies in return for union wage restraint and support for Labour's inflation fighting measures.

The Social Contract was implemented, at least partially, after Wilson returned to Downing Street in 1974. By 1976 Britain's economic decline imposed severe limitations upon the Labour government. The promises to expand some social programs, to keep unemployment down, and invest in prosperous industries were dashed by conditions imposed through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the insistence by Wilson's replacement as prime minister, James Callaghan, that inflation had to be curbed before Labour could worry about either extending welfare benefits or agree to higher wages. The unions supported Callaghan for two years, but by the end of 1978 a series of wildcat strikes broke the unions' wage restraint strategy and Labour's economic policies. Britain's economic woes and the wave of strikes of the Winter of Discontent had two immediate results for Labour: the party was trounced at the 1979 elections and

the left in the party and unions, for the first time, took control over union and party policymaking. Over the next two years the policy and organizational changes within Labour occasioned the defection of many social democrats to form their own organization: the Social Democratic Party.

*1964–69: Wilson, the British Pound, and  
“In Place of Strife”*

Labour’s major policy aim was the maintenance of the pound’s value when the party came to power in 1964.<sup>52</sup> However, the government was unable to reverse the loss of international confidence in the currency. Britain’s deteriorating economic position was, of course, a determining factor in the currency’s fall. Rising unemployment and inflation, coupled with decreasing rates of foreign investment, reflected the structural problems of an economic system that had failed to modernize or to direct investment.<sup>53</sup> Wilson’s electoral promise had been that Labour would encourage investment in new technologies to foster British competitiveness. But this strategy required confidence in the British economy and its future prospects. This confidence did not exist, and neither did the government consider investment strategies along the lines of its European or Japanese competitors. Experts disagree as to what policy course, if any, could have ameliorated the situation. However, there is considerable consensus that the Wilson government waited too long with its devaluation of the currency.

Instead, Labour turned to its union allies. Wilson argued that the primary goal of economic policy must be to curb inflation and the way to do that was through wage restraint on behalf of the unions.<sup>54</sup> The union leaders, with some reluctance, agreed to help their government in its time of need. They overcame considerable resistance to wage ceilings from their shop floor organizations. The shop stewards at the local level rebelled against the trade union leadership’s voluntary wage restraint which they had not voted upon or supported. In a dress rehearsal of the events of 1976 to 1979, unofficial strikes increased and broke the Labour-union leadership cooperation. Union leaders were thus blamed for both more strikes as well as scuttling Labour’s economic policies.<sup>55</sup>

To curb strikes and to restore confidence in the economy, Labour produced “In Place of Strife,” a document outlining an industrial policy in which government arbitrators would settle industrial disputes and strikes.<sup>56</sup> These government appointees were to be given the power to



overrule union demands. The stage was now set for a full-scale confrontation between a Labour government and the unions who regarded “In Place of Strife” as a frontal attack on their ability to collectively bargain on behalf of their members. The unions began to apply pressure on a number of Labour M.P.s, threatening them with a withdrawal of funds or support for their campaigns if they supported the planned proposals. Therefore, “In Place of Strife” had to be withdrawn. Yet the experience of a Labour government actually contemplating the imposition of intervention in collective bargaining persuaded union leaders that they ought to take a more active role in Labour Party decisionmaking. After the 1970 electoral defeat, the unions supported a number of policy measures which the PLP opposed.<sup>57</sup>

#### *1974–76: Wilson and the Social Contract*

The Conservative government of Edward Heath (1970–74) unwittingly did its best to patch up relations between unions and the Labour Party leadership. The Conservatives imposed an industrial relations policy on the unions which proved to be far more restrictive than anything the Wilson government might have planned. Heath introduced the three-day working week. The 1971 Industrial Relations Bill imposed penalties on the unions in cases of wildcat strikes, and the government abandoned any suggestion of maintaining full employment. As Gourevitch and Bornstein put it: “the conservatives delighted in jettisoning some of the most basic foundations of the postwar settlement on which the security and incomes of workers had long depended, scaling down the provisions of services by the welfare state, and explicitly abandoning the state’s commitment to full employment and support for nationalized industries and for ailing private firms.”<sup>58</sup>

Before Labour returned to power in 1974, the relationship between unions and the party leadership is best described by the contradictory nature of the unions’ support for a radical Labour Party Manifesto in 1973, while at the same time agreeing to an industrial and economic policy described as the “Social Contract.” The 1973 Manifesto called for nationalization of leading industries, worker management schemes, and investment control. The manifesto was, for all intents and purposes, a blueprint for a socialist transformation.<sup>59</sup> However, the unions also agreed to a far more moderate approach outlined in a document entitled “Economic Policy and the Cost of Living.” This document set out the



conditions of the Social Contract. Labour would repeal the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, extend unemployment benefits and social welfare programs, and commit itself to economic planning and greater shop floor power to the unions. The unions would, in return, help Labour control inflation through wage restraint.<sup>60</sup>

Initially the Labour government delivered. Welfare policies were extended, the Industrial Relations Act was replaced by a new, more union-friendly act, and the full working week was reestablished. The Wilson government did its utmost to fulfill union demands except for nationalization.<sup>61</sup> On this issue Wilson as well as the social democratic party leaders argued that a Labour government was not subject to a policy mandate. In 1974 Anthony Wedgwood Benn, the leading advocate of nationalization and the left, had been appointed minister for industry and thereby chairperson of the National Enterprise Board (NEB). The NEB was to be the instrument with which the Labour left hoped to nationalize Britain's leading industries.<sup>62</sup> But as soon as the referendum on continued EC membership showed a majority supportive of the EC, a major defeat for Labour's left, Wilson took the opportunity to remove Benn from this potentially powerful position.<sup>63</sup> The unions did not object. The left and its major transformative policy had been defeated.

### *1976–79: Callaghan and the Winter of Discontent*

Britain's economic crisis worsened considerably after 1974. The country suffered skyrocketing inflation and economic stagnation. By 1976 the government saw itself forced to ask the IMF for a loan to cover its debts. As is IMF practice, such a loan was attached to a series of conditions which severely restricted any further attempt by Labour to expand government expenditures. James Callaghan, who had replaced Wilson as prime minister, was forced to impose another round of austerity measures to curb inflation and to meet the conditions of the IMF.<sup>64</sup>

The union leaders, as in 1966 to 1969, supported their government by imposing wage limits on the rank and file. But by 1978 the shop stewards revolted. Unofficial strikes by the public service sector unions—which were most affected by government spending cuts—and in key industries effectively scuttled the union leaders' accommodationist approach to Labour's incomes policy. The Winter of Discontent put an end to union support of government policy.<sup>65</sup> The large Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) was the first to defy its leaders' strategy by calling for

wildcat strikes and pay increases well above the 5 percent limit Labour and the unions had tried to maintain. To union members, the Labour government had brought many costs and few benefits. Union leaders were reluctant to oppose their membership's activities. Ultimately, the PLP-union arrangement collapsed. To quote again from Gourevitch and Bornstein: "What happened was that the government attempted to extend its incomes policy over and over again, while failing to deliver to the unions the kinds of trade-offs on demand management, unemployment relief, industrial democracy, or structural modernization that might have eased their task of selling and enforcing the increasingly unpopular wage-restraint program."<sup>66</sup>

Not only did the Callaghan government provoke local union rebellion; the PLP managed to alienate a variety of other groups in and outside of the party. Labour's left wing opposed social democratic economic and industrial policy.<sup>67</sup> Labour's defense strategy became an issue with the British peace movement, particularly the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). Economic deterioration led to declining living conditions in the inner cities, which sparked the emergence of citizen initiatives to fight urban decay as well as racism and sexism. As a result of strikes and a widespread perception of economic incompetence, Labour was trounced at the 1979 elections. Labour lost even more votes in 1983 and recovered only marginally in 1987. The most immediate result of the 1979 election defeat was that the union movement and Labour left enforced significant changes, first in organizational rules, then party policy, and finally in the party leadership, to avoid another defeat as in 1966 and 1976. The bill for its performance in government was a wholesale abandonment of the leadership group around Callaghan by the majority of union leaders. This abandonment caused the defection of most prominent social democrats from Labour in 1981 and created the single most important obstacle to another Labour victory—the Social Democratic Party—in 1983 and 1987.

### The Elite and Policy Renewal Process

Parties have choices to make after incurring electoral losses. They may agree that the unfortunate development was a temporary setback and refuse to adjust their strategy.<sup>68</sup> In both Labour's and the SPD's case this option was less likely since both parties had undergone significant electoral erosion for some time. Once parties collectively decide it is time to

adjust, a number of options are open. They may adjust organizationally to become a more attractive party, to win new recruits, and change the internal balance between representatives, leaders, functionaries, activists, and members. They may adjust their policies to attract new groups or to retrench their electoral support in an established social base. Finally, they may change their leadership team. The Labour Party embarked upon major organizational, policy, and elite level changes. The SPD reacted far more cautiously and has only slowly changed some of its policies and allowed for a controlled change in the leadership group.

### *The SPD Case*

The SPD did not change its organizational structure or any of the rules governing the relationship between party activists and representatives. From 1968 to 1973 the new left in the Young Socialists (Jusos) had demanded the introduction of the “imperative mandate.”<sup>69</sup> The imperative mandate was to force party representatives, particularly at the local level, to enact policies adopted by the local party. Since at that time Jusos quite often controlled the local party but had not appointed the representatives, they wanted to obtain institutional powers to force representatives to enact policies they otherwise opposed. The party leadership from Brandt to Schmidt to Johannes Rau in 1987 all rejected any suggestion that party leaders were bound to policy decisions made by the party.<sup>70</sup>

At the elite level, the SPD was also relatively slow to adjust. The group around Helmut Schmidt controlled the upper echelons of the party until after the elections of 1983, and the party promised continuity in policy and its political elite.<sup>71</sup> Hans Jochen Vogel, the chancellor candidate in 1983, had been appointed because of his good contacts to the Schmidt group as well as other influential intraparty groups. The appointment of Johannes Rau as chancellor candidate in 1987 was motivated by similar considerations. Rau represented the traditional heartland of the SPD (Rau was prime minister of North-Rhine Westphalia) and its core constituency—the blue-collar working class. Rau stood for uncompromising opposition to the Green Party.<sup>72</sup> However, the composition of the Executive Committee had started to shift to include more leftist representatives.<sup>73</sup> Since the 1987 electoral disaster the SPD has made a concerted attempt to reintegrate the “green” constituency by moving younger politicians into important executive and even presidium positions. Oscar Lafontaine,

who will most probably be the party's chancellor candidate in 1990, is associated with the environmental and peace groups inside the SPD. He is supported by a growing group of politicians sometimes referred to as "Brandt's grandchildren." This group, while still a minority in the party, voices policy demands close to those of the new social movements.<sup>74</sup>

While the SPD might not have effected fundamental organizational or elite level changes, the party has attempted to answer the charge that it neglected the policy demands of the new social movements. The party underwent a wide-ranging debate on its defense and environmental policies. In these two areas the most remarkable changes have occurred since the days of the Schmidt government. During the 1970s the unions and most social democrats viewed environmentalists as a nuisance at best and subversive at worst.<sup>75</sup> By 1985, at the Dortmund Party Convention, the go-ahead was given for a revamping of the SPD's environmental policy. Two leading trade unionists produced a policy paper (the Rappe/Steinkuehler paper) which has since served as the basis for an environmental and industrial policy based upon "qualitative" rather than "quantitative" growth.<sup>76</sup> The paper argues for a state-led effort to expand German manufacturing into environmental technologies. The paper is a classic social democratic compromise: it placates moderate environmentalists because it shows good faith; it placates the unions because it hopes to maintain jobs; and it placates business because it provides new avenues of production with little risk.<sup>77</sup>

Defense policy was also adjusted to accommodate for the loss of support from the peace constituency.<sup>78</sup> While the commitment to NATO was never questioned, support for the modernization of nuclear weapons and the NATO double track decision were reversed.<sup>79</sup> Similarly, the party has attempted to win back the feminist vote by emulating the Green Party. The SPD has promised to provide a quota system—40 percent of its national representatives are to be female by 1990.<sup>80</sup> However, on economic policy no concessions to the traditional left or the Greens were made. While qualitative growth is stressed, economic growth is still paramount. The SPD remains very much committed to the social market economy and any suggestions of investment control or nationalizations have been rejected by the Executive Committee, the Presidium, and the Party Convention.<sup>81</sup> Social democrats will dominate party policy and positions, but they have adopted a much more accommodationist stance toward the new left than in the 1970s.



*The Labour Case*

Labour underwent a fundamental organizational change in 1979 to 1981. The Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) was able to persuade the Annual Conference to adopt mandatory reselection in 1979, and in 1981 the CLPD achieved a second victory by changing the leadership selection methods. The CLPD convinced the Annual Conference that if M.P.s were required to undergo an automatic reselection process prior to every general election in their constituency parties, they would be far less likely to ignore party policy as the Wilson/Callaghan PLP had done.<sup>82</sup> Although this proposal had been rejected by Annual Conference on previous occasions, in 1979 a majority of trade union delegates viewed such a constitutional change as a convenient way of controlling the PLP.<sup>83</sup>

In 1981 a special conference was convened at Wembley to discuss and decide upon a second CLPD constitutional change in the selection process of the party leader.<sup>84</sup> Hitherto, party leaders had been elected by the PLP. CLPD suggested that party leaders ought to be selected by the PLP in concert with the constituency Labour parties and the unions. The conference adopted a CLPD proposal to elect party leaders through an electoral college every year in which the PLP was given 30 percent of the vote, the CLPs another 30 percent, and the unions 40 percent.<sup>85</sup> The Wembley decision triggered the defection of the social democrats from Labour who had opposed this constitutional change.

When the social democrats defected from the party, they hastened a process of elite replacement that had already begun. James Callaghan had been replaced as party leader by Michael Foot. The entire social democratic "Gang of Four" consisting of Shirley Williams, William Owen, William Rogers, and Roy Jenkins would have faced trouble in their respective CLPs had they stayed in the party.<sup>86</sup> The composition of the PLP changed to include more leftist members. However, the most important elite level changes of 1979 to 1982 occurred at the NEC level where John Golding was, for some time, the only voice of the social democrats. The unions had placed numerous leftists on the NEC.<sup>87</sup> Once the SDP had been formed, and almost replaced the Labour Party as opposition party at the 1983 elections, the union leaders began to backpedal. The actual changes at the NEC level since 1982–83 are too complicated to review in detail here. Suffice it to say that since 1983 the unions have consistently rejected NEC candidates associated with the far left groups and have provided Neil Kinnock with a (more or less) compliant NEC.<sup>88</sup>



With the electoral defeat of 1979, the party resurrected many of its policies contained in the 1973 Election Manifesto. With complete disregard for public opinion the party insisted on a return to nationalization of all major industries, protectionist measures for declining industries, and investment control. In other words, the Alternative Economic Strategy was overhauled and updated for the 1980s by the so-called Manifesto Group.<sup>89</sup>

Similarly, the party adopted a radical stance on defense. While Labour had always supported NATO and the British nuclear force, in 1979 the party swung in favor of unilateral disarmament. The party campaigned for an alternative defense policy in which Britain would no longer remain a nuclear power. The party found itself at a disadvantage because of its pacifist defense posture when the Falklands war broke out.<sup>90</sup> The party opposed the campaign and was, of course, roasted by the Conservative Party for not wanting to support a "strong Britain." Since 1983 the party has oscillated wildly on the defense issue. At the Annual Conference the unions managed to vote both for unilateral as well as multilateral disarmament.<sup>91</sup> In 1989 the party finally abandoned unilateralism, although it remains to be seen whether this rejection is final.<sup>92</sup>

The electoral defeats of 1983 and 1987 have led to much soul-searching in the party. The unions are not committed to any policy before them because different unions have different preferences, particularly on economic strategy, as Dunleavy and Husbands suggest.<sup>93</sup> There is little consensus among the unions whether protectionism or nationalization are advantageous or disastrous policies. Some unions might benefit from both, particularly those in declining industries. But union members in competitive industries do not support either policy.<sup>94</sup> In 1989 the party claims to have abandoned its commitments to nationalization and protectionism.<sup>95</sup> The unions are divided in their preferences. Consequently, Labour's policy platform oscillates from Annual Conference to Annual Conference. The NEC commissioned a policy review in 1987 which recently finished its report.<sup>96</sup> The recommendations contained in the document read like the policy statement of the SDP in 1981. It would appear that social democracy has returned to the Labour Party. However, the disunity in the union movement is such that a reversal of policies is more than likely. In other words, it is difficult to establish whether there is a policy consensus in the party and which group or set of preferences is dominant.

### Conclusions: Electoral Performance, Shifting Social Bases, and Policy Choices

There can be little doubt that both SPD and Labour face electoral and organizational dilemmas. Both parties have suffered from marked electoral decline since the 1970s. While economic conditions allowed for it, these parties could credibly promise expanded welfare benefits and trade union rights. With economic slowdown, industrial adjustments, and value changes, the two parties have experienced severe difficulties keeping divergent constituencies together. The 1972 SPD reform package and the Social Contract promised more than either party could deliver. Both parties paid for their failure to deliver to their respective constituencies.

Both parties face similar choices. Social change and economic adjustment processes are at the heart of their electoral and organizational problems. The social base is split between those groups that benefit from industrial adjustment—workers and employees in the expanding and competitive industries and service sectors—and those who suffer the consequences of economic decline and uncompetitiveness. Which groups should the party favor? Those groups in the expanding sectors of the economy where more future workers might be located or the traditional electoral base in declining sectors? Further, the parties are split along the “materialist/postmaterialist” dimension. The protest movements of the late 1960s were recruited by both parties and, at least partially, incorporated. Centrifugal tendencies are at work in both parties, and they also had to make difficult choices about which constituency to placate. But the two parties reacted in very different ways to these choices. The task of the next chapter is to explain why they reacted so differently. The chapter describes how each group in the party devised its strategy, how the unions reacted to these aims, and what consequences these actions had for each party.

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## 6 Intraparty Groups and Strategies to Win Power

The last chapter described the outcomes of the two parties' internal struggles over policy, personality, and organizational rules. This one aims to analyze two issues. First, what were the motives for action for each group involved in the struggle? Second, what were the strategies chosen by each group and how was each "winning" group or coalition of groups able to maintain or win power over policy and organization?

The chapter shows not only that organizational structures and rules define power relations within a political organization, they also shape the interests and policy positions of the actors involved. Although the emphasis is on the developments from 1966 onward, the methods by which social democrats secured their dominance in the 1950s are a crucial part of the story. The chapter will first discuss how social democrats defeated traditional socialists in both parties before moving to the new left challenge of the late 1960s and 1970s. After examining the new left strategy, the discussion focuses on reactions of social democrats and the unions. Finally, the policy and elite renewal of the 1980s is examined in the light of the attempted accommodation between new left, social democrats, traditional socialists, and trade unionists in order to regain electoral competitiveness and organizational cohesion.

### Social Democracy's Triumph over Socialism

Although both parties experienced social democratic hegemony in the 1950s, this dominance had very different organizational foundations. In

the SPD, social democracy triumphed because the leadership of the party was convinced that it was the only path to electoral success. Social democracy was rigorously enforced from the top of the organization downward after social democrats had defeated their socialist opponents.<sup>1</sup> In the Labour Party, social democracy depended on the support of a number of major trade unions at the Annual Conference, which between them were able to outvote all opposition if they acted in unison. The union block vote guaranteed social democracy its predominance in personnel decisions and policymaking.<sup>2</sup>

Ideological and theoretical inconsistencies are part and parcel of the SPD's history. Committed to socialism for much of its early years, the party nevertheless managed to adopt policies which did not sit well with socialist principles. The split of 1917 between Communists, "independent" radical socialists, and mainstream SPD supporters over policy concerning the war effort attested to that.<sup>3</sup> A similar inconsistency marked the party in the postwar period. Although committed to socialism, the party was not prepared to turn principle into political praxis. Detlef Lehnert suggested that the Godesberg Programm was merely a recognition of principles guiding party policymaking for much of the SPD's existence.<sup>4</sup> Not content with being a "protest party," the SPD aspired to being a governing party. As such, it could not advocate socialist transformation since there was never an electoral majority in favor of such a goal.

A remarkably broad consensus developed within the SPD after successive electoral defeats in the 1950s: a clear readjustment of party policy was necessary to regain electoral competitiveness. The Godesberg Programm represented a rejection of socialism. However, even though the Godesberg Programm was accepted by 95 percent of the 1959 Party Convention delegates, the abandonment of Marxist class analysis, particularly on economic issues, was opposed by up to 30 percent of the delegates.<sup>5</sup> There are, to my knowledge, no studies of the actual internal process leading up to adoption of the program. However, there are a few studies of internal struggles in local parties prior to and after the adoption of the program. One of these studies focuses on Berlin where Willy Brandt began his ascent to the leadership.<sup>6</sup>

Brandt was one of the major players in the party's adaption process. In 1958 Brandt became the mayor of Berlin after a protracted struggle in the Berlin party between Brandt's supporters and a traditional socialist left wing. Brandt's rise to become mayoral candidate for the Berlin SPD was marked by a ferocious battle from one local party organization to the



next.<sup>7</sup> Brandt's followers were able to outnumber the established party people through mobilization of new members and through the ruthless use of organized voting power when it came to electing officials at the local and then regional level.<sup>8</sup> The tactics by which this takeover was achieved were not very different from those used by the new left in the 1970s when they in turn attempted to win control over local parties, described in more detail in the next chapter. A major difference, however, between the situation for social democrats in the 1950s and the Jusos challenge of the 1970s is that formerly "socialist" party leaders sympathized with social democratic ideals, which was not the case in the 1970s.

The triumph of social democracy in the SPD came after social democrats had been able to mobilize sufficient support in the local parties for their policies.<sup>9</sup> Social democratic party leaders had to build a solid foundation from the local level upward to change party policies. In many cases the leadership group already had such a basis. They had to persuade their followers that a change of political ideology was the road to electoral success. Others, such as Brandt in Berlin, had to build a membership and activist base. The important point is that social democracy as it appeared in the Godesberg Programm had to have solid backing among the party rank and file.

A thorough campaign was launched to eliminate the losers of the struggle over the Godesberg Programm. A number of leftist groups were expelled from the party for "not sharing the basic principles of the party." As party leaders argued, the Godesberg Programm represented a "minimal consensus" and whoever could not share this agreement had no place in the party.<sup>10</sup> The Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenverband (the German SDS) was the most visible of such groups.<sup>11</sup> There were several others, and some individuals, that were banished to a political life outside of the SPD and ended up in competition with the minute Communist parties. Others left of their own accord. Socialists were so despondent about their position that they did not even bother to put resolutions to the Party Convention, knowing fully that they had no chance of being accepted.<sup>12</sup> As Albert Hirschman noted, when there is no "exit" option for intra-organizational opponents (in this case a viable Communist or socialist party), there are only two options—voice opposition very loudly and run the risk of being expelled, or keep quiet.<sup>13</sup> Both situations occurred—those who kept quiet waited to emerge as opposition under more favorable conditions, and those who rebelled were frequently punished by being banished to life on the fringes of the political system.



Social democracy's triumph in the Labour Party was based on entirely different organizational foundations. In the 1950s a group of trade unions led by the so-called "Big Three"—the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), and the General and Municipal Workers Union (GMWU)—supported social democratic policies and candidates.<sup>14</sup> The "praetorian guard," as Minkin refers to the union coalition protecting social democratic party leaders, saw its role as giving the party leadership a solid basis of support at the Annual Conference. Labour leaders did not suffer a major defeat from 1950 to 1966 at the Annual Conference except on the issue of disarmament in 1960.<sup>15</sup> In other words, social democratic party leaders depended on their allies in the union movement to maintain power in their organization, and then to support them in the Labour Party. This organizational basis eroded in the 1960s when leftist candidates started to replace their rightist, social democratic predecessors in some of the bigger unions. By 1968 the miners had abandoned their moderation on policy, especially incomes restraint, and the membership voted for leftist leaders such as Lawrence Daly, and later Arthur Scargill.<sup>16</sup> By the end of the 1960s social democracy had lost its base of support among the trade unions.

Yet, throughout the 1950s the social democratic dominance seemed invincible. For traditional socialists the rightist union block vote represented a major obstacle to having any of their policy proposals even heard at the Annual Conference, since it was these unions which determined who the individuals on the CAC were.<sup>17</sup> Arthur Deakin of the TGWU, Tom Williamson of the GMWU and Will Lather of the NUM controlled over half the votes at the Annual Conference. They usually voted with the Engineers Union and the Railways Union, which gave this block over 5 million out of a total of some 6 million votes. The right-wing trade union block therefore controlled agenda setting, policymaking at the Annual Conference, and appointments to the NEC.<sup>18</sup> If they acted in a coordinated fashion, opponents had no chance to even put up candidates for a national office. If a leftist was elected to a position of power it was only because these unions tolerated the candidate.

The socialists were effectively isolated as a minority in the CLPs, the PLP, and in the unions. Under such conditions, a purge of socialists and opponents of the dominant social democratic personalities and policies was simply unnecessary. Minkin suggested that such a campaign might have led to serious intraunion upheavals, a situation the rightist leadership wanted to avoid. The campaign to amend Clause Four of the party

constitution, which states that Labour is committed to bringing about socialism, was abandoned in 1960 precisely for this reason.<sup>19</sup> Union and party leaders wanted to avoid unnecessary struggles over a principle which, at that time, had little impact on the party's policies. In other words, the base of support for social democratic party leaders was not a mass of activists and members at the base of the party or the unions, but a group of trade union leaders.

### The New Left Challenge: Assault from Below or from Outside?

Conditions changed for opponents of the social democratic course by the end of the 1960s, again for divergent sets of reasons. In West Germany a student movement emerged which challenged many of the fundamental values of both traditional socialism as well as capitalism. The student movement influenced and infiltrated the SPD to use the party as a platform for its reform plans. In the Labour Party, economic conditions led to increasing confrontations between and among unions and the PLP. Schisms between and within these two groups opened up opportunities for both traditional socialists and new leftist groups to gain influence in party decisionmaking.

#### *The SPD Case*

Partially as a result of the expulsion of leftists from the SPD after 1959, numerous socialist splinter groups emerged in the early 1960s which were to form the extra-parliamentary opposition (APO).<sup>20</sup> The APO led a campaign essentially on three major issues: the planned emergency legislation; NATO foreign policy, particularly on Vietnam and Iran; and university reform. Influenced by the writings of Marcuse, Sartre, and the Frankfurt School, the APO advocated emancipation from bureaucratic oppression, democratization of state bureaucracies, and liberation from the production process (whether capitalist or socialist).<sup>21</sup> The initial strategy was to raise the consciousness of students and workers by teach-ins, sit-ins, and demonstrations about various issues. But the strategy did not mobilize much support outside of the student population (unlike that in France or Italy). APO leaders reached the conclusion that the movement had to change strategy to reach the masses. Rudi Dutschke and others suggested

that members should join establishment organizations, such as the unions and the SPD, to “march through the institutions” to change society from within.<sup>22</sup> As one of the leading Jusos put it, the Jusos wanted “to shape a new society, not administer the old one” (“Gestalten und nicht verwalten!”).<sup>23</sup>

The Jusos became the focus of attention for many of those influenced by APO activities. By 1967 a significant change of political direction had taken place among the Jusos. Previously an organization for ambitious party youth intent on making a career by toeing the party line, by 1968 an intra-Juso opposition to social democracy had developed. In 1969 the chairman of the Jusos was thrown out of office and replaced by a leading figure of the left—Karsten Voigt.<sup>24</sup> The Jusos became the carriers of many APO ideas and policy proposals inside the SPD. The Jusos had simply been swamped and taken over by APO members or sympathizers. From their bases in the local parties, the new leftists challenged many of the local social democratic candidates for party offices or representative positions. In line with the concept of “marching through the institutions,” the Jusos adopted the so-called “double strategy.” The central idea was to mobilize workers and students against alienation, domination, and exploitation under capitalism and the state bureaucracy, while at the same time mobilizing support within the SPD to take over the party from the local levels upward.<sup>25</sup>

Although the Jusos regarded themselves as the vanguard of the working class, they had precious little support from workers. Most Juso activists came from middle-class backgrounds; their debates were held in a style more akin to university settings and often held in language the ordinary citizen found incomprehensible.<sup>26</sup> Similarly the habit of debating for hours on end proved to be not only tiring for many working-class members of the SPD, but an active hindrance to participation. Workers had to go home to sleep before the next day at work; students frequently stayed away from classes if the previous night’s activities proved to have been too tiresome.<sup>27</sup> Of course, if the point of endless debate was to weaken the opposition, the strategy certainly worked.<sup>28</sup>

The Jusos never obtained much support from the workers and unionists in the SPD, not only because of their language and social background, but because very frequently Juso groups would support their own candidate for local office against a candidate from the unions.<sup>29</sup> Taking over local party offices, at least in places where there were lots of students, proved to be a far simpler strategy than actually mobilizing workers around Juso

Table 6: Occupational Structure of the SPD's Membership, 1952-77  
(in percentages)

	1952	1968	1973	1977
Workers	45	34.5	26.4	28
Employees	17	20.6	21.9	24
Civil Servants	5	9.9	8.9	10
Pensioners	12	24.2	13.3	10
Housewives	7	4.3	9.9	11
Students/Trainees	—	0.9	6.8	11

Source: Adapted from Horst Schmollinger and Richard Stöss, "Sozialstruktur und Parteiensystem," in Dieter Staritz, ed., *Das Parteiensystem der BRD*, Opladen: Leske, 1980, p. 234.

policy proposals. For local support in their attempt to take over the local or city-wide party or even a subdistrict, Jusos relied far more heavily on people like themselves than on the workers in the party. Workers became opponents! The Jusos frequently advocated local policies opposed to the wishes of local trade unions.<sup>30</sup> For instance, it was Jusos who in many places opposed the building of large apartment complexes, office buildings, or roads which trade unionists had received support for from their SPD councillors. The Jusos concentrated on mobilizing groups opposed to local building projects, rather than workers. Citizen initiative supporters were more likely to join the Jusos in their campaigns than the ordinary worker, although there were, of course, instances where workers were adversely affected by a local building plan. However, in general, workers and their unions found themselves in opposition to Jusos and mainly middle-class citizen initiatives.

The Jusos were able to recruit many new members into the party. From 1968 to 1972 there was a marked increase in membership numbers (see table 6), many of these being members under the age of thirty-five (the age limit for Jusos).<sup>31</sup> Internally the Jusos were divided into a number of factions, of which the dominant group from 1968 to 1976 was the so-called "system overcomers" (Systemüberwinder), also known as the "executive group" since they controlled the Juso national executive. The policy strategy was to overcome capitalism by radical reforms rather than the gradualism advocated by the Godesberg Programm. They criticized the SPD party leaders for being far too cautious and pressed for more funda-



mental types of redistribution policies, and the decentralization of the universities, government bureaucracy, and local government. The group was challenged by two smaller groups—the Stamokap and the “antirevisionists,” both groups being opposed to the reform strategy. Stamokap advocated the theory of “state monopoly capitalism,” and argued that reforms could only come about if a broad working-class movement (including the Communists) was created to overthrow the state.<sup>32</sup>

Despite their theoretical differences, all Juso groups were united in believing that they could indeed take over the party from the local level upward. Given the SPD’s hierarchical structure, it is not surprising that the Jusos concentrated on a bottom-up strategy. There was no alternative. To win influence in the party, they had to have control over the local sections before they could dominate the all-important subdistrict and district levels.<sup>33</sup> For their strategy this meant that new members had to be recruited to take over local parties to enable the Jusos to move upward in the organization. The SPD was a vibrant membership party based largely on working-class support. The new members were largely from middle-class backgrounds. Friction between the new and old members was class based as well as ideological. By the mid-1970s many Juso policy demands came to look more like those of the supporters of the emerging antinuclear, peace, women’s rights, and environmental movements.<sup>34</sup> Particularly the antinuclear and environmental movements were at odds with the unions over the issue of nuclear power since the *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (DGB) was at that time in favor of extending the nuclear program and urged Schmidt to do so aggressively.<sup>35</sup>

By 1972 the Jusos had captured a variety of local and regional parties. They built alliances with old left groups and had gained full control over the districts of South Hesse, Schleswig-Holstein, and South Bavaria. They were substantial minorities in places such as Hamburg and Berlin.<sup>36</sup> Their organizational strength peaked at the 1973 Party Convention. They were able to convince the delegates to adopt a progressive tax reform and displaced a number of right-wing candidates from their positions on the party executive. But their efforts were not sufficient—the Jusos and their allies were not able to take over the all-important policymaking institutions of the Presidium (where they placed one representative—Erhart Eppler), and the party executive where they got some one-third of the seats. Despite having mobilized huge numbers of supporters, and having taken over a number of subdistricts and districts, the left was still not large enough to take over entirely.



*The Labour Case*

The traditional left in Labour was not purged as it had been in the SPD. As a consequence, traditional socialists held positions in the highest echelons of the party hierarchy.<sup>37</sup> There was a considerable leftist faction among the M.P.s, inside the NEC, and in the CLPs. The press came to draw a distinction in the late 1970s between the “hard” left around Tony Benn, the Tribune Group of M.P.s, the Manifesto Group of policy planners, and the “soft” left around Neil Kinnock which had some sympathies with the social democrats.<sup>38</sup> But even prior to the 1970s, traditional left-wingers were not uncommon within the party leadership.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the “new urban left” joined the Labour Party. John Gyford, in one of the few studies on this phenomenon, argues that this new left emerged from a variety of single-issue movements such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Rock against Racism, the environmentalist groups, feminist circles, and the citizen initiatives against local council spending cuts and/or building projects.<sup>39</sup> There are numerous similarities between these groups and those who were mobilized by the Jusos or supported Jusos in their attempt to take over local SPD offices.

Members of such single-issue groups entered the party just at the time when Labour’s membership reached its lowest point. The party membership had dropped to catastrophic levels by the end of the 1960s. As Whiteley demonstrated, many CLPs were completely devoid of party activists, particularly ones with working-class backgrounds.<sup>40</sup> An exodus of party members had taken place, especially working-class activists and members who deserted Labour for a number of reasons. Certainly, the performance of the Wilson government alienated many of them. But there were other reasons for dropping out of the party such as the reform of local government, which reduced the number of councillors on the new authorities. Those who had joined the party in hopes of a local government career left because the pool of available offices had shrunk. The reforms also allowed teachers and public servants to run for office, encouraging these social groups to join parties. A further reason for the membership crisis of 1967 to 1970 was the disastrous local council election in London of 1968 where many Labour councillors lost their seats and consequently dropped out of the party. At this point, the new urban left entered a party almost devoid of local activists, particularly working-class ones.<sup>41</sup>

Under these conditions the so-called “bed-sit wars” broke out in urban constituencies such as London, Liverpool, Manchester, and other, mainly university, towns. The name refers to what was believed to have been a widespread leftist strategy: activists would move from one Labour constituency party to the next, rent a bed-sitter (a one-room apartment) to establish the right to belong to the constituency Labour Party of that area, and then take over the party by joining in numbers sufficiently large to replace the “old guard” with a leftist executive committee.<sup>42</sup> After they took over, the activists would then move on to the next CLP. It is difficult to establish precisely how many such “moving militants” there were, but there is ample evidence to suggest that this was a widespread strategy, particularly in London and Liverpool.

The rallying point for many of these groups of activists was very often local policies.<sup>43</sup> The new urban left organized against local Labour councillors whom they accused of “selling out” their communities to big development and construction companies. As in the SPD case, the opposition to building projects frequently led to antagonism between local trade unions and these new left groups. Again, similar to the SPD situation, taking over local parties frequently involved replacing trade union officials who had held these positions for some time. At the local level not much love was lost between unionists and new leftists. But contrary to the SPD situation, the local fights did not influence national developments in as direct a manner. After all, in Labour the events at Annual Conference and the relationship between the PLP and the unions determines policy and strategy, not events in individual CLPs.

The Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) evolved from the struggles between local social democrats and their activist opponents in the CLPs.<sup>44</sup> The activists in CLPD were all committed to a variety of new leftist causes, but came together to enact constitutional reform to give the ordinary activist power over the representatives at both local and national levels. If activists could not immediately remove the representative from office, the argument went, then the representatives should at least be obliged to enact policies supported by their local parties.

The issue of mandatory reselection originated in the “bed-sit wars” as activists attempted to pressurize their representatives into adopting their policy positions. A number of Labour M.P.s had gotten into tremendous difficulties with their local parties. In Lincoln, Sheffield Brightside, and London Newham North-East party activists had tried for a variety of reasons to deselect their M.P.s.<sup>45</sup> Activists argued that the M.P. no longer

represented the views of the constituency party. The attempts to remove Dick Taverne in Lincoln in 1971 and Reg Prentice in Newham North-East in 1975 were notorious cases which highlighted the difficult relationship between an established M.P. and a radical activist base in the CLP.<sup>46</sup> The demands of the CLPD gave many local new and old leftist groups a focus for their discontent against social democrats in parliamentary seats. As a result, the issue of mandatory reselection became a rallying cry, first for the new left and then generally for all those groups opposed, for a variety of reasons, to the party leaders and the PLP.

CLPD's strategy was based on the fact that only the Annual Conference has the power to change party rules.<sup>47</sup> CLPD carefully prepared the ground for its efforts. The first step was to have a number of unions, CLPs, and socialist societies adopt resolutions worded by CLPD and propose them to the CAC.<sup>48</sup> The CAC would have to be persuaded to give the resolution favorable composite. The CAC could just as well ignore the resolution. By 1978 the CLPD had managed to obtain a seat on the CAC for one of its individual members—Bernard Dix of the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE).<sup>49</sup> Once before the Annual Conference, the resolution would have to gain a majority of union votes against what was known to be the stiffest of social democratic opposition. The CLPD therefore decided that it would be prudent not to leave the mandatory reselection issue merely up to the Annual Conference, but to lobby inside some of the major unions to get them to adopt mandatory reselection at the union congresses.<sup>50</sup> If the union congress adopted CLPD demands, that would force the union delegation at the Annual Conference to insist upon its adoption. CLPD organizers were worried that union leaders might strike a bargain with the social democrats to drop mandatory reselection for some desired policy. The more unions mandated their delegations to vote for mandatory reselection, the better the chances of it actually being passed.<sup>51</sup>

To make sure that unions adopted their proposals, CLPD first embarked on a campaign within the unions such as the NUM, a union in which dissatisfaction with the Labour government was high, and thus fertile ground for such a proposal to control the PLP.<sup>52</sup> CLPD's campaign depended on activism. It is surprising how just a few people succeeded in bringing about mandatory reselection. The group had only eight activists who spent more than one hundred hours working for mandatory reselection.<sup>53</sup> There were never more than twenty fully committed activists and only two who worked on the unions. Williams argues that it was the activism of the Trotskyists that made CLPD so successful.<sup>54</sup> But interviews

with the leaders of CLPD contradict this thesis. Trotskyists did not become active in CLPD until after 1981. In fact, the Trotskyists undermined CLPD on numerous occasions when they put up a rival resolution, which almost split the Annual Conference vote once the issue came up for discussion. After 1982 the Trotskyists tried to take over CLPD and almost succeeded.<sup>55</sup>

Two demands were added by CLPD in 1978–79. Annual Conference was to elect the party leader rather than the PLP. The intention was to further reduce the power of the PLP to make its own policy decisions. If the party leader owed his or her position to the Annual Conference, CLPD argued, the leader would be less likely to use his or her power of patronage to enforce loyalty among the M.P.s to break with Annual Conference policy. Since the party leaders enjoyed the privilege of appointing their friends to cabinet positions and governmental posts, the power of patronage was a substantial weapon with which to reward or punish other political entrepreneurs. Second, the election manifesto was to be written by the NEC rather than just M.P.s. The intention was to reduce the ability of the PLP to impose its views on the manifesto, which might not be in harmony with party policy. Again, both demands were viewed as of general interest to all opposition groups.<sup>56</sup>

The CLPD as the major proponent of democratization and perhaps the most visible new left organization in Labour embarked on a campaign circulating documents among the unions critical of the PLP and drafting model resolutions for the CLPs and unions to propose to the CAC. Sympathetic CLPs would then present these on CLPD's behalf.<sup>57</sup> In 1975 twelve CLPs submitted such a resolution; in 1976 there were forty-five; in 1977 the number increased to seventy-nine; and in 1978 there were still sixty-seven CLP resolutions favoring mandatory reselection.<sup>58</sup> Although there are more than six hundred CLPs, one must keep in mind that each CLP may only suggest one resolution to the CAC per year. The fact that so many CLPs regarded constitutional reform as important enough to make it the topic of their resolution is indicative of the commitment by party activists to establish these reforms. This saturation brought home the point that mandatory reselection was indeed a major issue among the party rank and file.

A comparison of new left motives for action in Labour and SPD shows some noticeable similarities. Local issues played an important role in both movements. Issues of housing policy, racism, and sexism were important motivators for political action, but they led to friction with the established



Table 7: Motives and Strategies for New Left Activists

New Left	Labour	SPD
Motives for Action	Local policy; traditional socialist demands; new politics issues; democratization	Local policy; traditional socialist demands; new politics issues; democratization
Strategies	Build coalition with trade unions; accountability of representatives	Mobilize local support to take over party from bottom up

working-class forces in the party. However, in the Labour Party these local issues tended to stay local. The leftist strategy to bring about change was quite divorced from these local issues. The CLPD was completely uninvolved in these types of issues, since it was only concerned with organizational-constitutional issues. Such a separation was not possible in the SPD case. In order to achieve constitutional or policy changes in the SPD, the new left needed to take over the majority of local parties to move up into the next higher level of decisionmaking. Not so in Labour. What counted in the Labour Party was to get sufficient trade union allies for a policy proposal or a constitutional change. In the SPD a mass movement was required to take over policy and organization. These structural factors accounted for divergent new left strategies and policy proposals (see table 7). In the SPD, members needed to be mobilized to join; in the Labour Party it was not numbers of members that counted but union support. Demands had to be tailored to the trade unions' desires in order to become acceptable at Annual Conference.

### The Social Democratic and Trade Union Response to the New Left

Initially the established groups within the parties were in favor of opening up the organization to the student movements. In the SPD's case the strategy was clearly one of "damage prevention" since a number of leading politicians feared that the student movement might spawn a rival political organization of some importance.<sup>59</sup> In the Labour Party it was the left in the PLP and the CLPs who advocated opening up the party to new

groups. Labour abandoned the “proscription list” which made membership in a Communist or socialist organization incompatible with membership in the Labour Party. In 1973 this list was abolished, with very little debate or controversy.<sup>60</sup> The most immediate motive was to replenish the CLPs with activists. For the old left opening up the party to leftist groups also seemed to offer an opportunity to attract allies in the struggle with the social democrats.<sup>61</sup>

### *The SPD Case*

The left was best organized at the Party Convention of 1973 when a broadly based alliance between Jusos and other leftist groups, particularly among the parliamentarians, voted on prepared slates for certain approved candidates. The left emulated a right-wing practice devised by the so-called *Kanalarbeiter*, a group closely connected with the union movement.<sup>62</sup> It included many of the top-ranking SPD party leaders and functionaries who also happened to be trade unionists. As a result of left-wing voting, a number of right-wingers lost their seats on the party executive, most notable Egon Franke, the leader of the *Kanalarbeiter*.<sup>63</sup> Not only did the right suffer defeats as a result of leftist coordination, they also underwent several heated debates over the interpretation of the Godesberg Programm. For the social democrats, the time had come to countermobilize and halt leftist advances.

By 1975 the leftist alliance had been smashed. The social democrats incorporated some Juso leaders into the party leadership.<sup>64</sup> Others were isolated or ignored. The most outspoken leftists were simply expelled from the party as a warning to other recalcitrants who would not modify their policy positions. The party leadership exploited divisions among the Jusos. Those who had joined in order to pursue a political career were given the opportunity to do so if they moderated their positions.<sup>65</sup> In other words, one of the most powerful incentives for political entrepreneurs was used to weaken the Juso challenge—the opportunity for a political career. The arrangement was simple: in districts where Jusos did not command a majority it was up to the dominant faction to decide whether to put an ambitious Juso on the party list for a representative position. The higher up one was placed on the party list, the better the chances for election; the lower, the worse. The willingness to compromise on policy could then be measured quite accurately by how high up or whether the candidate was placed on the party list. Those who responded purely to policy as an

incentive for action were threatened with expulsion or isolation if they did not moderate their positions.<sup>66</sup>

The willingness to use such methods of persuasion was openly expressed. Old left leaders, such as Harry Ristock in Berlin, had made agreements with the *Kanalarbeiter* to isolate certain Juso leaders to keep them out of party positions.<sup>67</sup> These bargains were common knowledge to the party members and the media. However, the most concerted attempt to silence the leftist opposition was exercised at the parliamentary level. After Brandt's resignation, the right organized effectively and succeeded in having Schmidt become chancellor. From then onward, Herbert Wehner kept order in the parliamentary party as chief government whip.<sup>68</sup> With his caustic wit and obvious commitment to freezing out opponents of the Schmidt government, the 40 to 50 leftist members of the Bundestag were effectively coerced into submission, except on two memorable occasions: the 1977 antiterrorist measures and the NATO double-track decision of 1979, when numerous leftists voted against Schmidt. Two SPD members of the Bundestag refused to go along with the government on the antiterrorism legislation.<sup>69</sup> Both individuals resigned from the party eventually.

At the local level, where incorporation strategies may not have worked as well, recalcitrants frequently were simply expelled from the party. Expulsion was an effective threat because APO sympathizers had joined the SPD precisely because the party offered the only possibility to obtain the policy changes the new leftist group desired. In 1975 a motion was passed by the party executive which gave the districts the right to supervise the activities of the working groups, most importantly the Jusos. The significance of this organization reform was that any activity by the Jusos which the district executive found objectionable could be punished by expulsion.<sup>70</sup> By 1975 the social democratic party leaders and their supporters at the local level had succeeded in isolating and silencing the leftist opposition.

How were the social democrats able to countermobilize so effectively? The secret to success lies in the control over party offices and patronage opportunities. Even in 1973 social democrats were still in control over the majority of districts, the Executive Committee, the Presidium, the parliamentary party, and the party bureaucracy.<sup>71</sup> They were able to count on support from the established membership, especially in places where the student movement was not particularly strong. The most bitter Juso-social democrat fights took place in cities such as Berlin, Munich, Hannover, Göttingen, Frankfurt, and other university towns.<sup>72</sup> The need to

mobilize grass roots support necessitated a Juso strategy of concentrating their forces, but they did not have the necessary organizational capacity or social support to take over outside of the university towns.

The social democratic countermobilization depended quite frequently on the mobilization of trade union supporters. Given that the relationship between SPD government and the unions was quite problematic, why did trade unionists not join the Jusos? Why did the major German trade unions oppose the leftists? After all, from 1966 to 1969, one of the leading members of the DGB and supporter of the political left, Otto Brenner, leader of the huge Metal Workers' Union, *Industriegewerkschaft Metall* (IGM), had supported the APO in their opposition to the Emergency Laws. Yet only two years later Brenner supported Brandt's government on the issue of wage restraint in opposition to leftists in both unions and the SPD.<sup>73</sup> Why such a remarkable turnabout?

There are three important factors shaping the unions' response to the Juso challenge. First, the incompatibility of Juso policy demands with union objectives; second, the rivalries between unionists and Jusos at the local level; and third, the relationship between DGB and the SPD as two separate and independent organizations. The Juso demand for decentralization and democratization was regarded by many unionists as a direct assault on the structure of the DGB. Far from seeing the centralized decisionmaking structure of the DGB unions as a handicap, West German trade unionists saw it as a major asset enabling participation in collective bargaining.<sup>74</sup> The Jusos inflamed matters by advocating wildcat strikes in 1973 and demanding a separate union for foreign workers.<sup>75</sup> These demands were viewed as a direct assault on the DGB's decisionmaking and organizational authority. Not only was the trade union delegation, the *Kanalarbeiter*, defeated by the Jusos at the Party Convention in 1973, but it appeared as if the Jusos had succeeded in undermining the DGB at the local level when a number of wildcat strikes broke out, mainly organized by foreign and female workers demanding higher wages, better working conditions, and foreign workers' rights.<sup>76</sup> The union leaders responded in a similar fashion to the SPD leaders: expulsions of leftist agitators followed.<sup>77</sup>

In the SPD many trade unionists, especially those organized in the *Kanalarbeiter* group, began to make a show of their support for Helmut Schmidt after the right had Schmidt elected to succeed Brandt. The Chemical Workers' Union (*Industriegewerkschaft Chemie, Papier, und Keramik*, IGCPK), the Mineworkers' Union (*Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau und*



Energie, IGBE), and the Construction Workers' Union (Industriegewerkschaft Bau, Steine, und Erden, IGBSE) earned the nickname "chancellor unions" for their unquestioning support for Schmidt.<sup>78</sup> It was, of course, the nuclear and building issues that greatly divided Jusos and these unions, preventing them from building a coalition even when the SPD-led government was unable to maintain welfare provisions in 1980–81. On several occasions unionized workers beat up groups of Jusos at demonstrations in support of nuclear power when the Jusos attempted to stage counterdemonstrations.<sup>79</sup>

The most important factor guiding trade union strategy, at least on the national level, was the relationship between unions and SPD. They were and still are separate organizations. The SPD came to government with a set of policies favored by the unions. Once it became clear that the Schmidt government could not produce all of these policies, frictions with the unions appeared. But these tensions did not lead to an attempt by the unions to get directly involved in SPD internal decisionmaking processes. Quite the contrary: the unions relied on free market principles.<sup>80</sup> The Metal Workers' Union (Industriegewerkschaft Metall, IGM) and the Civil Servants' Union (Öffentliche Dienste, Transport, und Verkehr) pursued a wage policy quite independent of government directives after 1979. But far from opposing the SPD leaders, these unions were also quite harsh critics of the new social movements, the Greens, and their Juso supporters. Only the teachers' (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft) and the journalists' (Industriegewerkschaft Druck und Papier, IGDP) unions were favorable to some of the Juso demands, since they had no stake in the building or nuclear policies of the government and shared some of the skepticism of the new left on these issues.<sup>81</sup>

From the perspective of union leaders the new left presented a challenge inside their own organization and a dubious coalition partner in the SPD. Why should the unions risk a relatively good working relationship with the party leaders by supporting their opponents, particularly opponents who were locked in a bitter struggle in many local parties with trade union members of the SPD? Moreover, these opponents began to look more and more like critics of production and growth—all developments upon which the unions depended for the extension of benefits and which they supported. A coalition with the Jusos was a far more costly strategy for DGB leaders than compromising with the social democrats.<sup>82</sup> Social democracy was still a preferred strategy among the unions, since economic conditions had not deteriorated to the extent they had in Britain.

*The Labour Case*

Labour's return to power in 1974 raised all of the issues and problems the unions and Labour government had faced in 1964 to 1970. Labour's leaders were not in a position to implement the pro-trade union policies they were committed to; they expected the union leaders to enforce solidarity with Labour on incomes policy. They exacted a high price from the working-class base for their stint in government. Once the Winter of Discontent destroyed the union-PLP arrangement, the stage was set for a major policy and personality shake-up. With deteriorating support for the social democrats, demands for greater accountability of the PLP to union/party policy planks gained support among the unions. Radical union members were already well disposed to mandatory reselection. But increasingly the union leaders came to view mandatory reselection as a convenient control over representatives.

CLPD was able to win union support away from the PLP. High-ranking officials in the NUM, the NUPE, the TGWU, the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW), the Association of Scientific, Technical, and Managerial Staff (ASTMS), and the Union of Communication Workers (UCW) all supported CLPD demands financially and in terms of manpower.<sup>83</sup> The public service unions particularly were adversely affected by government policy, and they supported CLPD. As disenchantment with the government grew, so did CLPD support. As Victor Schonfield, a leading figure in the CLPD, put it: "Reselection was certain to be adopted. By 1978 every trade unionist had reason to hate at least one M.P."<sup>84</sup> Although the final adoption of mandatory reselection was to be an exceedingly difficult process, not least because of interference by other leftist groups in the CLPD campaign, the 1979 Annual Conference did adopt CLPD's resolution. Two years later, again after much heated discussion, the second of CLPD's demands—that the party leader be elected by Annual Conference and not the PLP—was also passed. The Wembley Special Conference of 1981 ended up passing a compromise resolution proposed by the CLPD to elect the party leader via an electoral college in which the unions hold 40 percent of the vote, the PLP and the CLPS 30 percent each. The remarkable thing about this resolution was that none of the major unions supported the resolution, yet, since a number of unions did not vote as soon as it became clear that their favored electoral college plan was not going to be adopted, the CLPD resolution slipped through.<sup>85</sup> It was this decision that led to the defection of the social democrats.

However, the final victory did not come easily. The social democrats in the PLP put up stiff resistance and the leftist forces who generally supported mandatory reselection and diverse policy changes could not get their proverbial act together. A CLPD motion was defeated in 1974 and again in 1978 because of confusion amongst the unions as to which motion they ought to support.<sup>86</sup> In 1978 the CLPD motion was defeated by the “wrong vote” of the leader of the AUEW, Hugh Scanlon, for very unclear reasons.<sup>87</sup> Scanlon was mandated by his union congress to support mandatory reselection, yet voted against it, claiming that he thought he was voting against a rival resolution. The intricacies of the policymaking process at Annual Conference are such that motions may be defeated or passed for the strangest of reasons.

The CLPD, the general left, and their allies in the union movement had convinced the majority of union leaders that the obstacle to renewed prosperity was Labour’s refusal to push legislation for industrial reform, redistribution of income, and wealth and property rights. The old left resurrected the Alternative Economic Strategy of the 1973 Election Manifesto. The traditional planks of nationalization, protectionism, and withdrawal from the European Community (EC) resurfaced as Labour’s economic policy, in complete disregard of their electoral unpopularity. The constitutional reforms were adopted because many unions were convinced that the parliamentary party had to be controlled by party activists and the unions at the Annual Conference to avoid another Wilson/Callaghan government. Once the social democrats lost trade union support, they could not prevent leftist positions from winning. Ironically, the major defeat of the social democrats on the party leadership question was the last act of the radical union/new left/traditional left coalition. In the following months the groups which had found a common focus with the constitutional question disintegrated with a severe fight over numerous policy issues.<sup>88</sup>

By 1981 the tide had turned against the left after the campaign by Tony Benn and the “hard left” for him to become party deputy.<sup>89</sup> The Benn campaign was only the tip of the iceberg. Throughout the CLPs a fight for control over the executive committees had broken out between various leftist factions, social democrats, traditional socialists, and various single-issue group supporters. The unions called a meeting at Bishop’s Stortford to bring peace to the party. *The Times* summed up the situation rather well: “The reality is the chieftains make peace, the common soldiery in the constituencies continue to fight a savage civil war and the left now seems

to have widespread control.”<sup>90</sup> However, *The Times* was wrong in seeing the battle as one of right against left—this was a battle between many groups, as the case study of the Bermondsey local party in chapter seven shows. Whatever the case, the unions were disconcerted with Labour’s bad public image as being in complete internal disarray. Ever since 1983 the party leaders and their union friends have been desperately trying to recapture some semblance of organizational and policy coherence.

The range of issues on which the new left and the unions could form a lasting coalition was limited. They could agree on controlling the PLP and the party leader, on unilateralism and general commitments to some vague forms of protectionism, and general statements on socialist policy. But what was it to mean? As Ken Livingstone put it, “no one has a socialist wages policy,” meaning that the same unions committed in theory to socialism were violently opposed to egalitarian wage policies in practice.<sup>91</sup> Equally, attempts to enforce racial or sexual equality or decentralization of maintenance services were opposed by numerous unions. By 1981 the unions turned against the new and old left by deselecting CLPD supporters such as Margaret Beckett, Bernard Dix, and Norman Atkinson from the NEC.<sup>92</sup> Neil Kinnock’s campaign to throw the Trotskyists out of the party was more vigorously supported.<sup>93</sup> The unions again swung to support the moderates against the radicals, supposedly in search of a leadership team that would bring electoral victory. After all, a Labour government is still preferable to a Conservative one, no matter what its policies might be.

### Adaptation in the 1980s and Unresolved Policy Struggles

Since the electoral defeats in 1979 and 1983 both Labour and SPD have undergone a process of elite and policy renewal to meet the challenges of economic and social changes. Both parties are torn between competing interests within the working-class base and, on top of that, their need to attract, as Przeworski and Sprague argue, “allies” in other social groups, particularly the white-collar sector.<sup>94</sup> In both parties similar positions on the electoral dilemma exist. There are those who represent the traditional working-class sector, usually adversely affected by international and domestic industrial changes in the traditional industrial branches of textiles, iron and steel, and ship-building, that is the endangered and relatively uncompetitive industrial branches.<sup>95</sup> Representatives of these sectors are



prone to demand that protectionism and job security are the paramount objectives for working-class parties. In the Labour Party it is this group of interests that still holds a great deal of organizational power through the size of its trade union delegations.

There are also those branches of industry, and therefore parts of the working class, which are doing relatively well, are internationally and domestically competitive, and which oppose protectionist measures. These interests would rather see the development of social-democratic policies, that is the further extension of welfare for declining industries, but also a hands-off approach when it comes to international competition.<sup>96</sup> These groups are most prevalent in the West German union movement and still hold a great deal of organizational power in the SPD.

Increasingly these traditional and conflicting union and party interests are being challenged by groups such as the new left. Some authors have referred to these new interests as postmaterialist since they seem to concern themselves with life-style issues rather than purely economic concerns.<sup>97</sup> The emphasis on racism, sexism, and issues such as environmentalism, women's rights, NATO policy, nuclear power, and democratization of state and society all support this contention. These postmaterialist concerns are becoming a major political factor in West Germany and it is this set of interests which has spawned a challenging group in the SPD around Oscar Lafontaine. In the 1970s this group was represented by the Jusos and largely silenced. But since the electoral defeat of Johannes Rau, who represented the traditional interests within the party as chancellor candidate in 1987, this group has made headway because it represents the SPD's best hope of forming a coalition with the Green Party or even to reintegrate the Greens into the SPD.<sup>98</sup> These types of interests are also represented in Labour, as suggested, in various new left groups such as CLPD and the CND. However, apart from the issue of unilateralism, their influence is relatively small. The growing importance of the environmental issue was underscored at the last European election when the British Greens surprised everyone by taking some 15 percent of the vote. Both the Social Liberal Democratic Party (the successor of the SDP) and the Conservative Party have realized that the environmental issue is up for grabs since the Labour Party, with its emphasis on expanded benefits for the workers, is most unlikely to take up the environmental issue.<sup>99</sup>

These major sets of interests are now in competition with one another in shaping the future policy and electoral strategy of the two working-class-based parties. So far, the "declining interests" still seem to have the upper

hand in the Labour Party, but this means that the party is electorally not competitive. So, union and party leaders are trying to attract new or defecting social groups with a return to policies that resemble social democratic policies.<sup>100</sup> Even on the issue of organizational reform, Kinnock is advocating a system of “one person, one vote” at the CLP level in candidate selection procedures similar to the system prevalent in the now defunct SDP! The party has modified its position on protectionism, has become quite pro-EC, and is in the process of discarding unilateralism. It has even started to consider the advantages of privatization and has dropped its electoral albatross of taking back the council houses the Tories sold off to a thankful electorate.

### Conclusion: Organizational Structures and the Strategies of Intraparty Groups

The organizational structures of the two parties led to very different new left strategies. The SPD new left had no alternative but to attempt a takeover of local party offices to capture the next higher level of the organization and eventually end up in the top policymaking echelons. The Jusos tried to mobilize the local base, at first workers, but this strategy largely failed. Not only were workers already organized in the party, they did not share Juso policy preferences and soon became the opposition. To mobilize a local base, the Jusos relied heavily on citizen initiative activists who came from middle-class backgrounds. This strategy led them to stress issues the trade unions found objectionable, such as environmentalism and qualitative growth. Since the Jusos were not able to mobilize enough social support to take over the party entirely, the social democrats were able to block their advances by strategies of incorporation, isolation, or expulsion.

The strategy of the Labour left was quite different. The left was able to take over many CLPs, but this made virtually no difference when it came to policymaking. The CLPD strategy was a fine example of how to win a policy or constitutional fight in the Labour Party. They focused on a specific issue; then targeted the union memberships and had them support CLPD demands at union congresses. They then worked on getting enough union support to pass their proposals at Annual Conference. Exploitation of union structures, Labour's distribution of organizational power, and, most of all, union disenchantment with PLP policy brought CLPD success.

Just as new left strategies differed, union strategies differed in the two cases. The West German unions are not part of the SPD. They are more dependent on the goodwill of SPD leaders when it comes to passing pro-union legislation than the British unionists are dependent on Labour. A coalition with the opponents in the SPD could have been very costly. A coalition with opponents stressing policies to which the unions are opposed, such as environmental protection, or qualitative instead of quantitative economic growth, did not make much sense to union leaders. Further, German union members were not as adversely affected by government austerity measures as their British counterparts. The West German unions are part and parcel of the capitalist system; their membership has done well by economic growth. There are few reasons for West German unions to mobilize their workers against the current system of production and consumption.

The same cannot be said for British unions where union members were bearing the brunt of economic decline as a result of the austerity measures of the Labour government. Union leaders found themselves under pressure from their rank and file to punish the Labour leaders after their performance of 1974 to 1979. CLPD demands for PLP control and a variety of dubious policies were the convenient way of achieving this. But the limits to a union-leftist alliance are quickly reached as the British example shows. The major problem facing both union and Labour leaders currently is how to come up with a policy package that looks electorally promising as well as acceptable to the many different interests within the trade union movement. Not only has the party lost a great many voters to the Conservatives and the Alliance (now the Social Liberal Democrats), but it has yet to come up with a convincing policy compromise internally.

The West German SPD leaders do not have to fear internal challenges to the extent that Labour party leaders do. They have control over their organization. However, over-exercising this control led to the loss of a significant cohort of voters, activists, and potential supporters that the party needs to recapture in order to become electorally dominant. The last few years have seen a variety of attempts with which SPD leaders have hoped to bring about this reintegration of lost voters. The debate over a new party program indicated that the Godesberg Programm, which initially brought the party out of its 30 percent corner, has now run its course.

The preceding chapter focused on the structural limits both parties encountered in their efforts to adjust to socioeconomic change while in

government. In both parties a vicious struggle between social democrats and their leftist opponents erupted over how each party ought to adjust. This chapter has shown the choices made by the dominant coalition in their efforts to contain challenges from the new left. In both cases the dominant coalition and its challengers used institutional powers at their disposal to limit their opponents. The institutional base of the SPD leaders proved to be far more solid than that of their counterparts in Labour. SPD leaders could rely on their social base in the party and the resources that control over positions, policy, and disciplinary organs gave them. Labour's social democrats had to rely on the support of their trade union allies. The rise of leftists in the union movement spelled trouble for the social democrats even prior to 1979. Their basis for political power in the party was founded on nothing more than the power of being in government. Once that protective shield disappeared, they were exposed to the winds of leftist change sweeping through unions and party.

Institutional structures shaped the strategies of each group involved in the struggle. The motivations for action are similar in the two cases. There are political entrepreneurs, policy activists, and solidarist members. The policy groups are similar as well. There are social democrats, traditional and new leftists, and trade union interests at work in both parties. Yet the strategies they employ to win or maintain power differ according to the structure of each party and shape the policy demands of each group. Institutional structures provide the key to understanding why each group chose its particular strategy. Further, it helps in understanding why the losers lost and thereby illuminates the challenges facing each party in the future.



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## 7 The Impact of the New Left in Two Constituency Parties

The preceding chapters concentrated on the process of coalition formation at the national levels of the Labour Party and the SPD. This one examines factional struggle at the local level. Two constituency parties were chosen to investigate the motives of activists, political entrepreneurs, and trade unionists involved in the confrontation. Using interviews, newspaper reports, and the occasional academic text to piece together the events, a remarkable story of Machiavellian politics emerged. The new left mobilized as many followers as possible in an attempt to oust the established local party leaders. The social democrats countermobilized their followers, but not in sufficient numbers to stem the new left takeover. They then resorted to other techniques, such as the manipulation of organizational rules and appeals to their allies in higher party offices and the trade unions, to retain their power. In the Labour Party constituency of Bermondsey, the social democrats were ousted. In the SPD constituency of Munich, although at first defeated, the social democrats were able to hang on and survive, and then rolled back the new left challenge.

The following paragraphs address the issues raised in chapter three. First, the motives of each group within the party are investigated; second, their strategies to take or maintain power are described; and third, the institutional distribution of power between local and national party, between party activists, and political entrepreneurs is analyzed. The study shows that these relationships shape the strategic choices of the players and the winning coalitions which were eventually formed. Finally, the consequences for the local party of the struggle and its outcome are described.

The constituency parties chosen are Munich in West Germany and Bermondsey in South London. How one chooses local case studies is a question of enormous methodological difficulty. The choice in this study was guided by numerous considerations. These constituency parties may not be representative and there are many justifications for considering their choice idiosyncratic. Neither are they strictly comparable. They differ in size and in their economic and social structures. But they are terrific examples of intraparty strife. The major concern was not with finding representative samples, but with finding two constituencies in which bitter fighting between social democrats, new leftists, and trade union interests broke out. The case studies were chosen to illustrate the dynamics of faction fighting and these two cases were notorious for the ferocity with which the struggles were carried out. The fights in Munich dragged on for over seven years, gaining the Munich party a reputation for being extremely factionalized. In Bermondsey the fight lasted some four years, but was equally notorious for having received much unfavorable press coverage.

The two cases serve to answer the above questions. They illuminate what happens to a local party when it is being taken over by a new group; they show the connections between local and national politics and intraparty developments; they help us understand how the distribution of intraparty power affects local party politics; and they examine the impact of local developments on the national level. The actual stories of the internal fighting in these two constituency parties are complicated. For the purposes of this text, the chapter concentrates on only a few aspects of the struggle over policy, personality, and organizational power. The full story is available elsewhere for those interested in the minute details of the struggle.<sup>1</sup> The reader has been spared the excruciating exposition of executive committee reports, materials on factional positions, and the less important details on functions of various local committees. What remains is an analysis of the strategies of competing groups in a local party to either maintain or to gain local power.

### Bermondsey and Munich before the New Left: Calm before the Storm

Electorally, both constituencies had been safe Labour and SPD seats for some time. Munich had five direct mandates in the Bundestag; in 1949 the

SPD held all five; lost them all in 1953 and 1957; regained one in 1961; and captured four in 1965 and all five in 1969. At the mayoral level, however, Munich seemed a solid SPD bastion in a heavily conservative Bavaria. Both postwar mayors, Klaus Wimmer and Hans Jochen Vogel, were SPD members and extremely popular. The SPD dominated the city council since 1960.<sup>2</sup> Bermondsey had an even more impressive Labour Party connection—it had been a safe Labour seat since 1922, both at the local council level and in Parliament. During the 1950s and 1960s, Labour frequently did not even have opponents in local elections. Bermondsey was one of three areas where Labour councillors survived the disastrous 1968 municipal elections in which Labour councillors all over London lost their seats.<sup>3</sup>

Both parties exhibited a social democratic-union alliance. Bermondsey was a major dockyard and the dockworkers' union (TGWU) dominated local party politics for the entire period from the 1920s to the late 1970s. Only as a result of the docks closing in the early 1970s, the union lost members and also political influence in the constituency. But until the late 1970s the TGWU determined who represented Bermondsey both in Parliament as well as on the local council.<sup>4</sup> The postwar M.P., Bob Mellish, who became chief whip under Harold Wilson in 1969, had been elected by a union block vote. The local city council had been elected in a similar fashion.<sup>5</sup>

In Munich a similar union-SPD connection prevailed. The mayor from 1960 to 1972, Hans Jochen Vogel, who was to become a major figure in the Schmidt government as minister for justice and later the party chairperson, had been selected as SPD candidate with the help of his personal friend, Ludwig Koch.<sup>6</sup> Koch was the chairperson of the Bavarian DGB and himself involved in SPD local politics. During the 1960s he was a member of the executive committee of the Munich SPD subdistrict. Vogel's success in attracting the Olympic Games to Munich in 1972 made him one of the more famous of German mayors.<sup>7</sup> It made him almost invincible at the Munich polls where he took credit for having done enormous good for his country and Munich. The building contracts that came with the Olympics were yet another reason for solid trade union support. After all, they created a multitude of jobs.<sup>8</sup>

Both local parties were not particularly active membership organizations. They were marked by low attendance at meetings, a small activist group whose members, in time, advanced to become city councillors or occupied some other position inside the party. The Munich SPD had just over 8,000 members in 1962.<sup>9</sup> Bermondsey, which had had over 4,000 members in the 1950s, experienced a marked decline in membership

numbers to under 400 by the end of 1978.<sup>10</sup> Bermondsey is a classic example of Whiteley's study of Labour's membership crisis.<sup>11</sup> Bermondsey, for historical reasons, was spared the intense fights between new left activists and traditional social democrats in the early 1970s because the constituency had not been affected by gentrification as some other formerly working-class areas of London. Since over 80 percent of the houses in Bermondsey are council-owned, buying up houses in the area was not possible for newcomers. Consequently, the social changes which led to confrontations between established working-class Labour supporters and middle-class activists did not take place in Bermondsey.<sup>12</sup>

Membership lethargy can be interpreted in different ways. The established politicians claim that the members were happy with their political leadership and wanted to use the party as a social club. Indeed, interviews with both new left activists and members prior to the influx of the new left confirms that many members used the party as a social gathering point. Members played cards, talked about politics, but let their leaders, with whom they had few disagreements, take care of local and national politics.<sup>13</sup> The new left policy activists claimed that party leaders had purposely let the organization slip in order not to have to deal with political challenges from the members.<sup>14</sup> Again, there is evidence to suggest that this charge is correct. Party leaders, particularly in Bermondsey, argued that an active party membership does not mean that the party represents the people. Party leaders argued on the principle of "if it ain't broke, why fix it?" that the party's electoral success was more than enough confirmation that the party represented its constituency well. They suggested that the new left was out of step with electoral and political reality.

By the time the intraconstituency party problems began—1968 in Munich and 1978 in Bermondsey—the state of each local party was one of electoral success, but also of organizational decay. The Munich party was to experience a massive social transformation in its membership base from 1968 to 1972. The Bermondsey party was to experience the influx of a numerically limited group of activists who came mainly to protest against the local building policies of the Labour-controlled city council.

### The Growth of Opposition

Munich was fertile ground for the activities of the APO. By 1967 numerous former APO organizers and sympathizers had taken Dutschke's advice and



joined the SPD. Within a few months the influx of student activists became visible. Jusos had taken over the local chapters in the student areas of Munich. Interviewees confirmed the allegation made by the then party leaders that the takeover of local chapters was a planned strategy, mobilizing students to join en masse.<sup>15</sup> As soon as the local chapter had elected a Juso executive, the activists would move on to the next local chapter. In many local chapters, of which there are seventy in Munich, political survival for moderates depended on making some bargain with Jusos. As soon as the local chapter had been taken, it was used to criticize the established Munich SPD subdistrict executive. The most common charge against the established party leaders was that they had neglected the recruitment function and that the party had become lethargic.<sup>16</sup>

There was a definite pattern to the takeover strategy. Jusos would join the local branch, become very active, and as soon as sufficient new members were recruited, translate their numerical strength into voting power at executive meetings. If significant resistance was met, debates would rage on until the early morning hours to wear down the opposition.<sup>17</sup> Students would claim that their democratic rights were being trampled on if they could not speak as long as they wanted, that is until the opposition had gone home and a quorum of Jusos would take a vote and win. As a result of increasing animosity, many established working-class members, who had used the party as a social club, left.<sup>18</sup> An observer remarked, "the intellectual Jusos wanted to represent the workers, but could not speak or understand their language."<sup>19</sup> Worse, the workers could not understand Juso jargon. As the workers left the party, the Jusos recruited a great many new members. Housewives, students, and civil servants joined. The workers left, but in far smaller numbers. From 1969 to 1972 the party membership increased from 10,548 to 15,273. Most of these members were Juso supporters.<sup>20</sup>

Two issues polarized the SPD in the years between 1970 and 1972—one was the general disagreement over interpretations of the Godesberg Programm, and the second was the election of candidates to representative positions or offices in the party. By 1970 the Jusos had been able to drive out the executive committee and replaced the old guard with Juso leaders. Ostensibly, the old guard had resigned in the hope that the Jusos would be able to breathe new life into the party apparatus. The trade unionists in the party therefore supported the Juso slate of candidates.<sup>21</sup> But a few weeks later, a dispute over who was to succeed Vogel as mayoral candidate and a bitter fight between the Juso executive and the city council over

a festival for the Greek military regime broke out in which Vogel declared his complete opposition to the Juso forces and marshaled a counterattack. He argued that the Jusos not only disregarded the Godesberg Programm in their policy positions, but that they were intending to throw all of the traditional social democrats out of the local party.<sup>22</sup>

Vogel and his supporters won the ensuing struggle with the Jusos. Vogel's victory was surprising because by this point the Jusos controlled four of eleven local chapters in the subdistrict completely and were a significant minority in another three in which many of the moderates, that is those members who were not either committed to the Jusos or the Vogel wing of the party, were dependent on Juso support for their positions. How was Vogel able to win?

The Vogel supporters used a number of strategies to defeat the Jusos. First, they turned to their friends in the union movement. The civil servants' union staged strikes in Vogel's support, making it absolutely clear to Jusos and moderates alike that they would not tolerate actions against Vogel.<sup>23</sup> The Vogel group also exploited its good relations to the Munich press. The press was used to orchestrate a campaign that discredited Juso policy positions. Two attacks were launched: first, Juso policy positions were characterized as incompatible with the Godesberg Programm; and second, their policies were held to be electorally disadvantageous.<sup>24</sup>

Within the SPD, Vogel appealed to his political friends in Bonn, Herbert Wehner and Willy Brandt, to announce their support.<sup>25</sup> As a result of pressure both from the press and interest groups at the local level and arm-twisting from within the party from the national level, Vogel's group defeated the Jusos. Vogel won the support of sufficiently large numbers of moderates at the local level to elect a new executive committee and to control the party list for the upcoming communal elections. In other words, Vogel's supporters got the top list places for these positions.<sup>26</sup>

Soon after this victory, Vogel left Munich politics to take the position as leader of the Bavarian party. He left behind him an SPD organization completely controlled by Jusos, but a city council and mayor who represented social democratic positions with a shrinking base of support within the organization. This situation led to what became known as the Munich Seven Years War between the mayor, Georg Kronawitter, and the leftist Jusos, who tried in vain to force Kronawitter into enacting their policies, particularly on building issues.<sup>27</sup>

The Labour Party in Bermondsey did not ever face the prospect of a student influx, since few students live in this traditional white working-

class constituency. However, the Labour councillors faced tremendous economic problems. With most housing being run by the council, in desperate need of repair, and in a depressed region of London in which incomes from rates were low to begin with, financial problems forced the local council into trying to raise the revenue base.<sup>28</sup> Attracting development companies to build office blocks and redevelop the dockyards was an ideal strategy to refurbish lost revenue. Bermondsey's location just across the Thames from Westminster and the city made it an attractive proposition for office development. While unemployment soared in the borough and deprivation in the area was among the worst in Britain, office towers were being built and council homes neglected.<sup>29</sup>

These circumstances led to the emergence of a citizen initiative: the North Southwark Community Development Group headed by George Nicholson and Ted Bowman, both of whom were to become Greater London city councillors in the Livingstone administration abolished by Margaret Thatcher.<sup>30</sup> The initiative encompassed tenants' associations, playground groups, parents' groups, and sports clubs. Founded in 1972, the NSCDG put up rival candidates against Labour councillors in 1974 with little success.<sup>31</sup> The group protested living conditions in the area and wanted the council to divert monies to remedy these conditions. But they found that opponents of local building projects had almost no legal recourse once a council had given support to a local building project. There are simply no means of opposing a project, whether in the courts or in the local administration.<sup>32</sup> The most effective method of changing local building priorities was through action in the local council. The way to get there was by joining or becoming active in the local Labour Party. By 1978 this group had achieved some moderate success: in three of eight wards it succeeded in putting up its own candidates with the approval of the Labour Party headed by John O'Grady, a close associate of the M.P., Bob Mellish. These candidates were elected to the Southwark council which administers Bermondsey.<sup>33</sup>

By 1978 tensions existed between the O'Grady faction of the party and these NSCDG newcomers.<sup>34</sup> However, the O'Grady people in the local parties had admitted the NSCDG into the party because of the scarcity of activists. In fact, there were so few activists in the party that NSCDG people were put up for positions for which there were no candidates. The O'Grady group had no choice but to admit them and let their potential opponents run for party and representative offices. Of the eight wards in Bermondsey, only one, John O'Grady's Dockyard ward, showed any sign

of activity since some ten to twenty O'Grady supporters attended meetings.<sup>35</sup> One NSCDG activist put it this way: "I joined the Labour Party in 1974 and in those days Cathedral Ward, where I joined, had ten regular attenders at ward meetings. Of those, three were councillors and the others held party positions."<sup>36</sup>

For all intents and purposes, the Bermondsey local party was nonexistent. John O'Grady explained this situation by claiming that it was terribly difficult to run the largest public housing authority in Britain during economic bad times and make sure that the local Labour Party was active.<sup>37</sup> Opponents, of course, argued that the party was left that way since no activity meant no opposition to the Labour councillors.

### The Struggle over Organizational Power, Policy, and Personalities

When Vogel departed from Munich politics, the tide had already turned against the Munich social democrats. The Jusos were able to elect a leftist executive committee in which they made a point of including a representative of the trade unions—Erwin Essl, a member of the metal workers union and reputed leftist.<sup>38</sup> By 1972 the Jusos controlled enough votes to even change the list of candidates for the communal elections to be held that year. They were put under pressure from the national level, Herbert Wehner specifically, not to change the list in case it might lead to the defection of a Munich member of the Bundestag, Günter Müller, who was to defect to the CSU in any case some weeks later over Brandt's *détente* policies.<sup>39</sup> Müller had difficulties on both the national and local levels because he had been one of the severest critics of the "reform strategy," and it was doubtful whether a leftist party in Munich would put such a candidate up for election.

In hindsight, it was a major tactical mistake for the Jusos not to have changed the list. Müller defected in any case and the balance of power within the local party was such that problems between policy activists and representatives were unavoidable. The gulf between the social democratic majority faction which was elected into the city council and the minority faction backed by a majority in the local party was at the center of the dispute which tore apart the local SPD. As soon as Kronawitter was elected mayor, he insisted that the local party could not make policy for him. He appointed his staffers without giving positions to the left. Policies were pushed through the city council with the support of the other political



parties and against the votes of the SPD minority wing on the council. The Gasteig project, the European Patent offices, the extension of the inner-city transport routes, subway systems, and the prices for such public services were all highly contentious issues.<sup>40</sup> Leftist proposals were simply ignored. These large projects had the backing of the trade unions. The gulf between unions and the left increased. By 1973 Essl resigned his seat and in 1974 the Jusos punished the DGB by breaking tradition and not electing a DGB representative onto the executive committee.<sup>41</sup>

The struggle reached its crescendo in 1974 when the Bavarian election produced a sharp electoral decline for the Bavarian and Munich SPD. In Munich the party sank to a low of 40.1 percent and was overtaken for the first time by the CSU which obtained 48.4 percent.<sup>42</sup> The Kronawitter group blamed the Jusos; the Jusos blamed Kronawitter. The party leaders and functionaries at the national level blamed the Jusos as well. A number of Juso leaders were picked out by the regional party for disciplinary action, ostensibly for having written a document purporting to be SPD policy which advocated socialization of private property.<sup>43</sup> A so-called "unity paper" was written up by regional party functionaries to bring the sides together, but this effort failed miserably.<sup>44</sup> Relations between the Kronawitter group and the left-wing opposition in the Munich city council reached a new low, shown clearly when it was discovered that each side had tried to make a deal with the CSU opposition members on the council to topple the other faction and push them out of the council's decision-making process!<sup>45</sup>

In 1976 the remnants of the Jusos and the political forces outside of both camps took revenge on the mandate holders.<sup>46</sup> Kronawitter and his allies were dropped from the party list, and in their place a team of former Jusos, some DGB unionists, and moderates (independents who did not belong to either the Jusos or the Kronawitter group) found their way onto the party list. However, these candidates were not able to overcome the terrible image the party had acquired. After having been dropped by the party, Kronawitter embarked on a smear campaign against his own party. He insisted that the party list was made up exclusively of dogmatic leftists.<sup>47</sup> The CSU handsomely won the mayoral and communal elections of 1976.

SPD regional and national leaders had warned the Kronawitter group that if they insisted on ignoring the party in policymaking, there would not be a possibility of keeping them on the list. Kronawitter ignored these warnings, hoping that officials in the party hierarchy would intervene as

they had done on Vogel's behalf in 1971. Kronawitter had, by that stage, almost no followers in the party. The Jusos, however, were also a spent force. Some of their leaders had found their way into representative offices, but the bulk of activists dwindled away. Some of the leading Jusos had been expelled from the party, and membership numbers fell to what they had been in the 1960s. Participation rates dropped, and electorally the party was in severe trouble. It lost all but one of its direct mandates in the Bundestag. In the 1983 and 1987 elections the Green Party took almost 13 percent of the inner-city vote from the SPD.<sup>48</sup>

The curious postscript to this story is that Georg Kronawitter set about making a successful comeback in the Munich party. In 1983 he reappeared as mayoral candidate for the SPD. He had written a book on the tactics used by the left and virtually replayed this strategy to take over the party by mobilizing his supporters. By using his supporters' voting power, Kronawitter took over the executive committees and finally won back his position as candidate.<sup>49</sup> His campaign started as an attempt to capture the candidacy for a seat in the Bavarian Landtag. Kronawitter failed largely because his opponent had been clever enough to stop Kronawitter from joining up one hundred followers to the local party a few days before the election, whereas the sixty-odd Weber supporters had already been written up as party members.<sup>50</sup> But one year later, Kronawitter was to succeed in regaining the nomination as mayoral candidate. The SPD and Kronawitter won the mayoral race in 1984. He has since run the Munich city council with fluctuating majorities since the SPD and CSU have equal numbers of seats on the council, with the Greens holding the balance.<sup>51</sup> Since the mayor has to constantly make compromises with other parties, Kronawitter is in a position where he can happily ignore party activists. Times have changed as well. The chairperson of the subdistrict executive, Günter Naumann, claimed that "the party organization will still get involved in city council politics, but not in terms of criticism but with suggestions, ideas, and helpful comments."<sup>52</sup>

In Bermondsey tensions between the "old guard" Labour city councillors and the NSCDG councillors soon developed into a factional war on the council.<sup>53</sup> The majority Labour councillors refused to listen to the NSCDG proposals and as a result, since there was no opposition, the NSCDG group became the core of a leftist opposition of some eleven to thirteen council persons. In Bermondsey's Labour Party the NSCDG people were recruiting allies into the local party and by 1980 they were in a position to take over the local executive committee.<sup>54</sup> At this time Bob Mellish an-

nounced that he might take a position with the London Docklands Development Corporation and would resign as M.P. To avoid a leftist takeover of the Annual General Meeting by NSCDG supporters, the General Committee was “frozen” at its 1979 level, that is when the O’Grady faction was still in control of the local party. Mellish and O’Grady wanted to make sure that a candidate was chosen who reflected their interests.<sup>55</sup>

The left responded to this action by recruiting even more new activists into the party. By 1980 the opposition to the O’Grady faction was able to take over most wards in Bermondsey. They translated their activism into a deselection campaign. First, George Nicholson was elected to replace Sir Reginald Goodwin, a long-time member and leader of the Greater London Council (GLC), as Bermondsey’s representative for the GLC elections.<sup>56</sup> Mellish and O’Grady inflamed relations by refusing to campaign on Nicholson’s behalf after their ally had been deselected. Nicholson obtained 9 percent more votes than Goodwin had in his last election, but the refusal to help the “constructive left,” as the press had termed Nicholson, was not forgotten by the Bermondsey activists.<sup>57</sup>

When the Southwark council increased rents by 33 percent, started to sell off council homes under the guidelines of the Conservative government in the early 1980s, closed the area’s public hospital, and gave building permits to a number of office block developments, the left in the party threatened to deselect O’Grady’s councillors.<sup>58</sup> The left had captured enough wards to do that. The O’Grady faction fought back by trying to affiliate a friendly union—the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications, and Plumbing Union (EETPU)—to the party in sufficiently large numbers to outvote the left.<sup>59</sup> The left countered through affiliating some NUPE branches and appealed to the NEC to check whether the EETPU affiliation drive was proper.<sup>60</sup> The resulting press coverage discouraged the EETPU leadership from further pursuing this course of action. The result was that the left fully controlled the Annual General Meeting (AGM) in 1981. The O’Grady minority left the AGM amid protests that they had been barred from affiliating their allies.<sup>61</sup>

In October 1981 the left completed its sweep of the old guard by deselecting every member of the O’Grady group from the party short list of candidates for the upcoming communal elections. The O’Grady group appealed to the regional and national party and as a result of their appeal a number of members, not including O’Grady, were reinstated on the list.<sup>62</sup>

Mellish resigned as M.P. for Bermondsey amid charges that the party



had been taken over by “barmy” extremists. He claimed that the activists were not representative of the Bermondsey constituency. As he put it: “I have nothing to do with them, that load of rubbish.”<sup>63</sup> The O’Grady/Mellish group attempted to run a high-ranking official of the EETPU, John Spellar, as their parliamentary candidate.<sup>64</sup> The leftist executive committee eliminated Spellar from the short list, claiming that his nomination was based on “phoney union affiliation practices,” since he brought with him thirteen EETPU affiliations.<sup>65</sup> The candidate eventually chosen was Peter Tatchell, up to that point local party secretary and an ally of the NSCDG group around Bowman and Nicholson. It was this decision that put Bermondsey into the national limelight. The O’Grady faction complained to the NEC about the reselection process. They claimed that they had been eliminated by a group of radical leftists through improper means. The remaining rightist forces on the NEC and in the party in general used the opportunity to marshal an attack on the left.<sup>66</sup>

John Golding, member of the NEC, claimed that “if Mr. O’Grady is not allowed to stand for Labour because of the tyranny of left wing fanatics, then the people of South London will desert us in their thousands.”<sup>67</sup> Michael Foot, then party leader, probably in a fit of confusion, mixing up the leftist activist Tariq Ali with Peter Tatchell, claimed that Tatchell could “never be an endorsed parliamentary candidate.” Ali had applied for membership and stirred up a tremendous furor among the remaining right wing which argued that the acceptance of Ali opened the door to all sorts of radical socialist and Communist splinter groups. It is not certain whether Foot confused the two cases, but the evidence suggests that was the case.<sup>68</sup> Foot’s faux pas put the NEC in an unenviable position because it was called to vote upon the issue. Only to avoid embarrassing Foot by not defeating him, the NEC voted against Tatchell by a margin of fifteen to fourteen. The official reason given was that Tatchell had called for extra-parliamentary action against the Tories in a London Labour Briefing article where he had endorsed the March for Jobs and unemployment demonstrations on Parliament.<sup>69</sup> Foot’s statement on Tatchell and the NEC vote had nothing to do with the politics in Bermondsey—they were merely a signal from the Foot faction to the right of the party that it was going to halt the forward march of the left in the CLPs. The NEC vote was intended to keep even more rightist M.P.s from defecting to the SDP to avoid the reselection battles they might face in their CLPs.<sup>70</sup> Tatchell turned out to be a convenient target.

The campaign by Tony Benn to become deputy leader and the resulting



attempts by the unions to stop the intraparty bleeding led to the meeting at Bishop's Stortford where the Bermondsey case was also discussed.<sup>71</sup> The NEC dispatched Hugh Heffer and David Hughes, two leading leftists on the NEC, to stop the fighting in Bermondsey. Heffer, with NEC Organization Committee support, reinstated the O'Grady faction on the party short list of candidates. He is reputed to have told the local party: "I don't give a damn about the rules, Bishop's Stortford determines everything."<sup>72</sup> In other words, party leaders were supposed to enforce some form of accommodation in the local parties' rank and file to protect the remaining social democrats.

Despite this reinstatement only O'Grady and a second councillor were readopted as candidates by their local wards for the 1982 communal elections. After their defeat, most of these former councillors defected to the SDP. Some ran as independents, and Mellish supported them in a blaze of publicity.<sup>73</sup> He and O'Grady repeated the claim that the Bermondsey party had been taken over by extremists who made it impossible for them to be members of the party they loved. Mellish finally resigned as M.P., which made a reselecting process inevitable, thereby making Foot's life even more miserable because Tatchell again got the overwhelming endorsement of his local party. Foot accepted his candidacy this time, claiming that Tatchell had "changed his mind about extra-parliamentary activities."<sup>74</sup>

The Mellish/O'Grady faction defected from the Labour Party. O'Grady ran as an independent Labour candidate in the parliamentary by-election. He admitted that the campaign was merely designed to spoil Tatchell's chances.<sup>75</sup> The group ran a smear campaign against the "Australian homosexual, draft dodger," as they commonly referred to their opponent, which proved to be highly successful.<sup>76</sup> Labour lost the seat for the first time since 1922 and has since not recovered from the loss. The aftermath of the 1983 by-election and the intraparty fights was that many supporters of the Nicholson/Bowman group left the party. Membership numbers dwindled again and a new group, the Militant Tendency, took advantage of the situation by infiltrating the local party.<sup>77</sup> They have since taken power in the organization, selected a Militant member as parliamentary candidate, but have not been able to swing former Labour voters who defected to the Alliance as a result of the devastating war inside the local Labour Party. In Bermondsey Labour has to fight its image. As a local told a Labour campaigner in the Tatchell election: "It makes me laugh, you people coming around here touting. Labour's been in this borough for years, all the time, and look at the state of the place!"<sup>78</sup>

### Some Comparative Aspects

The dynamics of factional war in the two parties are remarkably similar. The old guard had neglected its party base and, once challenged, found out that to mobilize support it had to turn to its union allies—the civil servants' union in the Munich case; the rightist EETPU in the Bermondsey case. In both examples the countermobilization proved to be inadequate, but, for some time, the old guard was still in control over representative offices. It is this control over policymaking that led to greater confrontation and polarization. It is not that the old guard had oligarchic power in Michels's sense. On the contrary, they had none at all after the left had taken control over the local party. The old guard had independence from the party base, at least until the next round of elections and intraparty selections into the party lists, because of their positions as representatives.

In both cases, the old guard attempted to use their allies in the higher echelons of the party organization and their contacts to outside forces, such as the press and unions, to control their internal challengers. But the more they attempted to mobilize such extra-local support, the more the local opposition recruited new members to counteract these oligarchic methods. However, within each group, the factional confrontation necessitated oligarchic control over the troops. For the old guard it became a question of political survival to make sure that all of their allies voted in unison. For the challengers it became a matter of taking power to organize and vote in unity as well. Therefore, each group adopted hierarchies and control centers to coordinate activities, frequently in secret to make sure that the other side did not know what the next move might be.<sup>79</sup>

The national developments had an important impact on the local parties. In the SPD case, Kronawitter's comeback in the 1980s was a sign that the opposition to him had more or less defected from the party. The Jusos and their leftist allies lost the struggle in the SPD, even if they had temporarily won on the local level as in Munich. Many former SPD activists joined the Green Party. In the Labour Party, the O'Grady faction did not attempt a comeback because many of the potential supporters had joined the SDP. Ignoring the opposition, threatening disciplinary action from above, and a press campaign were the weapons of the established group. Deselection, retribution, and criticism at party meetings were the institutional weapons of the challenging group. The more factionalized, the more likely the rigorous application of these organizational powers. "Democratic" interaction became a misnomer—what occurred was a

vicious struggle for control of policy and appointments. Members were recruited to suit the purposes of one of the groups involved.

Each group used the resources at their disposal to effect the intended consequence—winning organizational power and thereby control over policy and appointments. The unintended consequence in both cases was electoral destruction. This consequence ought to have been foreseen, yet only started to make an impression on the groups once they were well into their struggle and incapable of retracting. In the Munich case a form of proportionalism has been adopted in which each of the major groups gets a slice of organizational power. This is not the case in Bermondsey where at the end of 1985 there was only a ruin left from what had been a ramshackle party structure at the beginning of the process.

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## 8 Conclusions

This book opened with a discussion of the “end of social democracy” argument. The assertion that social democracy is at an end as a viable electoral and political strategy is incorrect. Comparative analysis of the West European social democratic and socialist parties shows that only a few parties have experienced fundamental electoral decline.<sup>1</sup> Of course, all of these parties were affected by a variety of social and economic changes. The shift from blue- to white-collar employment, postmaterialist ideas, de-industrialization, and increased unemployment presented adjustment problems in terms of electoral and political strategies. Equally, socialist theory, the vision of socialism, is in crisis both in Eastern and Western Europe.<sup>2</sup> The failures of nationalization, the need to modernize, to produce efficiently, and to restructure declining industries have caused a prolonged struggle between policy groups. However, numerous parties have adjusted their political strategies to socioeconomic changes, and those which have not can still do so.<sup>3</sup>

Two prominent cases of social democratic decline were investigated in this study. In line with the conventional arguments about political parties, the research has shown that exogenous variables such as deteriorating economic circumstances and changes in the social as well as activist base had important consequences for both parties. Economic circumstances limited the ability of both Labour and the SPD governments to fulfill all of their electoral promises. Policy choices had to be made which adversely affected parts of the electoral constituency. Shifts in the social base of support led to confrontations between new groups entering the party and



the established working-class members. Choices had to be made as to which groups' policy preferences were to be enacted. In both parties the new left challenged the dominant coalition between the majority of trade unionists and social democrats. A massive fight over policies, personalities, and organizational power broke out. The fight ended in the continued dominance of the social democrats in the SPD and the defeat of the hitherto dominant social democrats in Labour.

The study focused on the role of intraparty decisionmaking in the choice of electoral strategy, policy positions, and coalition building. It addressed the question of why the two parties reacted to socioeconomic changes as they did, and why they failed to find a compromise solution to the struggles between the intraparty groups over the question of how to respond to such changes. The struggle between new leftists and social democrats was primarily about how a party ought to adjust to the emergence of new social groups and demands and to a changing system of production with higher unemployment. Both parties dealt unsuccessfully with the task of adjustments. Yet, roughly similar challenges from the new left on party orthodoxy led to vastly different outcomes. In the SPD the social democrats won the struggle; in the Labour Party they lost.

The central empirical question this study examines was why the two parties, despite similar conditions, exhibited such vastly different outcomes in the struggle over policy. The answer lies in the coalition building process of intraparty groups in response to a set of external events such as the state of the economy, electoral performance of the party, and the success or failure of the working-class-based party's government policies. When the new left challenged social democratic party leaders and policies, they did so under very different conditions in West Germany and Britain. Two overarching factors are of primary importance: economic performance and the reactions of the trade union movement to government performance.

The economic situation in Britain represented a far more serious threat to the social democratic government than in West Germany. Labour had to deflate the economy and the party imposed austerity on its trade union constituency. Second, within the British union movement, a gradual drift to the left had taken place since the mid-1960s. When the Callaghan government openly defied union interests, many trade unionists sided with Labour's emerging radical wing. The increasingly leftist unions used their institutional powers within the party to replace the social democrats. The social democratic party leaders could not reverse the disintegration of

the dominant coalition. Once they lost union support, they lost control over policy decisions and organizational power.

In the SPD the trade union-social democratic coalition remained intact, despite some economic difficulties. The same factors play a role in the explanation for this development as in the Labour case. First, economic conditions in West Germany did not result in pressure on union leaders from their rank and file to punish their social democratic allies. Second, even if there had been pressure to do so, the relations between union and party are such that it would be more difficult for the German union leaders to topple the SPD's leadership. On top of that, the new left adopted policy positions which were at odds with the interests of the mainstream union movement. Whereas the British new left concentrated on building a coalition with the unions, the German new left had to concentrate on a strategy of taking over the highly centralized SPD from the bottom upward. This necessitated the mobilization of grass roots supporters, often against local trade unionist SPD members. The new left concentrated on issues that appealed to citizen initiatives, but not necessarily to trade unionists.

Choices made about electoral and policy strategy in the 1970s caused electoral and organizational erosion in the 1980s. The emergence of new, challenging parties explain both Labour's and the SPD's electoral problems. The Green Party in West Germany voiced precisely the policy positions which had been rejected by the dominant social democratic-union coalition in the SPD. The Greens were the party of the new social movements, all of which were formed against a particular SPD-led government policy. The Green Party represented the positions of the new left in contemporary West German politics. Since the Greens have taken up to 13 percent of the SPD's urban vote, SPD leaders have attempted to reintegrate "green positions" into the SPD's electoral manifesto.

In Labour, the social democrats lost the struggle over control of the party. Once the unions supported new and traditional leftist policy positions and rules' changes, social democrats defected to form their own organization. For a short period of time, the new left was able to build a coalition between a majority of trade unions and the traditional left against social democrats. However, this coalition was short-lived once the social democrats exited from Labour and the leftist forces got themselves entangled in a struggle over the deputy leadership question. Their position was further weakened with the electoral disaster of 1983. The SDP almost succeeded in replacing Labour as the main opposition party. The unions then began to turn away from leftist policy positions and personnel. The

organizational prerogative of winning elections by appealing to “the voters of the middle” again became a central theme in union and party leadership strategic thinking.

The aim of this investigation was not only to describe the events of the new left-social democratic struggle, but to conceptualize intraparty politics. The following paragraphs provide an evaluation of the utility of the model and theoretical apparatus developed in chapter two. Closely related to the theoretical issues is the question of intraorganizational democracy. The findings of the study reveal much about the connection between democratic decisionmaking and factional politics. After having discussed the theoretical findings, the chapter will close with a discussion of the current efforts to adjust. The elite and policy renewal process of the 1980s provides a basis for a reflection of the lessons of the past and a short speculation about the future prospects of the two cases.

### The Model of Political Parties

The theoretical framework devised for this study derives from an in-depth critique of Robert Michels and subsequent work on the inner workings of political parties.<sup>4</sup> Michels and many others argued that party leaders controlled their organizations, made party policy in their own rather than their followers' interests, and manipulated the masses to do their bidding. Michels's notion of oligarchic control is shown to be incorrect in both cases. Party leaders are not in control of the party at all times. They require support among the rank and file to stay in power. Further, party leaders cannot make policy at will without running the risk of seriously alienating groups within the party whom they might need. They need to build dominant coalitions, which may disintegrate if the parliamentary group is not capable of providing the goods needed to maintain the coalition. Leaders can ignore party policy while in power but they run an increased risk of deselection when the time comes for the activists to get involved in the process of selecting their representatives. Moreover, Michels's dichotomy of leaders and masses is completely inadequate. Parties consist of numerous ideological groups. They encompass actors motivated by a variety of incentives. The size, composition, and activities of the party membership are crucial determinants of party politics and ensure that party leaders do not make policy alone.

The model of a political party developed from the central assumptions

in Mancur Olson's *Logic of Collective Action*.<sup>5</sup> Parties are complex organizations which exist to fulfill certain wants by those who founded them. They are voluntary organizations and therefore have to provide incentives for people to join them. They have to provide both common and individual goods for voters to support them and to attract dues-paying members. Parties appeal to a variety of motivations to attract members. They offer careers; they offer a means of implementing policy; they offer a political home or club; and they purport to represent the interests of various social groups.<sup>6</sup> In the case of working-class-based parties it stands to reason that trade unionists will join the party to translate their political demands into actual policy.

Parties attract two types of actors: those wishing to make a career from politics and those wishing to implement or support a policy, series of policies, or an ideology.<sup>7</sup> All parties provide a mixture of incentives to entice joiners, and they all consist of a variety of groups struggling for certain policies and/or institutional power. However, even though these conditions are similar, in the two case studies different outcomes occur. If Michels's thesis was correct, we should expect party leaders to prevail in their struggle with the masses. In Labour they lose; in the SPD they have to adjust—why?

The crucial factor missing from Michels's analysis of parties is the organizational dimension. Each party has a different institutional structure and distribution of internal power. In the comparison between SPD and Labour three crucial institutional differences help to explain why in one case the social democrats win and in the other they lose. These divergent factors are: first, the relations between the union movement and the parties; second, the basis of membership recruitment and activism; and third, the centralization and concentration of institutional power in the hands of the party leadership.

The relations between unions and parties differ on two dimensions. First, British unions are in control of Labour's decisionmaking process in the Annual Conference and the NEC. German unions are party neutral and are not represented as organizations in the party. Second, union members are members of the Labour Party by virtue of their union membership. Many union members do not find it necessary to join the party directly because of this circumstance. In the SPD many union members are also individual members of the SPD. In terms of membership activity, the second divergence between the parties, this difference is crucial. West German unionists are more numerous in the local parties than their British



counterparts. This situation contributed to the severe membership crisis in the Labour Party, which enabled small activist groups to take over local parties. The new left in West Germany encountered a vibrant membership party when they attempted to take over the SPD.

The organizational distribution of power in the SPD favors the leadership because decisionmaking power is concentrated in relatively small forums: the 400-member Party Convention, the 36-member Executive Committee and the 12-member Presidium. All of these legislative organs are dominated by party representatives and leaders. In the Labour Party, policy decisions are made by the Annual Conference, which is controlled by the unions and not by the party's parliamentary or leadership group. Further, SPD leaders have a number of incentives at their disposal, such as career opportunities and disciplinary options, to entice cooperation for minority opponents. In Labour these powers are not only less effective, patronage opportunities inside the Labour Party are much fewer than in the SPD, but also generally not in the hands of party leaders but of local activists or the unions.

### Structures and Choices

The strategies to maintain or take power by each group in the party are determined by institutional structures. To win or maintain power a dominant coalition is necessary. In the Labour Party such a coalition must consist of a majority of unions at Annual Conference or control over the PLP. In the SPD such a coalition must involve the capture of at least half of the twenty-two district organizations which influence the selection of parliamentary candidates on the party lists and delegates to the Party Convention. This in turn can only be achieved through mobilizing a huge number of local activists to take over the local and regional parties which select representatives for direct mandates and delegates to the next higher level of the party organization.

The social democrats had built a coalition with trade unionists in the 1950s around their policy preferences. For social democratic political entrepreneurs, the most important feature of their policy strategy was that it would help them win elections and political power. For union leaders, social democracy promised immediate short-term benefits in terms of higher wages and welfare benefits. Not all unionists and political entrepreneurs shared this enthusiasm about social democracy, as the opposition in

both Labour and SPD indicated. But once both parties won electoral support, or at least defined the political agenda as Labour seemed to do despite being in opposition during the 1950s, social democracy was given a vote of intraorganizational confidence. In the SPD social democrats took the opportunity to completely defeat their socialist opponents by expelling them from the party. Labour's social democrats could not pursue such a strategy because union leaders and members were opposed to such a measure and the pool of activists in the party was already shrinking in any case.

In the SPD social democrats took over all important party positions in the Presidium, the Executive Committee, and the district organizations. They built a solid foundation of support at the grass roots level of the party. By 1959, when the Godesberg Programm sealed the policy and elite renewal process by committing the party to an unequivocal social democratic policy course, the traditional socialists had been completely defeated. From the local level upward, the party was in the hands of social democrats. In many localities trade unionists formed the backbone of social democratic support and union interests determined party policy and personnel appointments. Vogel, as party leader and Munich's mayor, depended on the unions' support within the party for his dominance over the local organization.

In the Labour Party the organizational base of social democrats was much narrower. To be sure, there were many local party organizations which had social democratic majorities. But as we saw in the Bermondsey case, this base of support dwindled during the 1950s to 1970s. The size and participation rates of the Bermondsey membership may have been extraordinarily low, but it was by no means uncommon to find local CLPs with fewer than five hundred members.<sup>8</sup> The most important aspect of Labour's organizational distribution of power is the relationship between party and the unions. Until the mid-1960s, social democrats had unmitigated support among the union leadership. Yet by the 1970s many British unions were dominated by leftists. This predominance did not affect the party other than in terms of party policy. Social democrats were not thrown out of office, although the NEC became more pronouncedly leftist. The social democratic majority among M.P.s and in the party leadership remained in their positions.

In the 1960s the social democratic-unionist coalition was challenged by the new left. In both the SPD and Labour the new left demanded traditional socialist policies as well as nontraditional issues such as democrati-

zation, racial and sexual politics, and environmental protection. But the emphasis the new left placed on these issues varied with the necessity to build a new dominant coalition. The new left in the Labour Party had to win union allies. It consequently stressed issues on which a coalition could be built. The issue of representatives' responsibility to enact party policy proved a convenient platform for such a coalition against the social democrats. The unions had concentrated on writing party policy after the electoral defeat of 1970. The experience of 1974 to 1979 suggested that institutional control over the PLP was more important to implement pro-union policies than control over policymaking at the Annual Conference or in the NEC. The more the social democratic party leaders ignored party policy and alienated union members with their austerity package, the more likely a union-leftist dominant coalition became. Those new left issues to which the unions reacted negatively were put on the back burner, at least until after 1979.

In the SPD the new left also adjusted its policies to a strategy designed to take over power, and a takeover of the party depended on local mobilization. In a vibrant membership party, the strategy involved mobilizing new members, who were often not from working-class backgrounds. The student movement spearheaded an influx of such members, which led to confrontations with the established trade unionists. They stressed issues which appealed to citizen initiative members such as participation in decisionmaking, environmental, and local planning policies. Mobilizing new members was successful in university cities and in organizations where membership was relatively small, as in the Munich case. In other areas, however, the new left was not able to replace the dominant social democratic-union coalition. Their attempt to take over culminated in 1973 when their biggest intraparty victory also marked the turning point in their fortunes. At the Party Convention the left was able to win seats on the Executive Committee. But the right countered and used control over party positions, its power of expulsion to blunt, and eventually turn back the leftist assault.

The SPD new left was not able to obtain the necessary support from the unions for two major reasons. First, in the struggle for positions in the party, trade unionists and new leftists often found themselves in competition. The Munich case study shows that executive committees consisted of important union leaders. This is the case in many local SPD parties, not just in Munich. Replacement or challenges by the new left meant that at the local level new leftists and trade unionists found themselves in conflict.

Second, new left strategy often involved issues which clashed with national as well local trade union policy preferences. Local citizen initiatives frequently protested policies the unions supported. Again, the Munich case shows a number of instances in housing and building policies where this was the case.

The strategic choices of each union are shaped by the situation of their industry in the domestic and international economy. In Britain many unions faced decline as a result of industry's adjustment process. For union members it meant loss of jobs and economic security; for the union it meant loss of members and revenues. For numerous unions in declining industrial sectors the promises of protectionism voiced by Labour's left were appealing. The West German unions did not face such harsh choices. Although faced with growing unemployment, the welfare sector for the working population and those temporarily unemployed remained intact under the Schmidt government, and costs were imposed on the non-unionized population. Just as parties react to exogenous developments, unions do likewise. The inability of the British unions to reach a consensus of industrial policy was completely predictable since each union was affected differently by industrial readjustment. Unfortunately for the Labour Party, this conflict carries over into Annual Conference decisionmaking. The West German unions did not have to face similarly difficult choices.<sup>9</sup> Accepting social democratic policy preferences was never much of a question in the German union movement after the 1940s.

The lesson from these observations for a "theory of political parties" is that parties are shaped by external events, but that they then respond to these events in ways that are only intelligible if we examine their internal processes. The core of the theoretical argument can be condensed into four main propositions. First, parties are complex organizations in which a variety of policy groups and motivations for political action interact. The primary organizational goal is to provide positive incentives for voters, political entrepreneurs, and policy activists by winning elections, even though this goal may be in conflict with the motivations or interests of internal groups. Second, the distribution of power inside the organization structures the opportunities and constraints upon intraparty groups. The centralization of power, control over policy, patronage opportunities, and personnel appointments is a crucial determinant of whether a dominant coalition can control challenges from a group of activists. Third, in working-class-based parties the relations to the union movement and the forces affecting union policy stances are crucial in shaping party policy.



Fourth, the coalition-building processes inside the party and their relations to the union movement have to be set in the context of electoral performance and the outcome of implemented policies.

Political parties respond to their environment as one would expect from the vast literature depicting parties as essentially dependent actors.<sup>10</sup> The point of this study was to show that parties can also affect their environment; but in order to understand how they respond and act, knowledge of their internal decisionmaking processes is necessary. The few studies that have focused on internal procedures were concerned mainly with the question of compatibility of internal decisionmaking and democracy. The issue is a fascinating one since it stands at the intersection of theory and praxis.

### Intraparty Politics and Democracy

Michels argued that parties are undemocratic organizations.<sup>11</sup> He based this assertion on his observations of leadership behavior in the SPD at the turn of the century. Michels suggested that party leaders misuse the organization to foster their own ends rather than those of the membership, let alone the social class they supposedly represented.<sup>12</sup> The oligarchy manipulated the masses, controlled bureaucratic powers to silence any dissent, and were therefore incapable of achieving progress toward a truly democratic system. Indeed, since bureaucracy means organization and that means oligarchic domination, democracy could not be achieved if political organization existed. Michels's notion of democracy was one of "direct democracy" which did not allow for "representative democracy" as real democratic practice. As already noted, this pessimistic assessment of the antidemocratic nature of parties has been scrutinized by defenders of party systems and representative democracy such as Robert McKenzie or Maurice Duverger. McKenzie suggested that parties ought not to be "democratically" organized, since what mattered was not whether intra-party activists and members had their desires fulfilled but that the voter was given alternative policies and leaders to choose between.<sup>13</sup>

Michels's observations concerning the emergence of oligarchic groups is to some extent validated by the two case studies. As in any other voluntary organization, there are actors who decide that it is worth their while to pay the initial costs in time and effort to organize their supporters and take a leading role in decisionmaking. Not all policy activists are prepared to

do so and those who are quickly become leaders. In each group, political entrepreneurs took the trouble to devote much of their time to organizing their troops, gathering information, and deciding on strategies to win power. However, there is no evidence to suggest that such leaders are a conspiratorial group, since there are conflicts between leadership members within and among the intraparty groups or factions. For a group, tendency, or faction to win intraparty power it must organize itself, particularly if it intends to challenge the dominant coalition. To do so effectively, a division of labor is unavoidable. But this does not mean that leaders and followers necessarily have separate interests.

This study has revealed practices at both national and local levels of party decisionmaking that would have made Machiavelli blush. Once groups or factions have formed, the desire to translate their demands into party policies can lead to unmitigated "Realpolitik." Opposing factions consolidated their power by voting in a block, and they punished their opponents at every possible turn. Once groups or factions were locked in a power struggle, a cycle of action and reaction ensued which was very difficult to stop, particularly if each group had the illusion that they possessed the resources to completely defeat their opposition. If these resources, either in terms of membership numbers or organizational patronage, had not existed, then a compromise solution would have been far more likely. New left party activists used their superior numbers in the two local cases to outvote the social democratic right. Social democratic officeholders used the independence of their representative positions to ignore the new left. Both sides hoped to reduce the influence of the other side by manipulations of organizational rules. Mandatory reselection and the imperative mandate were two means by which the new left hoped to achieve activist control over representatives. It is not surprising that rules' changes took place in Labour and not in the SPD. The winners of the struggle insisted on rules favoring their aims.

The debate on party organization and democratic practices is highly subjective. Since definitions of democracy are plentiful, the judgment as to whether a party is organized in a democratic fashion is dependent on which view one takes of what democracy is. New left activists in the SPD had no difficulties in justifying their voting behavior at local or national levels by arguing that the right was doing the same. British unionists seemed to have few problems justifying the selection process for NEC members or the block vote. Labour's social democrats used to argue that the block vote was a democratic measure representative of trade union

opinion. But once the union block vote swung against them, they complained that it was undemocratic and unrepresentative. Perspectives change according to whether a practice helps a group win a struggle with challengers or not.

Angelo Panebianco suggested that initial decisions on party structures determine the political game inside a party for decades to come.<sup>14</sup> His observation is more than true in the two case studies. Labour was founded to represent trade union interests in Parliament. Recent developments show that the unions are still in control of the organization, perhaps even more so than ever before. We have witnessed not only the first and second “faces of power” in action, but also the third. The fact that the new left and the social democrats had to build dominant coalitions with the unions led them to adopt certain types of policies that they thought would appeal to the unions. The unions not only dominate agenda setting and can make party leaders do their bidding, but they have structured the party in such a way that it shapes the strategic thinking of each group.

A similar argument can be made for the SPD. The party emerged as a means of obtaining the franchise and representation in the Reichstag. The historical development of the party was such that much emphasis was placed on the role of the representative leadership. Of course, the SPD has undergone traumatic changes since the 1870s. Nevertheless, the original hierarchical aspects of the party’s structure which annoyed Michels so much still shape decisionmaking and coalition building. The social democrats were challenged by a relatively powerful and large social movement, unlike their British counterparts who were exposed to a challenge from a small group of activists. The SPD social democratic leadership survived this challenge. They were able to impose on the new left an unpromising strategy as a result of the SPD’s institutional setup. Peter Glotz likened the SPD to a tanker which, once set on a course, is difficult to stop or reverse.<sup>15</sup> A reversal to accommodate the issues of “new social movements” has taken place gradually and as a result of electoral disappointments.

Perhaps the most positive aspect of factional struggle is that it brought competition for positions and choices between intraparty rivals. It fostered a debate about policy choices, even if that debate sometimes took on quite untempered forms. In the SPD, top level party leaders attempted to build a proportional solution to the factional war in Munich. In the 1980s a similar solution was adopted at the top levels of party decisionmaking. In the Labour Party such a solution is only now emerging, after the unions

seem to have reached the conclusion that Labour must be given the chance to appear freer of union influence and adopt policies that appeal to electoral groups outside of the union movement.

### Historical Lessons and Future Scenarios

There are a number of important and obvious lessons for the future to be learned from the two case studies. Both Labour and SPD paid a high political price for economic slowdown and the consequences that had on their constituencies. The splits into a traditional working-class base, white-collar groups, the unemployed, and those who no longer share materialist or even corporatist sympathies represent new challenges for these parties and the trade union movement in bringing about a political program that can appeal to a broad constituency. These divisions are fundamental cleavages and will remain an obstacle to building stable electoral coalitions in the future. However, the task is not impossible. Other social democratic parties have had considerable success doing so. Labour and the SPD may well learn from the experiences of the Swedish, French, and Spanish experiments in building cross-class alliances. Of particular interest in the French and Spanish cases is the organizational differentiation between party and the union movement.

The broader lesson is that divisions also affect the electoral constituencies of the conservative parties, causing them electoral difficulties. Industrial readjustment has so far had a much more pronounced effect on the working-class constituencies. But it has not passed by other social groups either. Since for both Labour and SPD the major problem was not that these divisions existed but that they became reasons for the formation of new political parties, the lesson for the conservatives is obvious. If Labour can recapture the lost Social Democratic voters, then Labour becomes a viable contender again. There is no indication of a party emerging to the right of the Conservative Party. However, the disintegration of the SDP and SLD in recent months is a warning signal to the Conservative Party, amplified by the results of the European elections of 1989.

In West Germany the CDU/CSU already faces a similar problem to that confounding SPD strategists in the 1980s. The Republican Party to the right of the established conservative parties could well effect an electoral shift large enough to cost the CDU/CSU its parliamentary majority at the next general elections.<sup>16</sup> The Republicans are the equivalent of the pre-



dominantly leftist, "new social movements" of the 1970s, except they operate on the political right. The death of Franz Josef Strauss, the figurehead of this constituency, and the attempts by the CDU to attract the middle of the road, liberal voter so effectively pursued by Heiner Geissler at the last general election, opened up the opportunity for a rightist political party to form. The results of the European elections were a warning shot to the West German coalition government. The Republicans appeal to a sector of society that has been neglected by the conservatives, just as the SPD neglected the new leftist/postmaterialist groups. Republicans appeal to the lower middle-class voter who feels economically somewhat insecure and overrun by foreigners in West Germany.

Both Labour and the SPD face distinct sets of adjustment problems. For Labour the task is to secure some independence from the union movement. Given the organizational structure of the party, such a development is likely to be symbolic and quite limited. Yet, party and union leaders have attempted to provide an image of separation in recent months. The unions have promised a revision of the policy decisionmaking process. Some unions have even suggested the abolition of the union block vote.<sup>17</sup>

In the SPD the task is how to formulate a party program that can combine economic growth to secure union and working-class benefits, while at the same time offering a set of environmental policies convincing enough to provide for a return to the fold of Green Party voters. The SPD may also attempt to build a coalition with the Greens. This scenario is becoming more probable as the realist wing of the Green Party gains the upper hand in the struggle with their fundamentalist opposition.

It may appear trite to end this discussion not only on an optimistic note for the two parties, but to appeal to their sense of a political vision. The historical lesson of the tremendous victory in 1972 for the SPD must be that Willy Brandt offered such a vision. Not only in foreign affairs, but domestically many activists were inspired by this vision. So were the voters! The SPD can offer a political vision which concentrates on social issues, production, consumption, the environment, and the questions of justice and equality of opportunity. These are not temporary political questions. These are political issues on which the social democrats in Britain and West Germany have, for some time now, lost the initiative. Labour's task is a good deal more difficult because it cannot divorce itself from the sectional interests of a large constituency in declining industries. Nevertheless, the same issues are involved. The vision that determined party politics after 1945 in Britain was social democratic, even if the

Conservatives ruled.<sup>18</sup> The vision, however, is in need of adjustment.<sup>19</sup> The egalitarianism of former socialist thought may be outdated, but proposals for justice, equality, and fairness are capable of motivating many to act and vote for either SPD or the Labour Party. A glance at the innovative attempts to adjust to new conditions in Scandinavia, Spain, and France may well reveal to the British and West German social democrats some promising electoral and political avenues. Far from being at the end of the electoral road, social democracy is currently the only viable alternative to the neoconservative project.

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# Notes

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	Workers		Civil Service and Salaried Employees (based on salary & responsibility)		Self-Employed
	Unskilled	Skilled	Up to Midlevel	Leading	
1980	0	0	2	1	0
1983	1	3	7	17	2
1987	3	9	10	8	5

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### Chapter 3: The Study of Intraparty Politics

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37. Charles Sabel, “The Internal Politics of Trade Unions,” in Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 228–32.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 232.
39. Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, London: MacMillan, 1974; and John Gaventa, *Power and Powerless*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980.
40. Gaventa, *Power and Powerless*, pp. 5–25.
41. Lewis Minkin, *The Labour Party Annual Conference*, Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1980, p. xv.
42. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, quoted in Gaventa, *Power and Powerless*, p. 14.
43. Gaventa, *Power and Powerless*, p. 14.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
45. Panebianco, *Political Parties*, pp. 33–45.

#### Chapter 4: Institutional Structures and the Distribution of Organizational Power

1. Geoff Hodgson, *Labour at the Crossroads*, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981, p. 25. See also Tony Topham and Ken Coates, *Trade Unions in Britain*, Nottingham, England: Spokesman, 1980, pp. 308–11.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 310.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Tony Topham and Ken Coates, *Trade Unions and Politics*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 134.
5. Lewis Minkin, *The Labour Party Annual Conference*, Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1980.

6. Ibid., pp. 318–20.
7. David Kogan and Maurice Kogan, *The Battle for the Labour Party*, London: Kogan Page, 1982, p. 23.
8. Gerard Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats: 1969–1982*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983, pp. 17–33.
9. Ute Müller, *Die Demokratische Willensbildung in den politischen Parteien*, Mainz: Hase and Koehler, 1967, pp. 65–66.
10. Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats*, pp. 17–22.
11. Ibid., p. 22.
12. Ibid., p. 20.
13. Minkin, *The Labour Party Annual Conference*, pp. 68–71.
14. Ibid., pp. 141–42.
15. Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats*, p. 22.
16. Ibid.
17. Robert McKenzie, *British Political Parties*, London: Heinemann, 1963, p. 550.
18. Chris Mullin and Charlotte Atkins, *How to Select or Reselect Your M.P.*, London: Campaign for Labour Party Democracy, 1981, p. 9, contains an analysis of the shortlisting process in the General Committee (GC). “Because of the quirks of using the elimination ballot to draw up a shortlist it is frequently the case that a candidate who has substantial support does not make the shortlist. When this happens, the remedy lies with the GC. If it so wishes, the GC may overturn an entire shortlist recommended by the executive; it can replace any of the recommended candidates or it can add to the recommended shortlist.” In other words, the GC has extensive powers.
19. Mullin and Atkins, *How to Select or Reselect Your M.P.*, p. 10.
20. McKenzie, *British Political Parties*, p. 551.
21. Ibid., p. 552.
22. Ibid., p. 557.
23. Ibid., p. 556.
24. Mullin and Atkins, *How to Select or Reselect Your M.P.*, p. 7.
25. SPD Bavaria, *Satzung der SPD Südbayern*, 1985, p. 10.
26. Peter Glotz, *Die Innenausstattung der Macht*, Frankfurt: Fischer, 1981, pp. 113–15. Also Harry Nowka, *Das Machtverhältnis Zwischen Partei und Fraktion*, Cologne: Heymanns, 1973.
27. Hans-Jürgen Hess, *Innerparteiliche Gruppierungen*, Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1984, pp. 17–28, for a discussion of a variety of theories on the advantages and disadvantages of intraparty competition.
28. Thomas Koelble, “Party Activists, Trade Unionists, and Politicians,” *Comparative Politics* 19, no. 3, April 1987, p. 253.
29. Ibid., p. 261.
30. Kogan and Kogan, *The Battle for the Labour Party*, pp. 25–27.

31. Ibid., p. 23.
32. Interview with Vera and Vladimir Derer, CLPD organizers, London, March 3, 1986.
33. It is not known exactly how many direct members the party had since there are no reliable figures. See Paul Whiteley, *The Labour Party in Crisis*, London: Methuen, 1983, p. 56.
34. Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats*, p. 39.
35. National Executive Committee Majority and Minority Reports, *Investigation into the Liverpool District Labour Party*, Labour Party document, February 1986. In this case the Annual Conference adopted the recommendations of the majority and expelled a number of militant activists from the Labour Party.
36. SDA expulsions occurred after 1981 when the SDP formed, but a number of Social Democrats refused to leave the party, despite supporting Social Democrats in their quest for office.
37. Karl-Heinrich Hasenritter, "Parteiordnungsmassnahmen und innerparteiliche Demokratie," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, April 10, 1982, p. 22.
38. Interview with Irmgard Heydorn, *Links*, November 1986, p. 30.
39. McKenzie, *British Political Parties*, p. 519.

## Chapter 5: Electoral Strategy and Policy Choice

1. Adam Przeworski, "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon," *New Left Review*, July–August, 1980.
2. Ibid., pp. 27–28.
3. Ibid., p. 31.
4. Ibid.
5. Carl Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905–1917*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955, pp. 37–42.
6. Roger Moore, *The Emergence of the Labour Party, 1880–1924*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978.
7. Peter A. Hall, ed., *The Political Power of Economic Ideas*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989.
8. Przeworski, "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon," pp. 57–58.
9. Mark Kesselman, "Prospects for Democratic Socialism in Advanced Capitalism," *Politics and Society* 11, no. 4, 1982, p. 402.
10. Ibid., p. 403.
11. Claus Offe and Helmut Wessenthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action," in Maurice Zeitlin, ed., *Political Power and Social Theory*, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 1980.
12. Sven Steinmo, "Social Democracy vs. Socialism," *Politics and Society* 16, no. 4, 1988, p. 438.

13. Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Politics against Markets*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985.
14. Detlef Lehnert, *Sozialdemokratie zwischen Protestbewegung und Regierungspartei, 1848–1983*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983, p. 189.
15. Peter Glotz, *Der Weg der Sozialdemokratie*, Vienna: Fritz Molden, 1975, pp. 178–79.
16. Otto Kirchheimer, "Germany: The Vanishing Opposition," in R. Dahl, ed., *Political Opposition in Western Democracies*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966, p. 292.
17. Jürgen Dittberner, "Das Parteiensystem zwischen 1949–61," in Dieter Staritz, ed., *Das Parteiensystem der BRD*, 2d ed., Opladen: Leske, 1980, p. 145.
18. Ibid., p. 150.
19. Karlheinz Schonauer, *Die ungeliebten Kinder der Mutter SPD*, Bonn: Schonauer, 1982, p. 75.
20. Dittberner, "Das Parteiensystem zwischen 1949–61," p. 150.
21. Schonauer, *Die ungeliebten Kinder der Mutter SPD*, p. 114, on the refusal of Marxist groups in the SPD to accept its defense and economic policies. See also Glotz, *Der Weg der Sozialdemokratie*, p. 111, where the author suggests that those who do not share the "minimal consensus" of the Godesberg Programm on social democracy have no place in the party.
22. Lewis Minkin, *The Labour Party Annual Conference*, Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1980, p. 278; and Paul Whiteley, *The Labour Party in Crisis*, London: Methuen, 1983, pp. 59–61.
23. Samuel Beer, *Modern British Politics*, New York: W. H. Norton, 1982, pp. 198–99.
24. Whiteley, *The Labour Party in Crisis*, pp. 125–26.
25. Ibid., p. 126. See also Seymour M. Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," in M. Dogan and R. Rose, *European Politics: A Reader*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.
26. Whiteley, *The Labour Party in Crisis*, pp. 121–26.
27. Minkin, *The Labour Party Annual Conference*, p. 289.
28. Whiteley, *The Labour Party in Crisis*, p. 126.
29. Peter Gourevitch and Stephen Bornstein, "Unions in a Declining Economy," in Peter Gourevitch, Andrew Martin, George Ross, Andrei Markovits, Stephen Bornstein, and Chris Allen, *Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and Sweden*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1984, pp. 70–73.
30. Bodo Zeuner, "Das Parteiensystem in der Grossen Koalition," in Staritz, *Das Parteiensystem der BRD*, pp. 174–93.
31. Kurt Shell, "Extraparliamentary Opposition in Postwar Germany," *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 4, July 1970.
32. Zeuner, "Das Parteiensystem in der Grossen Koalition," p. 189.



33. Lehnert, *Sozialdemokratie zwischen Protestbewegung*, p. 200, suggests that the 1969 election results reflected a "pro-Schiller" vote.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 202–3.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 203; and see also Gerard Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats: 1969–1982*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983, pp. 269–71.
36. Lehnert, *Sozialdemokratie zwischen Protestbewegung*, p. 206.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 207. See also Manfred G. Schmidt, "Die Politik der Inneren Reformen in der BRD 1969–76," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 19, no. 2, June 1978.
38. Andrei Markovits and Chris Allen, "Trade Unions and Economic Crisis: The West German Case," in Gourevitch et al., *Unions and Economic Crisis*, pp. 131–33.
39. Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats*, p. 12.
40. Lehnert, *Sozialdemokratie zwischen Protestbewegung*, p. 204.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Andrei Markovits, ed., *The Political Economy of West Germany: Modell Deutschland*, New York: Praeger, 1982.
43. Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats*, pp. 230–32.
44. Karl-Werner Brand, Detlef Büsser, Dieter Rucht, *Aufbruch in eine andere Gesellschaft: Neue Soziale Bewegungen in der BRD*, Frankfurt: Campus, 1984.
45. Manfred G. Schmidt, "Die Politik der CDU/CSU und der SPD Regierungen," in Joachim Raschke, ed., *Bürger und Parteien*, Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1984.
46. Peter Katzenstein, *Policy and Politics in West Germany*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987, pp. 131–48.
47. Jürgen Hoffmann, "SPD Wirtschaftspolitik—Am Ende des Keynesianischen Projektes," in Bodo Zeuner, ed., *Genossen—Was Nun?* Hamburg: Konkret, 1983, p. 132.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 132; and see also Lehnert, *Sozialdemokratie zwischen Protestbewegung*, p. 211.
49. Katzenstein, *Policy and Politics in West Germany*, p. 263.
50. Jürgen Hoffmann, "Gewerkschaftspolitik in den 80er Jahren," *Prokla* 64, no. 3, September 1986.
51. Doug Webber, "Combatting and Acquiescing in Unemployment? Economic Management in Sweden and West Germany," *West European Politics* 6, no. 1, January 1983.
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53. Peter Hall, *Governing the Economy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 94.
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55. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
57. Minkin, *The Labour Party Annual Conference*, p. 330.
58. Gourevitch and Bornstein, "Unions in a Declining Economy," p. 41.
59. Geoff Hodgson, *Labour at the Crossroads*, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981, p. 229.
60. Gourevitch and Bornstein, "Unions in a Declining Economy," p. 45.
61. David Kogan and Maurice Kogan, *The Battle for the Labour Party*, London: Kogan Page, 1982, p. 23.
62. Hodgson, *Labour at the Crossroads*, p. 102.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
64. Hall, *Governing the Economy*, 1986, p. 94.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
66. Gourevitch and Bornstein, "Unions in a Declining Economy," p. 56.
67. David Coates and Gordon Johnston, *Socialist Strategies*, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983.
68. David Denver, "Great Britain: From Opposition with a Capital O to Fragmented Opposition," in Eva Kolinsky, ed., *Opposition in Western Europe*, London: Croom Helm, 1987, p. 83.
69. Thomas Koelble, "Trade Unionists, Party Activists, and Politicians," *Comparative Politics* 19, no. 3, April 1987, p. 260.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
71. Stephen Padgett, "The West German Social Democrats in Opposition 1982–86," *West European Politics* 10, no. 3, July 1987.
72. Johannes Rau, "Wir wollen klare Verhältnisse," in Wolfram Bickerich, ed., *SPD und Grüne*, Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1985, p. 233.
73. A superficial count of leftists at the 1984 elections to the party executive puts the number of leftists at seven (Engholm, Eppler, Matthiesen, Lafontaine, Von Oertzen, Wiczorek-Zeul, Scherf, Voigt) with some further six to seven "left-leaning" members (Ehmke, Klose, Vitt, Wettig-Danielmeier, Daeubler-Gmelin, Roth, Ristock).
74. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, September 14, 1988.
75. Heinrich Siegmann, *The Conflicts Between Labor and Environmentalism in the FRG and US*, New York: St. Martin's, 1985.
76. Chris Allen, "Trade Unions, Worker Participation, and Flexibility," *Comparative Politics* 22, no. 3, April 1990. Also Peter Glotz, *Schriftlicher Bericht des Bundesgeschäftsführer zum Nürnberger Parteitag der SPD 1986*, Bonn: SPD, August 1986. Also see *Frankfurter Rundschau*, "Deutliche Kurskorrekturen sind unerlässlich," September 1, 1986.

77. Padgett, "The West German Social Democrats in Opposition," p. 340.
78. Ute Obermeyer, *Das Nein der SPD—Eine neue Ära?*, Marburg: Arbeiterbewegung und Gesellschaftswissenschaft, 1985.
79. Padgett, "The West German Social Democrats in Opposition," p. 340.
80. "Frauen in der SPD: Langsam aber sicher an die Spitze," *Sozial-Demokratisches Magazin*, October 1985, pp. 8–9.
81. *Vorwärts*, January 28, 1989.
82. For a detailed account of the reselection issue see Alison Young, *The Reselection of MPs*, London: Heinemann, 1983.
83. Interview with Vera and Vladimir Derer, London, March 3, 1986.
84. Kogan and Kogan, *The Battle for the Labour Party*, p. 83.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
86. Ian Bradley, *Breaking the Mould?* Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981, pp. 99–119.
87. John Bochel and David Denver, "Candidates Selection in the Labour Party," *British Journal of Political Science* 13, no. 1, January 1983.
88. Eric Shaw, *Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.
89. Francis Cripps, John Griffiths, Frances Morrell, Jimmy Reid, Peter Townsend, and Stuart Weir, *Manifesto: A Radical Strategy for Britain's Future*, London: Pan Books, 1981.
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92. *The Financial Times*, September 4, 1989.
93. Patrick Dunleavy and Christopher T. Husbards, *British Democracy at the Crossroads*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1985, p. 24.
94. *The Times*, October 4, 1988.
95. *The Financial Times*, May 21, 1990.
96. Labour Party, *Meet the Challenge: Make the Change: Final Report of Labour's Policy Review for the 1990s*, London: Labour Party, 1990.

## Chapter 6: Intraparty Groups and Strategies to Win Power

1. Detlef Lehnert, *Sozialdemokratie zwischen Protestbewegung und Regierungspartei 1848–1983*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983.
2. Lewis Minkin, *The Labour Party Annual Conference*, Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1980, p. 278; and also Paul Whiteley, *The Labour Party in Crisis*, London: Methuen, 1983.

3. Carl Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905–1917*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955.
4. Lehnert, *Sozialdemokratie zwischen Protestbewegung*, p. 191.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
6. Hans-Jürgen Hess, *Innerparteiliche Gruppierungen*, Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1984.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 36–50.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 36–50.
10. Peter Glotz, *Der Weg der Sozialdemokratie*, Vienna: Fritz Molden, 1975, pp. 178–79, 11.
11. Karlheinz Schonauer, *Die ungeliebten Kinder der Mutter SPD*, Bonn: Schonauer, 1982, p. 114.
12. Dieter Stephan, *Jungsozialisten: Stabilisierung nach langer Krise?* Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 22.
13. Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970.
14. Minkin, *The Labour Party Annual Conference*, p. 322.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 316–24.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 322.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, p. 278.
20. Kurt Shell, "Extraparliamentary Opposition in Postwar Germany," *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 4, July 1970.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 659.
22. Horst Mahler, *Die Krise der ausserparlamentarischen Opposition und wie man sie überwindet*, Berlin, pamphlet, 1968.
23. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, March 25–26, 1972.
24. Stephan, *Jungsozialisten*, p. 27.
25. Schonauer, *Die ungeliebten Kinder der Mutter SPD*, p. 239.
26. Interview with Manfred Jena, October 28, 1985. Also interview with August Haussleiter, October 8, 1985.
27. Hess, *Innerparteiliche Gruppierungen*, p. 131. See also Hans Jochen Vogel, *Die Amtskette: Meine zwölf Münchner Jahre*, Munich: Süddeutscher, 1972, p. 213. The Munich subdistrict changed its constitution to limit voting decisions to any time before but not after 11 P.M., in order to avoid filibustering.
28. Interview with Jena, October 28, 1985, who suggested that the Juso strategy was designed to push opponents out of the party.
29. Micheal T. Greven, "Grenzen der Handlungsfähigkeit und Krise des Politischen Konsens," in Bodo Zeuner, ed., *Genossen—Was Nun?* Hamburg: Konkret, 1983, p. 55.



30. Sylvia Streeck and Wolfgang Streeck, *Parteiensystem und Status Quo*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972, p. 56.
31. For the national level see Gerard Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats: 1969–1982*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982, p. 40. For the Munich level see Peter Glotz, "Anatomie einer politischen Partei in einer Millionenstadt," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, October 11, 1975, p. 34, where Glotz shows that between 1968 and 1974 the percentage of students in the party went up from 6 to 15 percent, the percentage of workers fell from 23 to 18 percent, and that of civil servants stayed constant at 44 percent.
32. Volker Häse and Peter Müller, "Die Jungsozialisten in der SPD," in J. Dittberner and R. Ebbighausen, eds., *Parteiensystem in der Legitimationskrise*, Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1973, p. 280.
33. Interview with Jena, October 28, 1985.
34. Manfred Jena and Michael Wendt, "Bewegungslos zwischen Korporatismus and Ökosozialismus," in Klaus Thüsing, Arno Klönne, and Karl-Ludwig Hesse, *Zukunft SPD: Aussichten linker Politik in der Sozialdemokratie*, Frankfurt: VSA, 1981, p. 133.
35. Volker Brandes, "Gewerkschaften, Atomenergie, und die Anti-AKW-Bewegung," in Otto Jacobi, Walter Müller-Jentsch, and Eberhard Schmidt, eds., *Gewerkschaftspolitik in der Krise: Kritische Gewerkschaftsjahrbuch 1977/78*, Berlin: Rotbuch, 1978.
36. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, *Innerparteiliche Gruppierungen in der SPD*, Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1982.
37. Minkin, *The Labour Party Annual Conference*, pp. 328–34.
38. The variety of leftist groupings in the Labour Party is astounding. To classify all of these groups is a monumental task and has led to divergences in categorization. See Alan Ward, *Consensus and Beyond*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982, who distinguishes between social reformers (social democrats), fundamentalists (the Tribune Group around Tony Benn), and collectivist-technocrats (such as Harold Wilson). Phillip Williams, "The Labour Party: The Rise of the Left," *West European Politics* 6, no. 4, October 1983, offers a different classification. He divides the party into minimalists and maximalists whom he defines as the Trotskyist section of the party. He claims that the maximalists have taken over a significant section of the local parties. David Webster, *The Labour Party and the New Left*, Fabian Tract no. 477, 1981, distinguishes between ultra-democrats (the Bennites), the Trotskyists, and social democrats. All of these classifications run into problems with hybrid groups and shifting positions on a number of issues. Yet the important comparative point is that Labour never purged itself of the left as did the SPD after 1959.
39. John Gyford, *The Politics of Local Socialism*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1985, p. 18.

40. Whiteley, *The Labour Party in Crisis*, p. 55.
41. Gyford, *The Politics of Local Socialism*, pp. 18–19.
42. David Kogan and Maurice Kogan, *The Battle for the Labour Party*, London: Kogan Page, 1982, p. 14.
43. Gyford, *The Politics of Local Socialism*, p. 18.
44. Vladimir Derer, *History of Mandatory Reselection*, London: CLPD pamphlet, 1986, p. 1.
45. Alison Young, *The Reselection of MPs*, London: Heinemann, 1983, pp. 68–83.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 68–74.
47. Interview with Vera and Vladimir Derer, London, March 3, 1986.
48. Interview with Victor Schonfield, London, March 6, 1986.
49. David Kogan and Maurice Kogan, *The Battle for the Labour Party*, London: Kogan Page, 1983, p. 43.
50. Schonfield interview, March 6, 1986.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*
53. CLPD, *Annual General Meeting Report*, 1983, p. 6.
54. Williams, "The Labour Party: The Rise of the Left," p. 39.
55. Derer interview, March 3, 1986.
56. *Ibid.*
57. Derer, *History of Mandatory Reselection*, p. 3.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4.
59. Siegfried Heimann, Gitta Martens, and Peter Müller, "Die Linke in der SPD," *Prokla* 7, no. 3, 1977, pp. 63–64.
60. Labour Party, *Labour Party Annual Conference Report*, London, 1973, pp. 11, 189.
61. Williams, "The Labour Party: The Rise of the Left," pp. 33–34.
62. Müller-Rommel, *Innerparteiliche Gruppierungen in der SPD*, pp. 161–82.
63. *Der Spiegel*, March 21, 1973.
64. Müller-Rommel, *Innerparteiliche Gruppierungen in der SPD*, pp. 86–87.
65. Horst Heimann, *Theoriediskussion in der SPD*, Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1975, p. 169.
66. Karl-Heinrich Hasenritter, "Parteiordnungsmassnahmen und innerparteiliche Demokratie," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, April 10, 1982.
67. Müller-Rommel, *Innerparteiliche Gruppierungen in der SPD*, p. 86.
68. Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats*, pp. 202–10.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 214–15.
70. Heimann, Martens, and Müller, "Die Linke in der SPD," p. 82.
71. Müller-Rommel, *Innerparteiliche Gruppierungen in der SPD*, p. 211.
72. Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats*, pp. 92–101.
73. Georgia Tornow, "Die alte Arbeiterbewegung in der Krise," in Zeuner, ed.,

- Genossen—Was Nun?* p. 76. See also Eberhard Schmidt, "IG Metall: Von der Opposition zur Kooperation," in Otto Jacobi, Walter Müller-Jentsch, and Eberhard Schmidt, eds., *Gewerkschaften und Klassenkampf: Kritisches Jahrbuch* 1972, Frankfurt: Fischer, 1972, p. 69.
74. *Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 18, 1973. See also *Der Spiegel*, August 20, 1973. For a definitive statement on West German unions and their organizational structures see Andrei Markovits, *The Politics of the West German Trade Unions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
  75. Tornow, "Die alte Arbeiterbewegung in der Krise," p. 79.
  76. Walter Müller-Jentsch, "Die spontane Streikbewegung 1973," in Jacobi, Müller-Jentsch, and Eberhard Schmidt, eds., *Gewerkschaften und Klassenkampf: Kritisches Jahrbuch* 1974, pp. 44–53.
  77. Rainer Erd, "Gewerkschaftsausschlüsse in den 70er Jahren," in Jacobi, Müller-Jentsch, and Schmidt, eds., *Gewerkschaften und Klassenkampf*, p. 168.
  78. Bodo Zeuner, "SPD Bindung der Gewerkschaften—Krisenfest," in Zeuner, ed., *Genossen—Was Nun?* p. 95. Also Heimann, Martens, and Müller, "Die Linke in der SPD," p. 73.
  79. Brandes, "Gewerkschaften, Atomenergie, und die Anti-AKW-Bewegung," pp. 199–200.
  80. Andrei Markovits and Chris Allen, "Trade Unions and the Economic Crisis: The West German Case," in Peter Gourevitch, Andrew Martin, George Ross, Andrei Markovits, Stephen Bornstein, and Chris Allen, *Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and Sweden*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1984, p. 172.
  81. Brandes, "Gewerkschaften, Atomenergie, und die Anti-AKW-Bewegung," p. 201.
  82. Thomas Koelble, "Challenges to the Trade Unions," *West European Politics* 11, no. 3, July 1988, p. 96, suggests that even though the German unions opposed the austerity program of the Schmidt government in 1981, it did not break with the SPD leaders as did the British union movement.
  83. Kogan and Kogan, *The Battle for the Labour Party*, p. 43.
  84. Schonfield interview, March 6, 1986.
  85. Kogan and Kogan, *The Battle for the Labour Party*, pp. 94–97.
  86. *Ibid.*, pp. 24–30.
  87. Derer, *History of Mandatory Reselection*, p. 4.
  88. Derer interview, March 3, 1986.
  89. *The Times*, January 8, 1982.
  90. *Ibid.*
  91. Ken Livingstone and Tariq Ali, *Who's Afraid of Margaret Thatcher*, London: Verso, 1984, p. 83.
  92. CLPD, *Bulletin* no. 2, October 1982.

93. *The Times*, December 10, 1985.
94. Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, *Paper Stones*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 41.
95. Surprisingly little has been written on this interest group in contemporary working-class movements. Since such workers have a huge vote in the Labour Party through the union movement, an in-depth study of their policy preferences may well explain the policy decisions and consequent electoral problems of the party. An appropriate label for this group would be "work-erist."
96. For a refinement of this argument about a split of the working class into "winners" and "losers" of the adjustment process, see Thomas Koelble, "Searching for Electoral Victory: The British Labour Party and the West German Social Democrats," manuscript, University of Miami, 1989.
97. Herbert Kitschelt, "Structure, Interests, and Ideas in the Analysis of Political Parties," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1988, where Kitschelt refers to this constituency as "left-libertarian."
98. Wolfram Bickerich, ed., *SPD und Grüne*, Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1985, presents a collection of essays on the topic of whether SPD and Green constituencies can coexist or need to be reintegrated.
99. Labour's policy planners realize the difficulties environmentalism presents. They attempt to address the issue very tentatively in the Labour Party Policy Review, *Meet the Challenge: Make the Change*, London: Labour Party, 1989, pp. 67–79.
100. A well-known political scientist specializing on the Labour Party commented to the author at the 1989 APSA meeting that Labour's Policy Review reads as if "it's Labour's Godesberg Programm."

## Chapter 7: The Impact of the New Left in Two Constituency Parties

1. Thomas Koelble, "Trade Unionists, Party Activists, and Politicians," Ph.D. thesis, University of California, San Diego, 1987.
2. Sylvia Streeck and Wolfgang Streeck, *Parteiensystem und Status Quo*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972, p. 55.

Communal election results:

	1952	1959	1960	1966
SPD (city council)	38.7	43.1	53.1	58.4
SPD (mayor)	60.9	58.3	64.2	78.0



3. John Gyford, *The Politics of Local Socialism*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1985, p. 25. See also Chris Mullin, "Bermondsey Days," *New Socialist*, January/February 1982, p. 18.
4. John E. Turner, *London's Doorstep Politics*, London: MacMillan, 1974, pp. 132–35.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 117–18.
6. Hans Jochen Vogel, *Die Amtskette: Meine zwölf Münchner Jahre*, Munich: Süddeutscher, 1972, p. 19, describes the close personal friendship between Vogel and DGB leader Koch.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 95–132, describes the efforts to bring the Olympics to Munich.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
9. Peter Glotz, "Anatomie einer politischen Partei in einer Millionenstadt," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, October 4, 11, 1975.
10. Turner, *London's Doorstep Politics*, p. 158.
11. Paul Whiteley, *The Labour Party in Crisis*, Methuen: London, 1983.
12. Gyford, *The Politics of Local Socialism*, p. 23.
13. Interview with John O'Grady, April 28, 1986. See also Georg Kronawitter, *Mit allen Kniffen und Listen*, Vienna: Fritz Molden, 1979, p. 26. Both social democratic politicians made the same argument about the party functioning as a working-class social club.
14. Streeck and Streeck, *Parteiensystem und Status Quo*, p. 57; and also interview with Peter Tatchell, April 15, 1986.
15. Interviews with Günter Giersch, October 7, 1985, and Manfred Jena, October 28, 1985; and also conversations with Karlheinz Schonauer, January 1986.
16. Kronawitter, *Mit allen Kniffen und Listen*, p. 32.
17. The process is referred to as "Kippen" or to overthrow the executive, and is described by both Kronawitter as well as Hess's account of Berlin politics in Hans-Jürgen Hess, *Innerparteiliche Gruppierungen*, Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1984.
18. Ursula Feist and Klaus Liepelt, "New Elites in Old Politics: Observations on the Side Effects of German Educational Reform," *International Political Science Review* 4, no. 1, 1983.
19. Interview with August Haussleiter, October 8, 1985.
20. Glotz, "Anatomie einer politischen Partei in einer Millionenstadt," p. 34.
21. Streeck and Streeck, *Parteiensystem und Status Quo*, p. 57.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
23. The Vogel group and the Jusos began to organize their own secret meetings to discuss strategy. Streeck and Streeck, *Parteiensystem und Status Quo*, pp. 84–90.
24. *Münchner Stadtanzeiger*, March 17, 1972, where the press echo to the

elections is discussed. The reactions are all the same: the SPD Jusos are responsible for the SPD losses.

25. Vogel, *Die Amtskette*, p. 228.
26. *Münchner Stadtanzeiger*, July 9, 1971; and see also *Zürcher Zeitung*, January 20, 1972. Vogel, *Die Amtskette*, p. 240.
27. Juso support for citizen initiatives is first reported as a major phenomenon by *Der Spiegel*, November 20, 1972. See also Streeck and Streeck, *Parteiensystem und Status Quo*, pp. 78–79.
28. Campaign for Homes in Central London, *Priced out of Town*, London: CHICL, 1986, pp. 14–16. See also Steve Platt, “Return to Broadwater Farm,” *New Socialist*, April 1986; and the *Evening Standard*, November 30, 1973.
29. Greater London Council, *Annual Report 1984–85*, London: City Hall, 1986, p. 84.
30. Interview with Ted Bowman, April 16, 1986.
31. Interview with George Nicholson, April 30, 1986.
32. Letter to author from Ted Bowman, July 7, 1986.
33. Nicholson interview, April 30, 1986.
34. Bowman interview, April 16, 1986.
35. O’Grady interview April 28, 1986.
36. Nicholson interview, April 30, 1986.
37. O’Grady interview, April 28, 1986.
38. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, January 19, 1972. Erwin Essl was appointed to the subdistrict executive committee with the help of the Jusos in an attempt to split the union movement. Essl, a long-time leftist in the IG Metall, was chosen over Ludwig Koch, Vogel’s friend and political supporter.
39. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, March 25–26, 1972; and also *Münchner Stadtanzeiger*, March 17, 1972. Müller was in the news at both local and national levels for his opposition to Brandt on Ostpolitik and his clashes with the Jusos in Munich.
40. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, November 8–9, 1972; and also *Münchner Stadtanzeiger*, November 8, 1972.
41. *Der Spiegel*, July 9, 1973; and also interview with Jürgen Giersch, November 26, 1985.
42. *Münchner Stadtanzeiger*, January 15, 1972, Munich Landtag districts and SPD share of the vote in percentages:

1974	SPD	40.1	CSU	48.4
1970	SPD	47.6	CSU	38.6
1966	SPD	48.4	CSU	31.9
1962	SPD	46.4	CSU	35.7

43. *Der Spiegel*, October 14, 1974.
44. *Münchener Stadtanzeiger*, November 18, 1975, reports that members of the Bavarian SPD had accepted that the unification paper had been a failure.
45. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, March 23, 1976; and also *Die Zeit*, March 26, 1976.
46. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 6, 1976.
47. Peter Glotz, *Die Innenausstattung der Macht*, Frankfurt: Fischer, 1981, p. 78. Glotz describes Kronawitter's actions as "Kaputtstrategie."
48. Ursula Feist and Hubert Krieger, "Alte und neue Scheidelinien des politischen Verhaltens," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, March 21, 1987, p. 35.
49. *Abendzeitung*, November 2, 1979 reports on how Kronawitter mobilized one hundred supporters and took over the Neu-Perlach local party. *Münchener Stadtanzeiger*, December 7, 1979, reports that Kronawitter now holds six local parties and will use them as a base for a comeback. See also *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 29, 1980.
50. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, November 12, 1981. As one former SPD activist and now Green Party functionary in Munich put it: "as soon as a crucial election took place, all of these Kronawitter supporters started to crawl out of the woodwork. People who had never been active in the party and whom we never saw again after the election, wandered in and voted for their man."
51. *Münchener Stadtanzeiger*, November 12, 1985.
52. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, April 28, 1984.
53. Peter Tatchell, *The Battle for Bermondsey*, London: Heretic Books, 1983, p. 30.
54. Interviews with Bowman, Nicholson, O'Grady, and Tatchell.
55. Mellish and the Labour leadership, rumor has it, wanted to keep the safe Bermondsey seat free, possibly to give it to Shirley Williams to entice her to stay in the Labour Party. Williams had lost her Stevenage seat in the 1979 elections and was known to be looking for a safer constituency.
56. Tatchell, *The Battle for Bermondsey*, pp. 36–37.
57. Interviews with Bowman, Nicholson, and Tatchell.
58. *New Statesman*, December 11, 1981.
59. *The Times*, December 4, 5, 1981. *The Sunday Times*, December 6, 1981.
60. *The Times*, January 19, 1981.
61. Tatchell, *The Battle for Bermondsey*, p. 43.
62. *New Statesman*, December 11, 1981.
63. *The Sunday Times*, December 6, 1981.
64. *Ibid.*
65. Tatchell interview, April 15, 1986.
66. *The Times*, December 13, 1981.
67. *Ibid.*, December 3, 1981.
68. *Ibid.*, December 16, 1981.

69. Ibid., December 17, 1981.
70. *The Guardian*, December 5, 1981.
71. *The Times*, January 8, 1982; and *The Guardian*, January 7, 1982, both report that union leaders have expressed anxieties about Labour's inability to attract votes as a result of internal factional struggle.
72. Tatchell, *The Battle for Bermondsey*, p. 87.
73. *The Labour Weekly*, April 23, 1983.
74. *The Guardian*, January 11, 1983.
75. O'Grady interview, April 28, 1986.
76. *The Times* and *The Guardian* throughout February 1983.
77. *The Times*, November 2, 1983.
78. *New Statesman*, February 11, 1983.
79. Streeck and Streeck, *Parteiensystem und Status Quo*, p. 84; and see also Hess, *Innerparteiliche Gruppierungen*, pp. 127-40. In all groups secret meetings were organized to plan strategy and to oust the opposition.

## Chapter 8: Conclusions

1. Wolfgang Merkel, "Decline, Maintenance, or Resurgence?" Paper presented at Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Boston, May 1989.
2. Ellen Commisso, "Crisis in Socialism or Crisis of Socialism?" Paper presented to the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1989.
3. Gosta Esping-Andersen, *Politics against Markets*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985.
4. Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, New York: Free Press, 1962.
5. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965.
6. Alessandro Pizzorno, "Interests and Parties in Pluralism," in Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
7. Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
8. Paul Whiteley, *The Labour Party in Crisis*, London: Methuen, 1983.
9. Thomas Koelble, "Challenges to the Trade Unions," *West European Politics* 11, no. 3, July 1988.
10. Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York: Harper and Row, 1957, is a fine example of an extremely influential approach to the study of party behavior and absolutely ignores internal decisionmaking.
11. Michels, *Political Parties*, p. 71.
12. Ibid., p. 166.



13. Robert McKenzie, "Power in the Labour Party: The Issue of Intraparty Democracy," in Dennis Kavanagh, ed., *The Politics of the Labour Party*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1982.
14. Panebianco, *Political Parties*, p. xiii.
15. Peter Glotz, "Der Tanker ist kein Surfbrett," in Wolfram Bickerich, ed., *SPD und Grüne*, Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1985.
16. Claus Leggewie, *Die Republikaner*, Berlin: Rotbuch, 1989.
17. *The Financial Times*, June 7, 1990.
18. Joel Krieger, "Class, Consumption, and Collectivism," paper presented to the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1989.
19. Esping-Andersen, *Politics against Markets*, pp. 321-24.

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